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Abstract 
The international investments in the Middle East has increased the level of stock market 
activity, this being the case in Jordan as well. This situation has raised issues of public 
interest. Precisely to what extent are some investors engaging in "insider dealing" and 
thereby making profits not available to others? Considering the threat of insider dealing 
to market integrity and investor confidence, Jordan has, like law-makers and financial 
regulators the world over, brought this issue under the spotlight and imposed a 
prohibition on insider dealing. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that Jordan’s regime is 
neither effective nor enforced. During the last 17 years since the prohibition regime was 
enacted, no cases of insider dealing have been brought before the courts. 
The study therefore explores and evaluates the policy for prohibiting insider dealing and 
market manipulation in Jordan. In particular, it examines why the prohibition was first 
created, and why it was not subsequently enforced. To best approach this important 
question, the study adopts a comparative and analytic methodology, considering both 
the UK and the Jordanian prohibition regimes. It would not be possible to assess the 
Jordanian regime fairly and appropriately unless it was viewed externally and in a larger 
context through the use of a comparative method. This comparative approach focusses 
both on the clarity of the statutory prohibition (the legal rules) in the UK and Jordan, 
and on the effectiveness of the enforcement (the law in action). The outcomes of this 
study are in the form of, on the one hand, suggestions for developing and strengthening 
the Jordanian prohibition regime, and on the other hand, recommendations for more 
effective enforcement of the UK prohibition regime. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction and Methodology 
1.1 General Background 
As a result of the globalization of finance1 and the increase in international investments, 
the level of stock market activity has increased in the Middle East region in general, as 
well as in Jordan.2 This situation has raised issues of public interest: is the stock market 
reflecting the true underlying value and worth of an issuer of securities through the price 
mechanism? And to what extent are some investors engaging in ‘insider dealing’ and 
thereby making profits not available to all others? 
Insider dealing can be defined as: the trading in a company’s (or other issuer’s) 
securities (e.g. shares, bonds, or stock options) by individuals with access to, or 
possessing non-public information relating to that company or issuer, which may, if 
more generally known, affect the relevant securities’ price. 
Law-makers and financial regulators throughout the world have now brought this issue 
into the spotlight, have imposed prohibitions on insider dealing, and consider it to be an 
abuse of the stock market, which harms both society and individuals, by decreasing 
market accuracy and transparency.3 
Insider dealing has been debated4 mainly on two levels:
5 
1) Is it fair to trade when participants are not equally informed? 
2) Is it economically efficient to permit insider dealing? 
The bulk of the literature characterises insider dealing as an immoral, unfair and 
harmful practice, damaging investors’ confidence in the financial markets. Furthermore, 
                                                     
1
 See generally: Steinberg M I, International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative Analysis 
(Kluwer Law International, 1999). Also see, Zufferey J B, Regulations of Trading Systems on Financial 
Markets (Kluwer Law International, 1997)  
2
 According to the statistics of Amman Securities Exchange (ASE): In January 2006, shares owned by 
non-Jordanians represented 44.5% of ASE capitalization, 35.4% of which were owned by Arab investors 
and 9.1% by non-Arabs. While in September 2009, shares owned by non-Jordanians represented 48.7% 
of AES capitalization, 33.6% of which were owned by Arab investors and 14.7% by non-Arabs. This 
information is available at:  <www.ase.jo/pages.php?menu_id>   
3
 Rob M, ‘The flaw at the heart of Europe’s insider dealing’, (2003) 34 Euromoney 34. Available at: 
<http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1002679/The-flaw-at-the-heart-of-Europes-insider-dealing-
laws.html> Accessed 1/10/2010.  Also see, The Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Revenue tackles insider 
dealing’ (2005) 125 Accountancy 9  
4
 See the debate over insider dealing in details in Chapter 2, Sec.3  
5
 Leland H E, ‘Insider Trading: should it be prohibited?’ (1992) 100  Journal of Political Economy 859  
2 
scholars justify the prohibition of insider dealing on a number of grounds:
6
 mainly that 
it harms investors, and consequently undermines their confidence in the market; also 
that it harms issuers of the affected securities and affects the market's integrity.7 Thus it 
should be regulated effectively. 
By contrast, other scholars argue that insider dealing should be deregulated, and that it 
should be left to corporations to protect their inside information by means of contracts 
and policies. Others argue that insider dealing should be decriminalized, and thereby 
made a civil wrong, settled between affected parties without the intervention of criminal 
law.8 The problem with this argument is that it would be difficult to determine the 
affected parties. The impersonal nature of market transactions makes it difficult to 
identify parties injured by insider dealing, or establish a causal link between the 
transaction and any resultant damages. 
Economists, however, argue that insider trading is the best, if not the only, method of 
compensating corporate investors adequately. Manne
9  contends that insider dealing 
benefits markets and firms in whose securities the insider dealt, because: 
1) Insider dealing moves the market for a particular security towards the price that 
the security would reach if the inside information were publicly disclosed. 
2) Insider dealing is considered to be an efficient compensation mechanism for 
managers who produce valuable information.10 
Insider dealing has given rise to a significant volume of academic material on the 
rationale for its prohibition, on evaluating its effects, and on the question of whether 
legal regulation has succeeded in reducing its incidence. 
1.2 Brief Review of the Law in Relevant Jurisdictions 
The United States was in the vanguard in prohibiting insider dealing, which it saw as 
trading in securities based on material, non-public information. 11  Numerous other 
                                                     
6
 Bainbridge S M, ‘Insider Trading: An Overview’, (1998) University of California, Los Angeles-School 
of Law <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=132529> Accessed 9
th
 November 2009  
7
 Karnell E, ‘White-collar crime and European financial crisis: getting tough on EU market abuse’ (2012) 
37 European Law Review 481. Karnell stated that market integrity, commonly, is negatively defined as 
“the extent to which investors engage in prohibited trading behaviour”.   
8
 Hutchinson A, ‘The Case of Decriminalizing Insider Dealing’ (1990) 11 Economic Affairs Journal 45   
9
 Manne H, ‘In defence of Insider Trading’, (1966) 44  Harvard Business Review 113    
10
 Ibid.   
11
 Avgouleas E, The mechanics and regulation of market abuse - A legal and economic analysis (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 196. Avgouleas gave the example of the US insider dealing regime prominence by 
citing how it was adopted, in a varying degree, by the EU Insider Dealing Directive of 1989.   
3 
countries have since followed in its wake. Currently, there are three basic situations 
where the US law sees insider dealing as illegitimate:12 
1) the “disclose or abstain” rule;13 and 
2) the misappropriation theory,14 both of which were created by courts under Section 
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934,15 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; 
3) trading based on information relating to a tender offer,16 which came about later, 
when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 14e-3, to 
prohibit insider trading. 
Likewise, the United Kingdom has criminalized insider dealing since 1980, in the 
Companies Act (CA of 1980), Part V, sections 69-73. 17  These provisions were 
subsequently consolidated in the Companies Act of 1985 (CA of 1985), then amended 
by the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA of 1986).18 The impetus for further reform 
came from the European Community (EC) Directive of 1989, which was implemented 
in Part V of the Criminal Justice Act of 1993 (CJA of 1993). 
However, activities and behaviours in the market continued to violate the spirit of these 
laws, and undermined investors' confidence, despite falling short of criminal behaviour 
under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA of 1993). This explains the decision to use Part 
VIII of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA of 2000), to create a bespoke 
regime that employed civil regulatory sanctions against behaviour which fell short of 
the criminal law, but was judged to be abusive or manipulative of the market. 
                                                     
12
 Bainbridge S M, ‘Insider Trading: An overview’ (n 6) 
13
 The US began prohibiting insider trading from the case SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833 
(2
nd
 Cir 1968) which put the rule of equality of access to information, i.e. anyone possessing material 
non-public information is obliged either to disclose it before trading or abstain from trading.    
14
 This theory was raised by Chief Justice Burger. The theory required, like the disclose or abstain rule, a 
breach of fiduciary duty before trading on inside information, but the insider did not need to owe a 
fiduciary duty to the issuer of the securities that were traded, nor to the investor whom he traded with. 
The theory applies when the insider violates a fiduciary duty owed to the source of information (see; US v 
O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) where the court stated that this theory was designed to protect 
market integrity against outsiders’ abuse.). See, Bainbridge S M, ‘Insider dealing: An overview’ (n 6)  
15
 Full articles of the Act and the court’s decisions are at: <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf> 
Accessed 17 November 2009  
16
 The rule prohibits insiders of the bidder from disclosing information about a tender offer, and also 
prohibits any person possessing material information relating to a tender offer by another person from 
trading in the target company securities. This prohibition is effective only when the bidding commences 
or any steps have started towards commencing it.  
17
 Barnes P, ‘The regulations of insider dealing in the U K: some empirical evidence concerning share 
prices, merger bids and bidders’ advising merchant banks’ (1996) 6  Applied Financial Economics 383  
18
 Speech by Margaret Cole, then the FSA Director of Enforcement, at the London School of Economics, 
‘Insider Dealing in the City’ 17 Mar 2007. At: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0317_mc.shtml> Accessed 
1/6/2013 
4 
Among many other changes which it introduced, FSMA 2000 gave the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the financial regulator at the time, a wide range of rule-
making, investigatory, and enforcement powers, including the ability to prosecute 
offenders for breaches of the criminal law of insider dealing, and to impose civil 
penalties on those engaged in it – including fines and restrictions on their activities. As a 
consequence, action in respect of insider dealing can be brought on either a criminal or 
civil basis, although the definitions of what is prohibited behaviour differ between the 
criminal regime, the CJA of 1993, and the civil market abuse regime in Part VIII FSMA 
200019. 
In addition, there have been international moves to promote higher standards of 
securities regulation, and maintain just and efficient markets. These moves have been 
led by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)20, which, via 
its member agencies, has resolved to: 
1) exchange information to promote the development of domestic markets; 
2) harness the efforts of its member agencies to establish effective standards for 
international securities transactions; 
3) promote the integrity of markets by effective application and enforcement of those 
standards.21 
The European Commission has also had a role in promoting and regulating financial 
markets, aiming to provide maximum harmonization in the markets of EU countries. 
The Commission recently reviewed evidence for the application of the Market Abuse 
Directive (2003/6/EC) (MAD), which aims to ensure that behaviours such as insider 
dealing and market manipulation are deterred.22 The review resulted in the adoption, in 
2011, of the Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and 
                                                     
19
 On the 6
th
 of May 1998, The Chief Secretary announced a package of measures to tackle market abuse. 
Tough new powers were set out to help the FSA tackle market abuse and financial crime. The proposed 
package included: giving power to the FSA to prosecute cases of insider dealing and market 
manipulation; the power to levy fines; a new civil regime for combating market abuse; a code of market 
conduct to be produced by the FSA to defined unacceptable behaviours in the market. <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_69_89.htm> Accessed 17 November 2009. Also, the same proposed package was 
included in the FSA 10
th
 CP, ‘Market abuse Part I: Consultation on Draft Code of Market Conduct’, 6 
Nov 1998 <http://fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp10pdf> Accessed 13 November 2009 
20
 OICU-IOSCO, Insider Trading, How jurisdictions regulate it: Report of the Emerging Markets 
Committee of International Organization of Securities Commissions 2003 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD145.pdf>  Accessed 13 November 2009  
21
 <http://www.iosco.org/about> Accessed 18 November 2009  
22
 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-IP/09/>  Accessed 18 November 2009  
5 
Market Manipulation. 23  The EC proposal was intended to strengthen the existing 
framework, provided by the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) (2003/6/EC), and ensure 
market integrity and investor confidence. 24  For this reason, the proposed Directive 
introduced criminal sanctions, not just for insider dealing, but also for abusive 
behaviours (market manipulation).25 
Jordan has only recently begun to regulate insider dealing, and this thesis will argue that 
its regime is neither effective nor enforced. In 1997, the Securities Law (SL of 1997) 
was enacted, which prohibits insider dealing and renders it a criminal offence. 26 
Contemporaneously, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) was established as a 
public institution, to develop, regulate and monitor Jordan's capital market,27 and to 
maintain a sound investment environment and protect investors. The SL of 1997 was 
amended in 2002, giving greater authority to the JSC. Pursuant to its rule-making 
authority under the Securities Law of 2002 (SL of 2002), the JSC issued by-laws to 
monitor the market for insider dealing, market manipulation and other breaches. 28 
Despite the significant improvements in the SL of 2002, insider dealing still persists. 
The evidence for this is to be found in the fluctuation in securities prices over recent 
years.29 Nor did the JSC issue sufficient instructions in furtherance of the ban on insider 
dealing,30 introduced with the SL of 2002. Also, the thesis contends that, at the date of 
this study, no cases of insider dealing have been brought before the courts. The 
objective of the study, therefore, will be to look at ways to develop and strengthen the 
                                                     
23
 EC Press Release, ‘Getting tough on insider dealing and market manipulation’, 20/10/2011.  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1217_en.htm?locale=en> Accessed 1/4/2012  
24
 Amended proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider 
dealing and market manipulation, COM (2012) 420 Final, 2011/0279 (COD), Brussels 25/7/2012.  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/COM_2012_420_en.pdf> Accessed 1/2/2013  
25
 Karnell (n 7)  
26
 <http://www.jsc.gov.jo/public/mainenglish> Accessed 11/2/2011 
27
 This market is the only organized securities market in Jordan, established in 1978. 
<http://www.ase.com.jo> Accessed 1/4/2013 
28
 <http://www.imcan.jo/usefulinformation/FAQs/Regulation/tabid/99/Default.aspx> Accessed 5/10/2009  
29
 See more at: <http://www.ase.com.jo/bulletin/yearly/English_2008_new.html> Accessed 27/10/2009. 
There is no definite evidence that the crisis in the Amman Stock Exchange which happened in 2008 
resulted from insider dealing. However, the crisis was not something normal for the market, and many 
press releases discussed it, as well as the Parliament. It was reported on the Jordan Times newspaper on 
10 November 2008: ‘MPs called for holding accountable those state agencies that perceptibly failed to 
carry out their duties in protecting citizens and their money…’ 
<http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=11992> Accessed 4
th
 November 2009. Also, it was 
reported in the same newspaper on 17 November 2009; ‘Analysts want the government to step in and stop 
the ‘bleeding’ as the share price index of ASE shed about 16 per cent over the past six trading days…’  
<http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=12162>  Accessed 4 Nov 2009     
30
 This has been recommended since 2005. See: Kulczak Michael, ‘Instructions on trading violations and 
burden of proof - Final report’ 2005, Assessment of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) in collaboration with the USAID Jordan. (hereinafter, Kulczak NASD Assessment of Jordan) at 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF324.pdf> Accessed 5/10/2011   
6 
regulatory structure of Jordanian law, as well as to recommend more effective means of 
enforcement. 
1.3 Research Aims and Objective 
The aims of this study are to: 
1) Identify the underlying policy for prohibiting insider dealing and market 
manipulation in Jordan – in particular, to find out why prohibition was established 
in the first place, and why it was not enforced. This broad question will be 
approached in different ways, by looking at: the clarity of legal rules and their 
prohibition ambit; the efficacy of the financial regulator; and the financial 
regulator’s approach to regulation and enforcement. 
2) Assess the UK prohibition regime, and find out to what extent it is effective in 
combatting insider dealing and market abuse. 
The objective of this study is to present a comparative-analysis of the UK and Jordanian 
legal and regulatory regimes for insider dealing and market abuse, which were both 
introduced to tackle misleading, manipulative, unfair and fraudulent practices in the 
financial markets. 
The study starts by identifying how each regime uses insider dealing laws to underpin 
securities regulations objective relating to investor protection, and ensure that markets 
are fair, efficient and transparent. Both regimes are then critically analysed, to assess 
their weaknesses, and to make appropriate recommendations for further improvements 
where necessary. 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
The potential scope of this study, as its title indicates, is very broad. Regimes to counter 
insider dealing, market manipulation and market abuse are, of necessity, very extensive, 
as they must encompass elements of the legal framework, the financial regulator, and 
supervisory and enforcement processes which support regulatory goals (to maintain 
market integrity and investor confidence).31 
                                                     
31
 Carvajal A and Elliot J, ‘The challenges of enforcement in securities markets: Mission impossible’ 
(2009) IMF Working Paper WP/09/168, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09168.pdf> 
Accessed 1/5/2013   
7 
It is unrealistic for this study to attempt to examine such extensive regimes 
exhaustively. The study focusses, therefore, on those issues that best serve to answer the 
Research Questions in Section 1.5. Those questions are designed to achieve the aims of 
this study (Section 1.3), and, at the same time, to limit its scope. 
1.5 Research Questions 
In approaching Research Questions, certain criteria are employed to serve the 
comparative-analytical nature of this study. These criteria are presented in section 1.6, 
Research Methodology. 
The initial rationale for conducting this comparative study was the weak 
implementation, to date, of the Jordanian regime. The lack of enforcement action also 
raises issues about its effectiveness. The UK regime for tackling market misconduct 
under the criminal and civil regimes, provide a comparator model that can shed light on 
the analysis of the Jordanian prohibition regime. 
This thesis therefore asks the following Research Questions: 
1) Why was insider dealing prohibited in Jordan? 
Was it because legislators considered it an offence which would harm the 
economic interests and confidence of investors, and hence affect their 
participation in the market? Or was it prohibited as a consequence of the 
globalization of financial markets, which Jordan is keen to be part of? In other 
words, has Jordan amended its financial law in order to satisfy international 
standards for global financial markets, without paying sufficient attention to 
making that law effective? 
2) Is the recently introduced Jordanian law effective? 
Is there any enforcement of the law? If so, why are no cases brought to court? 
Do judges settle these cases using alternative dispute resolution? If there is no 
enforcement, what are the underlying factors that are hindering enforcement? 
3) After decades of prohibiting insider dealing, has the UK legal framework 
succeeded in tackling insider dealing and market abuse effectively? If so, has 
this been achieved through the criminal or civil regime? In other words, which 
regime provided better level of credible deterrence? 
 
8 
4) Does this comparative study of the UK and Jordanian law, afford any insights 
that could lead to recommendations for improvements to Jordanian law? 
1.6 Research Methodology 
An understanding of the research methodology used for this thesis, and why it was 
chosen, will help to explain those aspects of the subject which were addressed, as well 
as the approach adopted.32 Examining the insider dealing and market abuse regimes in 
two different jurisdictions, requires the adoption of a critical, comparative-analytical 
method. The essence of comparative-analysis is to look at two legal systems, assessing 
each and then aligning similarities and differences
33
. In doing this, the UK and Jordan 
prohibition regimes are juxtaposed, first to reach an understanding of the content and 
ambit of both, then to gain insights into the Jordanian regime. A comparative-analysis 
like this offers more than an analysis focussed on the Jordanian regime alone. It is not 
possible to appropriately assess the Jordanian regime unless it is viewed externally and 
in a larger context, using the comparative method
34
. As Wilson says: 
“……by looking at other legal systems, it has been hoped to benefit the 
national legal system of the observer, offering suggestions for further 
developments, providing warnings of possible difficulties, giving an 
opportunity to stand back from one’s own national system and to look at 
it more critically…..35” 
The usefulness of comparison is one of the pervasive features of studies by law and 
finance scholars.
36
 Their findings
37
 are often considered by the World Bank
38
 when 
assessing the quality of law “law on the books” and the effectiveness of institutions 
enforcing the law in a particular state “law in action”39. In their studies, law and finance 
                                                     
32
 Cruz PD, Comparative law in a changing world, (3
rd
 edn,  Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 43     
       
33
 Eberle E, ‘Comparative law’ (2007) Roger Williams University School of Law Research Paper No.52 
<http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1019051>  Accessed 1/5/2013                                  
34
 Ibid 
35
 Wilson G, ‘Comparative legal scholarship’ in McConville M and Chui W H (eds), Research methods 
for law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 87-103, 87    
36
 Siems M, ‘Legal origins: Reconciling law & finance and comparative law’ (2007) 52 McGill Law 
Journal 55  
37
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scholars use various approaches to measuring the quality of law,
40
 but two in particular 
are considered: the first focusses on law on the books and links its quality to the legal 
system of the examined country; the second adopts a broader approach by measuring 
and assessing law on the books in its legal culture.
41
 
As regards the first approach – linking the quality of “law on the books” to the legal 
system of the country – empirical analysis by scholars suggests that the quality of “law 
on the books” (statutes) plays a vital role in the development of financial markets within 
countries.
42
 This approach, adopted by La Porta et al,
43
 and the follow-up comparative-
analysis,
44
 placed too much emphasis on the substantive laws within countries. In 
measuring the quality of law between countries, their studies relied on the traditional 
distinction between common law and civil law countries.
45
 Empirical studies by La 
Porta et al, mainly into shareholder and creditor protection laws, claimed that common 
law countries out performed civil law countries in terms of the quality and style of 
laws.
46
 As this thesis will be looking at two different jurisdictions, with the UK being 
one of the common law countries, and Jordan claimed to be a civil law country, it will 
examine whether the findings of La Porta et al apply and are vindicated. 
One of the criticisms of this approach was that it gave too little attention to the 
effectiveness / enforcement of laws.
47
 Although good and clear statutes are necessary 
requirements for financial development, it can be argued, as Pound has, that the quality 
of “law on the books” does not guarantee that it will actually be enforced.48 In line with 
this argument, an empirical study by Berkowitz and Pistor’s et al, into the legal changes 
affecting financial development (equity markets, to be precise) in 24 transition 
economies, revealed that transition economies boasted higher levels of investor 
protection in their statutes “law on the books” than some of the developed countries. 
                                                     
40
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41
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(1997) 3 Journal of  Finance 1131; La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer A and Vinshy R, ‘Law and 
finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113  
43
 La Porta et al, ‘Legal determinants of external finance’; La Porta et al, ‘Law and finance’ (n 42)  
44
 See for example: Levine R and Zervos S, ‘Stock markets, banks and economic growth’ (1996) WB 
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However, they found that enforcement levels for such laws did not match the levels of 
statutory enhancement
49
. 
For this reason, the studies of other law and finance scholars, such as those of Pistor,
50
 
Deakin,
51
 Armour
52
 and Siems,
53
 have adopted a different approach, which examines the 
quality of law within its legal environment. This, as North argues, plays a vital role in 
the effectiveness of legal institutions (like regulators and courts).
54
 Similarly, Siems says 
that the emphases should be on the legal environment / culture in which the law sits. For 
this reason, it is necessary to consider many factors in the assessed country, such as 
politics, culture, religion, geographical institutions….etc.55 
The comparative approach adopted for this thesis considered both, the “law on the 
books” and the “law in action” because it extends the knowledge of, and highlights the 
differences between, the legal systems in each of the countries. It allows the study to 
explore the historical events
56
 under which insider dealing and market abuse regimes 
were established and developed – specifically: to consider the UK and Jordan 
prohibition regimes within the context of their respective legal cultures; to identify those 
rules which were established to combat market misconduct; and to determine how each 
regime functions, and to what extent its effectiveness is influenced by its surrounding 
culture.
57
 Any consideration of the legal culture
58
 surrounding the prohibition regime of 
either country requires, as Curran says: 
“……immersion into the political, historical, economic…..contexts that 
modelled the legal system, and in which the legal system 
operates……..59” 
                                                     
49
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Thus, this thesis does not limit itself to prima facie written legal rules.
60
 Although 
words, if they are clearly drafted, are capable of conveying the meaning and ambit of a 
prohibition regime, words only reveal what is on the surface.
61
 For this reason, political 
and economic factors in both countries are also considered, and help to answer the 
Research Questions (see 1.5). While examining the effect of those factors on prohibition 
regimes, the study also tests the argument of law and finance scholars, about the impact 
of legal culture on the effectiveness of prohibition regimes. 
Thus, the comparative approach employed not only offers a broader vision, by being 
cognisant of the legal culture of foreign regulatory regimes,
62
 it also enhances and 
refines the skills and techniques needed to interpret texts and rules, and helps in 
identifying underlying policy.
63
. Answering the Research Questions for this thesis 
would not have been possible without adopting a comparative approach and considering 
both “law on the books” and “law in action”, in both countries. Using this approach, it 
was possible to assess the prohibition regimes in both countries, identify their strengths 
and weaknesses, and suggest reforms.
64
 
The comparative-analysis of the UK and Jordan legal and regulatory regimes in the 
previous sense proves that the UK prohibition regime cannot be transplanted to Jordan. 
Even if UK financial statute could be transplanted, the legal culture, which influences 
the effectiveness of the legal institutions enforcing the law, could not. Also, a number of 
major differences between the two countries make transplanting impossible, as follows. 
1) There are clear differences between the legal systems and the judicial structures in 
each country. Law and finance scholars claim that Jordan belongs to the group of 
civil law countries,
65
 however Jordan’s history suggests otherwise. Jordan was 
under the Ottoman Empire before World War I, then part of Great Syria, as a 
French colony and later as a British colony (Transjordan in 1920).
66
 This suggests 
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that Jordan would have a mixed legal system: Islamic principles inherited from 
Ottomans; Napoleonic Commercial Code influenced by the French mandate; and 
British financial and administrative regimes influenced by the British Resident in 
Amman in the 1920s. Certainly these all shaped the country’s legal system and 
enacted laws,
67
 and illustrates how Jordan’s legal system was initially 
transplanted. In light of this, law and finance scholars argued that legal systems 
were transplanted around the world from two original parenting systems: the 
English common law system, and the French civil law system.
68
 But the extent to 
which transplanted legal rules were adapted to local needs, is another issue which 
is examined in this study 
The UK’s legal system is the original common law system, with case law as its 
hallmark. In common law countries, the role of judicial precedents, in developing 
finance and supporting the economic growth of the country, was vital.
69
 This is 
because judges have discretion to shape rules to changing circumstances.70 Judges 
are claimed to be the producers of case law, which evolves to meet the needs of 
the society and economy, as they change over time. 71  By contrast, civil law 
countries are said to be inherently more rigid, since law can only be changed and 
developed through legislative procedures.
72
 This difference, and its effect on the 
evolution of prohibition regimes to counter insider dealing in both countries, is 
highlighted in this study. 
2) Regarding their differing experience of regulating financial markets, Jordan, as a 
developing / transition country, has begun, especially in the last two decades, to 
modify its economic regulations, in an attempt to attract foreign investments. By 
contrast, the UK, as a developed country, has reformed its legal regime in light of 
the expansion in the financial system,73 to maintain investor protection. For this 
reason, the UK experience will be used as a guide when suggesting suitable 
modifications to the Jordanian financial regime. 
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3) There are clear differences in the size and type of each country’s financial 
markets. Jordan has only one organised securities market, with limited securities 
(stocks and equities) traded, whereas the UK has different financial markets with 
various kinds
74
of traded securities and dealing mechanisms.75 
4) Both countries have their own political and economic policies that serve their 
respective financial position. As emphasised by Pistor et al,
76
 Siems
77
 and 
Deakin,
78
 the legal culture, that surrounds regulation and influences legal 
institutions for enforcing the law, is vital for credible enforcement. This legal 
environment is specific to each country and cannot be transplanted. 
5) The importance of language should not be overlooked. It is, as Seims described, “a 
key determinant of how well ideas travel between different countries.
79” Each 
country’s language and local understanding of legal concepts, affects the 
translation of transplanted regulation, and results in different interpretations when 
enforcing the law. 
For all of these reasons, legal transplantation is always problematic. Transplanting legal 
rules from the UK to Jordan is ineffective, because the environment in which the regime 
operates – the culture and the political context – cannot be abstracted.80 Thus, even if 
the UK prohibition regime was effective in tackling insider dealing and market abuse 
within the UK, it would not necessarily operate effectively in other jurisdictions.81 
These arguments for the inefficacy of legal transplantation, and the differences 
highlighted between the UK and Jordan, beg the question: why attempt this comparative 
study at all? 
Comparing such different jurisdictions can be justified on many levels. In this era of 
globalization, the study argues that the nature of commerce and finance requires legal 
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transplantation,82 at least to implement minimum international standards and address the 
globalization needs of securities markets. 83 This is illustrated in Jordan, where the 
financial reform programs have addressed globalization requirements.
84
 Globalization 
has fostered the dismantling of boundaries, capital freedom and competitiveness, as 
countries have developed financial regulations in response to these pressures. This 
effect is identified in this study, both in the UK and Jordan.85 Therefore, globalization in 
the financial industry can serve as a common base between regimes, and justifies 
comparisons being made between the regimes of the UK and Jordan.  
Also, even though the UK and Jordan belong to two different legal systems, both have 
financial statutes that define offences for insider dealing and market abuse. These 
statutes have effectively implemented those neo-liberal and globalization requirements 
which support the argument of Zweigert and Koz,
86
 that “different legal systems give the 
same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the development, conceptual 
structure…” In support of this reasoning, the study will identify, for example, 
similarities in the geneses of prohibitions on insider dealing (fiduciary relation), and in 
the statutory requirements for the offence of criminal insider dealing. 
Paralleling this legal similarity, the financial regulations in both countries give financial 
regulators the autonomy and powers to tackle market misconduct. Therefore, it is 
possible to compare how each regulator uses its regulatory mandate to enforce the 
prohibition regime. 
Another reason for choosing the UK as benchmark for this comparative study, is 
historical. The effects of British financial and political policies can be traced back to the 
time when Jordan was a British colony.
87
 
To sum up, this critical, comparative-analytical approach allows the study to: 
1) compare the UK and Jordan legal frameworks governing insider dealing; explore 
themes in the UK framework; allow comparisons with the situation in Jordan; and 
assess whether Jordanian law promotes transparency, stability, and efficiency in 
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its securities markets; 
2) highlight similarities and differences, advantages and disadvantages, and 
weaknesses and strengths, in each of the two legal frameworks; 
3) assemble comparative results to determine what can be learned from the two legal 
frameworks, and how any insights might be relevant to reforming Jordanian law. 
In the course of the comparative-analysis, relevant scholarship, publications, cases, and 
doctrine will be reviewed and discussed. 
1.7 Comparison Criteria 
For the purpose of comparison, the study defines ‘Comparison Criteria’ to be used, as 
follows: 
(i) the financial regulator’s independence 
(ii) the clarity of regulation 
(iii) adequacy of human capital 
(iv) regulatory transparency 
Compared to UK regulation, the Jordanian prohibition regime lacks the enforcement 
structures which underpin the effectiveness and sufficiency of law 88 . This lack of 
enforcement is one of the main justifications for this comparative-analysis of legal 
frameworks, and illustrates how the UK regulator’s long experience in monitoring 
securities markets and prosecuting offenders,89 can contribute to the debate in Jordan. 
1.8 Limitations, Potential Difficulties and Originality of the Study 
As outlined in Section 1.2, above, the Jordanian legislator has recently introduced 
regulation of the financial market, and prohibited insider dealing. Before the Companies 
Law of 1997, there were few provisions for regulating investment in the financial 
markets by company directors, or for requiring them, or their families, to disclose any 
securities owned in their companies. Similarly, it was not expressly stated that insider 
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dealing was prohibited, until the Securities Law (SL of 1997) was enacted. These recent 
changes mean that there is a dearth of literature on insider dealing, and this has proved 
problematic and challenging for this study. The scholarly studies that were reviewed, 
merely contained general discussions on the prohibition of insider dealing, and lacked 
specifics90. Similarly, the financial regulator, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), 
has not issued sufficient instructions or by-laws to explain the law in general, or clarify 
ambiguities in the prohibition regime. Thus, this legal area remains overlooked by the 
regulator and by legal scholars. Finally, Jordanian law schools do not teach law of 
financial markets as a separate subject, but only refer to it briefly when teaching 
company law. This explains the lack of interest in conducting legal research. 
This scarcity of research and literature, on either the substantive content, or the 
enforcement practices of the Jordanian insider dealing regime, underlines the originality 
of this study, and gives it the potential to make a significant contribution to establishing 
an academic literature on insider dealing, which is specific to the Jordan’s legal 
framework. 
1.9 Literature Review 
The literature review, which forms part of this study, is based on a wide examination 
and analysis of primary sources (regulation and case studies of the law in action), and of 
secondary sources (scholarly literature and policy documents). It includes a preliminary 
bibliography for both primary and secondary sources. 
1.9.1 Primary sources 
Using these sources, the study will present the UK and Jordan legal frameworks on 
insider dealing and market abuse. Regarding UK regulation, the study will address early 
attempts in the UK to construct a regime against insider dealing, i.e. the CA of 1980, the 
provisions of which were re-enacted, with minor amendments, in the CA of 1985. The 
primary motive for prohibiting insider dealing was to ensure equality of market 
information for all investors, while legal liability was based on fiduciary duty.91 This 
motive is apparent in the latest CJA of 1993, though there is one significant difference: 
it is still important, under the CJA of 1993, to maintain confidence in the integrity of the 
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market, but it is no longer necessary for the accused insider to be connected with the 
source of information, or with the issuer of the affected securities, i.e. liability is not 
based on fiduciary obligation. This shift in the CJA of 1993 reflects the adoption of 
European Directive 1989,92 which was also adopted by other EU countries, to ensure the 
integrity of Community financial markets and investor confidence. 
This study will therefore examine the evolution of EU Directives, with respect to their 
influence on the UK prohibition regime, to illustrate their effect on UK regulation. The 
study will also discuss the justifications, and the consultation papers, prior to enactment 
of the FSMA 2000,93 which gives power to the FSA to impose civil sanctions, including 
fines, on persons who engage in market abuse on certain designated markets.94 The 
FSMA 2000 sets out a new framework for tackling not only insider dealing, but also 
market abuse. It covers anyone who deals in the market, whether authorised or 
unauthorised, and ensures more clarity in the market95. In recent cases the FSA has 
shown its willingness to take tougher measures, including use of its criminal 
prosecution powers, where it had previously only used preventative measures or civil 
actions. 96  Although the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the new UK financial 
regulator, replaced the FSA on April 2013, this study will focus on FSA enforcement 
actions, given the novelty of the FCA, which has yet to establish methods of 
enforcement which could be amenable to scholarly examination. 
Primary sources used in the study describe important legal cases that reflect both 
historic and more recent attitudes to UK law. In these cases – such as Bell & others v 
Lever Bros & others 97 (1932) AC161, Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421,
98 Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 387 and Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1992] 4 
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 It was argued that the Criminal Justice Act 1993 was too narrow to cover all aspects of insiders’ acts, 
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rd
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Accessed 13/11/ 2009 
96
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98
 This case is an example of the court’s opinion that directors owe fiduciary obligation to the company, 
not to its shareholders, although courts in some circumstances have stated otherwise. 
18 
All ER 45199 – the courts established that directors are under fiduciary obligation during 
their relationship with the company, and are not allowed to profit by virtue of that 
relationship. 
The study also uses criminal cases of insider dealing contrary to the Criminal Justice 
Act (CJA of 1993) – such as: R v Butt [2006] All ER (D) 31100 and R v McQuoid [2009] 
4 All ER (D) 100.101 These cases illustrate how, before there was statutory prohibition 
in financial regulation, the courts used fiduciary duty, under companies law, to prohibit 
insiders from taking advantage of their position in a company to secure personal gains. 
More recent cases brought by the FSA, as part of its on-going drive to promote efficient 
and fair markets, and tackle market abuse,102 are discussed. These include: the recent 
case of Matthew Uberio and his father Neel, who were found guilty of insider 
dealing103; Andrew King, whose case was the fifth insider dealing criminal prosecution 
to be brought by the FSA; as well as other cases.104 The decisions of the European 
Court of Justice relating to insider dealing are analysed, such as the case of Grongard 
and another (C-384/02)105. Cases on market abuse will also be presented, for instance 
Baker Tilly (a firm) v Makar [2009] All ER (D) 198, and cases which were brought to 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, such as Iourgos Ikonomikon and 
another v Georgakis (C-391/04). 
1.9.2 Secondary sources 
The UK now has a considerable body of scholarly research on the impact of insider 
dealing on financial markets. Several sources are examined and analysed: general 
sources on companies’ law and the financial markets, and particular sources on insider 
dealing and market abuse. As regards the general sources, works by significant authors 
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has been reviewed such as: Ben Pette,106 Brenda Hannigan
107
 and Janet Dine,
108
 as well 
as Cases and Materials in Company Law by Len Sealy.
109
 As regards particular sources, 
major works by authors have been taken into consideration, such as; Alistair Hudson, 
Michael Ashe, Julia Black, Alistair Darling and Barry Rider. This study references a 
number of journal articles written by specialists in the financial markets, or by legal 
professionals such as Paul Branes, 110  Stephen Bainbridge,
111
 Campbell D
112
 and 
Richard Alexander.113 
The thesis also presents the views of those scholars who argue that insider dealing 
should not be prohibited, such as: Manne114, Leland
115
, and McVea H.
116
 In addition, the 
thesis reviews works of scholars who discuss EU Directives on insider dealing and 
market abuse, such as: Emilios Avgouleas117, Mathias Siems
118
 and Brain Adungo.
119 
1.10 Summary of Thesis Structure 
Turning to the substantive chapters of the thesis, Chapter 2 tackles the financial 
regulator itself, in both the UK and Jordan, and sets out the general framework for the 
prohibition of insider dealing. It starts by considering the position of the financial 
regulator in the UK and Jordan, given the important role of regulators in ensuring 
compliance with regulation and sanctioning perpetrators. The establishment of financial 
regulators, and recent developments in light of new factors, is explained and assessed, 
and regulatory independence used as a Comparison Criterion. 
The chapter then looks at the justifications for prohibiting insider dealing, the basis of 
prohibition initially, and how it has evolved. In addition, it looks at the different 
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explanations of prohibition used by scholars, and also the debate over the need to 
prohibit insider dealing at all. Chapter 2 looks at the discussion of theoretical aspects of 
prohibition in Western literature, while Chapter 4 substantively examines the legal 
regimes in both countries. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to answer Research 
Question 1) - Why was insider dealing prohibited in Jordan? – (see Section 1.5 above) 
Chapter 3 examines the disclosure regimes of the UK and Jordan. It explains the 
importance of the disclosure regimes in the UK and Jordan in controlling the timely 
flow of inside information through the regulatory channels. It argues that enforcing the 
disclosure obligation on issuers, functions as a precautionary measure in tackling the 
incidents before they happen. Timely disclosure not only controls the dissemination of 
inside information, but, among other things, it also ensures that issuers have 
implemented proper systems and controls to minimize any possible leakage. The focus 
on disclosure regimes emphasises the importance of transparency as a criterion, and the 
extent to which existing disclosure obligations in both countries foster and provide high 
levels of transparency. 
Chapter 4 addresses the substantive prohibition regimes to counter insider dealing and 
market abuse in the UK and Jordan. Section 1 provides critical analyses of the UK 
criminal and civil regimes. It looks at the reasons behind creating two regimes to tackle 
market misconduct, the ambit of regulatory prohibition, the prohibited behaviours, and 
the regulatory requirements for each offence. It then identifies any weaknesses in the 
prohibition regime. 
Section 2 of Chapter 4 scrutinises Jordan’s regime. In addition to identifying the 
regime’s scope and nature, it also assesses its clarity and effectiveness in providing 
sound regulatory prohibition, compared to the UK regime. Regulatory clarity is used to 
answer Research Question 2) – Is the recently introduced Jordanian law effective? – 
and determine whether problems in the drafting of regulation reflect a lack of skilled 
human capital – using the ‘human capital’ Comparison Criterion (see page 15). 
Chapter 5 explores the reasons for lack of enforcement action in Jordan. The chapter is 
informed by the UK experience. Section 1 examines the UK financial regulator’s 
enforcement process, as well as the problems encountered in its approach to 
enforcement, as exposed by the banking crisis of 2008. It looks at whether the 
regulatory failures can be attributed to external factors; whether they resulted from the 
regulator (structure or staff); or whether from drafting problems in the regulation itself. 
21 
After assessing the enforcement process in the UK, Section 2 shifts to exploring the 
problems of enforcement in Jordan. Key issues will be considered in assessing the 
Jordanian enforcement regime, such as regulator independence, staff professionalism, 
influences from senior market players…etc. All four Comparison Criteria (see page 15) 
are considered in assessing regulatory enforcement in the UK and Jordan. Section 3 
sheds light on scholars’ arguments in regard of the effective enforcement against 
insiders and abusers and whether this is best achieved through the criminal or civil 
prohibiton regime. The chapter answers Research Questions, 2) – Is the recently 
introduced Jordanian law effective?– and 3) – After decades of prohibiting insider 
dealing, has the UK legal framework succeeded in tackling insider dealing and market 
abuse effectively? If so, has this been achieve through the criminal or civil regime? In 
other words, which regime provided better level of credible deterrence? 
Chapter 6, the final chapter, contains conclusions and recommendations, and suggests 
further areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2  The UK and Jordanian Financial Regulators 
and the Policy of Regulating Insider Dealing 
Financial regulators are cornerstones for the success of any regulatory framework. 
As North Douglas asserted,
120
 having a sound financial regulator capable of 
achieving the regulatory objectives – mainly market integrity and investor 
confidence – is vital. Acknowledging this was especially significant in the 
aftermath of the banking crisis in 2008.
121
 However, equipping the financial 
regulator with the autonomy and necessary tools to conduct supervision and 
enforcement – to ensure compliance and to take enforcement actions – is not 
enough to guarantee regulator efficacy.
122
 It is more important to ensure its 
financial and political independence.
123
 Also, the chosen regulatory model might 
play a role in any regulatory failures, as in the case of the FSA.
124
 
Section 1 looks at the creation and development of the financial regulator in the UK 
and in Jordan. It describes influential factors that led to the chosen model, and 
whether there are problems of structure or independence which affect regulator 
actions against insiders and abusers. The discussion highlights problems of 
regulatory transparency, which clarify the reasons for reform. The section 
concludes by looking at whether levels of independence differ between developed 
and developing countries, using Comparison Criterion (i) – the financial regulator’s 
independence (see section 1.7). 
The chapter then presents the legal and regulatory justification for prohibiting 
insider dealing. Section 2 looks at the genesis of prohibiting insider dealing in the 
UK and Jordan, and at whether they have implemented similar prohibition systems. 
Section 3 discusses theoretical justifications for prohibiting insider dealing, as 
presented by legal and economics scholars. The chapter concludes by answering 
Research Question 1)  Why was insider dealing prohibited in Jordan?  
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2.1 Section 1: The UK and Jordan Financial Regulator - a historical 
perspective and underlying policy 
Scholars argue that there is no ideal regulatory model for securities markets.
125
 The 
evolution of different regulatory models throughout the world has been influenced 
by many factors – for example: the geographical location of the market; the types of 
listed securities; the diversity of financial services; and the size of investments at a 
national and international level.
126
 Nonetheless, any regulatory model must meet 
certain requirements, primarily, that the regulator operates independently of 
national government and the private sector.
127
 As Carvajal and Elliott argued in 
their global analysis of securities markets, political influence represents the greatest 
challenge to the strength of regulators.
128
 The governments and decision makers of 
the UK and Jordan are mindful of the vital role financial markets play in the 
national economy
129
 and this section will explore the rationale and reasons for 
regulatory development, and the extent to which formal financial policies in the UK 
and Jordan – both political and economic – have contributed to the shaping of their 
current financial regulatory models. 
To start with, it is important to note that tracing financial regulator reforms, and the 
justification for them, was much more straightforward in the UK than in Jordan. 
For example, the justification for UK financial regulator reforms was presented in 
HM Treasury consultation papers, Parliamentary debates, prime ministers’ 
speeches, official statements from decision makers, etc. By contrast, extracting the 
reasons for regulatory reform in Jordan was “like looking for a needle in a hay 
stack”. This illustrates from the outset the variation in transparency levels between 
the two countries, which will be evidenced right across this study. 
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2.1.1 The UK financial regulatory model 
The UK witnessed its third regulatory reform in April 2013.
130
 The financial 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), ceased to exist in its current 
form.
131
 Two financial regulators replaced it in regulating market conduct: the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) – an independent subsidiary of the Bank of 
England (BoE), responsible for financial institutions that manage significant risk on 
their balance sheet – and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the successor to 
the FSA in the area of business conduct across the financial industry.
132
 Akin to the 
FSA, the FCA will protect and enhance market integrity and investor confidence in 
the UK financial system.
133
 But what triggered this and earlier reforms, is discussed 
below. 
2.1.1.1 Origins of the financial regulator – the pre-1980s era 
London’s leading role as a national and international trading centre emerged during 
the twelfth century.
134
 Ever since, the City
135
 of London has maintained its global 
prominence, through a process of trial and error, over the intervening centuries.
136
 
The character and importance of the City has had a profound influence on the 
structure and evolution of the UK financial regulator. Before the 1980s, internal 
self-regulation by the City
137
 upon the financial industry was the norm
138
. To City 
players, self-regulation meant, loosely, leaving everyone to regulate themselves 
according to their own speciality and interests, and subject only to authorisation 
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from their professional or trade association.
139
 As Rider said
 140
, although self-
regulation bodies in the City were diverse in their structure and standards of 
success, they worked effectively, because of the homogeneous character of the 
City’s occupants141. 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers
142
 (the Panel), a salient example of a self-
regulatory body, was appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England to police 
takeovers of public companies in the City.
143
 In this, the Panel had an international 
reputation for efficiency, and had devoted considerable efforts to policing insider 
dealing, especially in the area of takeover bids.
144
 But the efforts of the Panel in 
tackling insider dealing were confined.
145
 In this, the Panel’s Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers
146
 lacked a statutory base, which meant that the Panel could not 
conduct investigations, in cases of suspicious insider dealing, unless its members 
and their clients were involved.
147
 For the same reason, the Panel was unable to 
impose legal sanctions.
148
 Finally, the Panel was not a regulator for all City 
transactions, as it operated only in the area of takeovers.
149
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These points demonstrate that self-regulation was inefficient in tackling insider 
dealing and malicious or abusive activities. Additionally, self-regulation was 
undermined by financial scandals, which weakened investor confidence.
150
 
In general, the adequacy of the self-regulatory system was questionable. Those in 
favour emphasised its advantages, foremost of which was its ability to generate 
rules governing conduct on a contractual basis. This allowed more flexibility in 
application, and resulted in higher standards than could have been attainable by 
statute.
151
 This rule-making was the defining characteristic of the Panel.
152
 Those 
against the Panel, on the other hand, enumerated the disadvantages of self-
regulation, which were that: regulators acted as ‘judge and jury’; they could not 
deal with outsiders because they had no legal powers; and they lacked a clear 
authoritative voice to call for legislative intervention when it was needed, as was 
evident in cases of insider dealing.
153
 
In supporting the arguments against self-regulation, the then Department of Trade 
Inspectors’ Reports unveiled evidence of serious abuses in the market that had 
slipped through the regulatory net.
154
 This raised the question of whether reform of 
the regulation itself was necessary, or reform of the regulatory model.
155
 The 
Jenkins Committee,
156
 which was asked to respond, recommended that prohibition 
of market misconduct be established on a statutory basis. However, the Committee 
did not advocate the creation of a statutory body (a regulator).
157
 The Committee’s 
opinion mirrored the Panel’s call for its Code to be put on a legal basis (while also 
rejecting the establishment of a statutory regulator). The Panel’s view was that a 
regulator would impede the flexibility and swiftness of financial services.
158
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Although it could be said, therefore, that financial scandals triggered calls for a new 
regulatory model, they were not the only factors. 
The early 1980s witnessed the evolution of the UK financial sector, and the gradual 
integration of financial services offered by: (1) the banking sector, monitored and 
supervised by the Bank of England; (2) the organised markets in the City (e.g. the 
Stock Exchange and Lloyd’s); and (3) the rest of the financial sector (e.g. insurance 
companies, building societies...etc.)
 159
 This new trend towards integration was one 
of the driving forces behind the creation of a unified UK regulator, the FSA – 
which will be discussed later in this section. 
Also, other contingent factors, occurring in the mid-1980s,
160
 influenced significant 
changes to the regulatory structure.
161
 These factors included: 
1) changes in ownership structure, which required larger deal sizes; 
2) the increasingly international nature of securities trading, 162  in which 
investments became more diversified, much larger, more interrelated and 
more international.
163
 This very significant trend towards international 
securities trading, implementing neo-liberal theories and ideologies,
164
 found 
itself faced with restrictive rules of trade, and professional bodies set up to 
protect the interests of their members.
165
 
3) the information technology revolution – particularly the telecommunications 
revolution – which meant, for example, that shares in British companies could 
                                                     
159
 Blair M, Blackstone’s guide to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Blackstone Limited 
2001) 2. In the 19
th
 century the Bank of England had an informal role in the supervision of banks. In 
1979 the Bank attained statutory powers through the Banking Act of 1979, which was a direct 
consequence of the secondary banking crisis. For details see; Lomnika E, ‘Reforming UK financial 
regulation: The creation of a single regulator’ (1999) Sep Journal of Business Law 480; Ferran, 
‘Examining the UK’s experience in adopting the single financial regulatory model’ (n 150) 
160
 What was called the ‘Big Bang’ on 27 Oct 1986. See: Valentine S, ‘The Stock Exchange and the 
Big Bang’, (1988) 21 Long Range Planning 35; Rider et al, Guide to financial services regulation (n 
93); Gower, ‘Big Bang and City regulation’ (n 139); Alcock A, ‘A regulatory monster’, (1998) JUL 
Journal of Business Law 371. Alcock argues that: “Big Bang... was to remove inappropriate 
protections (and so costs) for institutional investors and... to provide end-consumers with 
competitive products.” 
161
 Valentine, Ibid 
162
 Ibid. Valentine states that: “The percentage of UK company shares owned by individuals was 66 
per cent in 1957, whereas the proportion owned by institutions in that year was less than 20 per cent. 
By 1981, the personal sector’s share was down to 28 per cent while that of the financial 
institutions... had risen almost 60 per cent” 
163
 Gower, ‘Big Bang and City regulation’ (n 139) 
164
 A detailed discussion on neoliberalism and its effects on UK financial policy is in Chapter 5, 
Sec.1 
165
 Rider et al, Guide to financial services regulation (n 93); Gower, ‘Big Bang and City regulation’ 
(n 139); Valentine (n 160) 
29 
be traded on the New York Exchange as easily and swiftly as on the London 
Exchange.
166
 
If London wanted to maintain its superiority, therefore, thorough reform of its 
financial regulatory structure (self-regulation) would be required
167
. This desire to 
maintain London’s prominence as a global financial centre, while remaining 
committed to a ‘gentlemanly’ system of self-regulation, contributed to the relaxing 
of rigorous financial regulation in the UK,
168
 and the introduction of so-called 
‘light-touch’ regulation – which is discussed in Chapter 5 (Sec.1).169 
2.1.1.2 Paving to reform 
In July 1981, the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher appointed 
Professor Gower
170
 to review investor protection,
171
 and to consider the need for a 
new regulatory regime to control dealers, investment consultants and managers.
172
 
According to Gower, the review was influenced, inter alia, by financial scandals 
(the collapse of some major investment banks).
173
 
Gower’s innovative recommendation174 was that the law must regulate investment 
markets and their participants.
175
 His justification was that protecting investors 
could be best achieved through a regulatory system based on continuous 
supervision and the requirement to disclose information that might affect a 
company’s future, its growth, or managerial performance.176 
In addition, Gower proposed reforming the regulatory structure. He was in favour 
of establishing a US-style, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but knew 
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that it was impossible, given City political constraints.
177
 In fact, the elite merchant 
banks and London Stock Exchange members denounced Gower’s suggestion of 
regulator reform.
178
 Their opinion was that the optimal regulatory system for 
financial services was that government should not intervene in the markets.
179
 
In the face of this rejection by the elites, Gower reluctantly proposed a new 
securities regulator, comprising a wide range of self-regulatory authorities, within a 
statutory framework, all subject to governmental surveillance.
180
 Ferran described 
Gower’s proposal as a “political compromise designed to assuage the concerns of 
market participants.
181” 
It is evident that elite market players influenced government opinion on Gower’s 
proposal, and led to its reshaping. This, arguably, raises questions about the 
independence of the regulator from economic forces in the market. In this regard, it 
should be noted that law and finance scholars
182
consider the influence of politics 
and market players to be of great significance in shaping regulatory enforcement 
policy, in respect of “law on the books”.183 
Despite the over-reaction to Gower’s report – essentially a discussion paper 
between government
184
 and the City
185
 – the government ‘White Paper’ adopted 
most of Professor Gower’s recommendations, 186  but proposed a different 
institutional structure.
187
 The White Paper described it as being “self-regulation 
with a statutory body”.188 The result was promulgating in the Financial Services 
Act of 1986 (FSA of 1986), which had to be enforced by Self-Regulatory 
Organisations (SROs) recognised by a designated agency.
189
 This meant that any 
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SRO responsible for the conduct of business,
190
 was subject to control by a private 
company limited by guarantee – the Securities and Investment Board (SIB)191 – 
rather than being administrated by the government.
192
 As part of the first UK 
regulatory reform, SIB was charged with recognising and regulating both SROs
193
 
and Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs)
194
, and with supervising their day-to-
day conduct of business.
195
 
This regulatory model, under FSA of 1986, was a ‘Multiple Industry Focused 
Agencies’ (MIFA) model,196 under which there existed a number of SROs, covering 
different sectors in the financial market, all under the supervision of the SIB. 
Although the government attempted to introduce this regulatory model to protect 
investors,
197
 critics
198
 raised concerns about its efficacy.
199
 The nub of industry 
concern was the existence of multiple regulators (SROs), which introduced 
uncertainties for the supervised entities.
200
 The problem was that – because SIB was 
not a single, direct regulator for the majority of investment firms – those firms 
found themselves subject to different SRO rules when undertaking different 
activities (such as banking, insurance, securities……). Even if a certain level of 
cooperation between SROs existed, therefore, there was a risk that rules might 
either overlap, or underlap.
201
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The failure of SROs to control financial services that were moving towards 
integration,
202
 coupled with financial scandals
203
 which reflected the failure of 
SROs to protect consumer interests,
204
 prompted the reform of this regulatory 
structure. The intention to replace the threadbare system of self-regulation emerged 
in 1995,
205
 however radical reform (the second UK regulatory reform) only came in 
with the new Labour Government
206
of 1997. 
2.1.1.3 The emergence of a single regulator 
The creation of a single regulator came in an announcement by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, in May 1997
207
: 
“SIB will become the single regulator underpinned by statute. The 
current system of self-regulation will be replaced by a new fully 
statutory system, which will put the public interest first and increase 
public confidence in the system.”208 
The Chancellor was keen to create a financial regulator capable of supervising and 
dealing with the integrated financial sector
209
 in a way that maintained the 
international trading position of the City of London.
210
 According to Gordon 
Brown, this was achievable by adopting a single super regulator model. Note that 
the Chancellor’s desire to maintain London’s financial position not only shaped his 
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choice of structural model, but also shaped the operation and approach to regulation 
of the regulator over the following years
211
 as discussed later in this study.
212
 
The Chancellor’s vision was implemented in a report by Andrew Large, then SIB 
Chairman, in July 1997.
213
 The report proposed super regulator combining the roles 
of: the SIB; the Supervision Division of the Bank of England; three SROs;
214
 the 
Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade and Industry; the Building 
Societies Commission; the Friendly Societies Commission; and the Registry of 
Friendly Societies. Given this structural combination it is clear that the new 
regulator inherited many of the old regulator’s deficiencies. Also, the political 
establishment remained committed to self-regulation.
215
 This is discussed further in 
Chapter 5 (Sec.1), when describing the effect neo-liberal ideologies on the UK 
financial regulator and policies. 
In October 1997, the government’s ambitious proposal was launched with the 
renaming of the SIB to the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
 216
 The majority of 
the existing regulatory organisations were brought under the FSA structure;
217
 
however banking regulatory and supervisory responsibilities were not passed to the 
FSA until the promulgation of the Bank of England Act of 1998.
218
 
The FSA integrated regulatory model was applauded worldwide, throughout the 
1990s, as a result of its ability to accommodate the move towards integrated 
financial services.
219
 However, deficiencies in its inherited structure were only 
acknowledged in the aftermath to the banking crisis in 2008, and were considered 
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one of the key factors behind FSA failures that led to the crisis.
220
 Those structural 
deficiencies within the FSA were highly significant in terms of its approach to 
regulation.
221
  
The creation the UK “super regulator” introduced by Gordon Brown,222 with its 
expanded regulatory objectives
223
 and powers,
224
fanned the debate among 
commentators.
225
 Supporters of the single regulatory structure argued that it would 
facilitate the operation of financial groups across all sectors.
226
 A single regulator 
would be more capable of providing efficiency gains. It would allocate resources, 
with appropriate expertise and experience, to improve business performance and 
outcomes at minimum costs.
227
 For this reason, among others, the FSA adopted a 
risk-based approach, to ensure its efficiency.
228
 
Proponents added that a single regulator would be more effective in achieving its 
objectives, because its structure reflected the integrated nature of the financial 
markets.
229
 Ironically, in the aftermath to the banking crisis, this alleged 
effectiveness was considered one of its causes, as Adair Turner, then FSA 
Chairman, said in his Mansion House speech in 2012.
230
 
Commentators in favour of the FSA model also argued that it would improve 
accountability, because “the more clearly the regulator’s mandate and areas of 
responsibility are defined, the easier it should be for those who are affected by its 
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operations to hold it accountable.
231” However it should be noted that the FSA’s 
wide-ranging role and powers were criticised and raised concerns, early in the 
passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA of 2000).
232
 
Those against the FSA model warned of the risks inherent in it.
233
 One of the most 
frequently raised concerns was for the quality of regulation and supervision that the 
FSA would provide, given the very wide range of financial service businesses 
within its remit, and the associated risks.
234
 A single regulator might adopt a “one 
size fits for all” approach in its operations and supervision. 235  Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the banking crisis, this was added to the list of FSA regulatory failures 
and arguably affected its enforcement actions.
236
 Adair Turner, then the FSA 
Chairman, in acknowledging this systemic failure, stated: 
“The FSA was asked to do too much, combining in one 
organisation functions best kept separate. Good prudential and 
good conduct supervision requires different skills and 
approaches.
237” 
Furthermore, it was argued that the failure to maintain market integrity and 
consumer protection could easily have been anticipated.
238
 Alcock advanced this 
argument: 
“By concentrating all financial services on the FSA, a single 
scandal in one small area of responsibility could, in future, destroy 
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the reputation of all financial services regulation in the United 
Kingdom.
239” 
Alcock was not mistaken in his concerns, as the credit crisis in 2008 showed. 
Deficiencies in the structure of the FSA contributed in failures in its supervision, 
and in its approach to regulation.
240
 The banking crisis, among other factors, 
prompted the third UK financial regulatory reform. 
2.1.1.4 Reappraising the FSA - the Twin Peaks model 
Based on the previous discussion of the UK financial regulatory model, it appears 
that many factors have prompted reforms to the model, including: SRO inefficiency 
in tackling market misconduct; financial scandals; and recently the banking crisis. It 
could also be argued that the political climate contributed to those reforms and was 
probably the most influential. The detailed review of the UK reforms showed that 
each regulatory reform came with a new government: the Conservative Government 
in the 1980s, the Labour Government in the 1990s, and the current Coalition 
Government since 2010. Although abolishing the FSA was accelerated by the 
banking crisis in 2007- 2008,
241
 the political context should not be overlooked. The 
calls for regulatory reform came in the Conservative White Paper in 2009, stating 
that the British regulatory system was flawed.
242
 The then Shadow Chancellor 
George Osborn said: 
“We will abolish the Financial Services Authority, and will create 
instead a strong………..powerful body able to stand for consumers 
and ensure they are treated fairly….243” 
Although the proposed reform was not because of insider dealing and market abuse 
but, as Alcock pointed out in 1998,
244
 a financial scandal in one of the financial 
sectors (banking sector) would destroy the reputation of the regulator. Along with 
other factors, structural deficiencies within the FSA, were said to be one of the 
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causes of FSA failures that led to the banking crisis. The fact that the FSA was an 
integration of the old fragmented (self-regulation) structure, and never had a 
regulatory framework of its own,
245
 was mentioned in the Turner Review.
246
 
Turning to insider dealing, this inherited structure, and arguably the FSA light-
touch approach to supervision and enforcement – which meant minimum 
intervention in the market
247
 – had affected the FSA’s ability to counter incidents of 
insider dealing. According to the FSA, insider dealing “still appears rampant, and 
even controlling market abuse appears more aspirational than actual.
248”It should 
be said here that political policy not only impacted the creation of the FSA (the 
flipside of Chancellor Gordon Brown’s reforming announcement in 1997249) but 
also impacted approaches to regulation and enforcement. The FSA light-touch 
approach mirrored Gordon Brown’s vision of London’s prominent financial role on 
a global scale. Brown advocated a light-touch approach as a way to attract 
international investment, at a time when US authorities were adopting a harsh 
approach to financial regulation.
250
 To this end, it can be argued that the UK 
financial regulator had suffered from problems of independence. 
Despite the FSA’s internal reforms, and changes in its approach to supervision and 
enforcement
251
 – which will be discussed in Chapter 5 (Sec.1) – shortly after the 
election of the current Conservative-Liberal Democratic government (Coalition 
Government), the new regulatory structure was proposed.
252
 
The Coalition Government
253
 and HM Treasury declared their endorsement of the 
“Twin Peaks” regulatory model, replacing the unified FSA.254 Interestingly, this 
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model was known before the creation of the FSA, and had been proposed for the 
UK financial regulatory structure, but rejected. The geneses of the Twin Peaks 
models can be found in an article by Michael Taylor, published in 1995.
255
 
According to Taylor, the Twin Peaks model was proposed at the same time as the 
integrated model (FSA), but was rejected,
256
 not for rational financial reasons but 
for political reasons. He said: “Labour [Party] distrust of the Bank of England, the 
Parliamentary timetable…257” 
Therefore, the political climate was – and possibly still is – the most influential 
factor in regulatory reform. 
Just as the creation of the FSA was advocated for the advantages it would bring, so 
Taylor made the case for the Twin Peaks model, as follows: 
1) integration in the modern financial industry requires a regulatory structure 
that focusses on the objectives of regulation (unlike the FSA focus on 
outcomes
258
); 
2) each regulator has specific objectives and a clear mandate (also in contrast to 
FSA objectives, which were described as very weak or woolly
259
); 
3) the regulation of systemically important firms, and who regulates them, 
should be two sides of the same coin.
260
 
These advantages prompt questions about the effectiveness of this regulatory model 
in preventing the UK from being exposed to another financial crisis, and about 
whether it is capable of countering insider dealing and market abuse more 
effectively than the FSA. Answering these questions is not as easy as it may seem 
and arguably only time will tell. 
In fact, most of the financial regulatory models were found wanting during the 
banking crisis. This confirms that there is no ideal regulatory model, as the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) frankly admitted.
261
 
As previously argued, although UK regulatory reforms were prompted by many 
factors, one common factor was arguably the most influential in each of the three 
reforms: the political climate and pressure from elite market players. In this regard 
the World Development Movement case study of the FSA model revealed: 
“The FSA…….is almost wholly governed by present and past City 
actors…….it has not been shown to be independent of either the 
financial sector or the government……..FSA staff frequently swap 
positions from industry to regulator and back again…..262” 
This statement also causes us to question the independence from political and 
economic policy, of the new regulator, the FCA, and the extent to which current 
government political policy will impact FCA operations, and its approach to 
regulation. For any regulator to operate efficiently and effectively, it should be 
independent, not only financially, but also politically.
263
 Although financial markets 
play a vital role in the economy of any country, and it is hard to separate them from 
politics, it is suggested that political influence be kept to a minimum. 
To summarise, political influence, allied with influence from élite market players, 
has not only helped shape the regulator structure, but also its operations – as shown 
in Chapter 5 (Sec.1). 
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2.1.2 The financial regulatory model in Jordan 
While the UK was going through its second regulatory reform in 1997, Jordan 
created its current financial regulator, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC). The 
creation of the JSC by virtue of the Securities Law of 1997 (SL of 1997) was 
considered one of the financial reforms in Jordan.  
Reforms in the UK, as mentioned above, were triggered by financial scandals, 
London’s prominence as a leading financial centre, global competiveness and 
finally the banking crisis in 2008. By contrast, the international reform programs, as 
will be discussed below, triggered regulatory reform in Jordan. This appeared from 
the IMF, World Bank (WB) and OECD assessments of Jordan’s financial market.264 
Any discussion of the financial regulatory model in Jordan requires first an 
understanding of Jordan’s position in the Middle East and its natural resources, as 
they are arguably the hidden factors in financial reform. 
2.1.2.1 General background – a case of political influence? 
Jordan, like most Middle Eastern states, is a “Rentier State265”, lacking oil and 
natural resources, except for small amounts of phosphate and potash.
266
 Since its 
founding
267
 Jordan has had to rely on “strategic rents in the form of economic 
aid
268”, not only for reform, but also to meet its general budget. This suggests that 
Jordan’s economy is to a large extent vulnerable to oil prices volatilities and to the 
external conditions of financial donors or lenders, whether from neighbouring 
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countries (Gulf States), the US or international organisations (WB, IMF).
269
 
Jordan’s macroeconomic imbalances had begun deteriorating during the 1980s, 
reaching a low point in 1989.
270
 In order to overcome these financial difficulties 
Jordan requested loans from the WB and IMF, which were granted on condition that 
economic and political reforms were introduced.
271
 
This way of conducting legal reform is considered to be a form of legal 
transplantation, as described by Berkowitz et al in their assessment of legal 
environments in transition countries.
272
 In their study, Jordan was classified as a 
transition country that had voluntarily transplanted legal rules as a result of reform 
programs.
273
 According to law and finance scholars, Jordan not only transplanted 
its legal system, as a result of its establishment
274
 under colonization,
275
 but also as 
a result of reform programs.
276
 This clearly illustrates one difference between UK 
and Jordanian financial regulation. The UK created its own, whereas Jordan 
borrowed it as a result of reform reasons. The extent to which this transplantation 
has affected the quality of financial law, and its enforcement, is discussed in the 
following chapters.
277
  
Although financial reform started in the late 1980s, it remained mostly on paper, 
with limited practical implementation.
278
 Substantive reform came with the 
succession to the throne of King Abdullah II in 1999.
279
 The King was keen to 
transform Jordan into “an outward-oriented, market based economy, competitive in 
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the global market place.
280” In 2000 King Abdullah II emphasised his commitment 
to financial reform: “We have taken the initiative to make free markets, the only 
norm of resource allocation.
281” His vision was to bring Jordan’s economy up to 
international levels.
282
 In this, policy makers considered the development of the 
financial market to be vital for increasing the growth of the national economy.
283
 
Bringing Jordan’s emerging financial markets in line with international standards, 
therefore, was an essential step in attracting foreign investment.
284
 
Thus, akin to the UK, promoting free financial markets and global competitiveness 
– one of the neo-liberal ideologies 285  – were Jordan’s motivating factors for 
financial reforms.
286
 Implementing globalization requirements in the financial 
regulation of both countries seems, therefore, to be a common base for financial 
reform. 
Although the introduction of financial reform in Jordan was challenging and faced 
internal resistance,
287
 the King reiterated his commitment to reform in 2012 by 
stating: “Jordan’s economic challenges are substantial. Economic reform is 
necessary……..it’s a necessary pain….288”. This statement is very significant in 
terms of the enforcement challenges discussed in Chapter 5. That chapter attempts 
to link the rare cases of insider dealing and market abuse to these internal forces of 
resistance and opposition to reform.
289
 
This study suggests that the promulgation of the SL of 1997, which introduced the 
JSC and the criminal offences of insider dealing and market manipulation, was part 
of a much wider programme of structural adjustment and financial reform in 
Jordan. The political agenda, to implement the requirements of international reform 
programs, was arguably the most significant factor in this wider programme. The 
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fact that the repealed SL of 1997 was a provisional law, and the current SL of 2002 
still is, provides clear evidence of this political influence. Provisional laws,
290
 as 
discussed below, illustrate how executive authority can bully the sovereign 
legislative authority into introducing laws. This political power, vested in the 
executive authority
291
 (headed by the King as symbol of the country’s 
sovereignty
292
), has its legal foundation in the Constitution of 1952.
293
 However, 
this power should never undermine the sovereign legislative authority of 
Parliament, which regulates the conduct of state through promulgated law.
294
 
According to the Constitution of 1952, in cases where Parliament “is not sitting or 
dissolved”, the government, with the approval of the King, is entitled to issue 
provisional laws, to cover matters that require action or urgent expenditure. Such 
provisional laws have the same force and effect as other law
295
 until they are placed 
before Parliament at its next session, to be either approved or rejected.
296
 In these 
exceptional and urgent circumstances, the executive authority can place itself above 
the legislative authority, and issue the necessary provisional law. 
The theoretical basis for this legal exception
297
 was to justify executive authority 
intervention in cases of emergency, where state interests are under threat of war or 
financial crisis
298
 and prompt action is needed. The head of state can therefore use 
his sovereign powers, through the government, to respond to these exceptional 
cases with law-decrees
299
/ provisional laws. 
It cannot be said that there was an emergency situation to justify applying this 
constitutional exception to the SL of 2002. Jordan’s recent history, since the mid-
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1990s, did not witness any exceptional or emergency circumstances that required 
the government to urgently enact provisional laws. The SL of 2002 is merely a 
body of law that regulates the conduct of business in the financial market, not a 
matter that poses an imminent threat to the country’s integrity. Also, it cannot be 
described as an urgent matter that required exceptional measures or unexpected 
expenditures – as the Constitution requires300 – unless bowing to the WB and IMF 
pressures to conduct financial reform in exchange for loans, essential to support the 
budget of the country, is considered an urgent and exceptional situation. This 
argument is too weak to justify the use of such emergency powers, especially that, 
at least in the past 10 years, Jordan has witnessed excessive use of such provisional 
laws, to the extent that they have become the rule rather than the exception.
301
 This 
brutal abuse of executive authority, using a Constitution exception to undermine the 
sovereignty of legislative authority, provides clear evidence of political influence. 
Remarkably, this abuse
302
 was not revealed, nor did it raise concerns, until the 
beginning of the Arab Spring.
303
 The VICSS established this, when it said: 
“In September 2011, the Vision Institute for Civil Society and Good 
Governance Studies initiated the first civil society dialogue on 
provisional laws in Jordan. This came in response to the growing 
debate questioning the constitutionality of provisional laws, amid 
public demands for political and legislative reform.
304” 
In response to the debate over provisional laws, triggered by Arab Spring demands 
for reform, the Constitution of 1952 was amended,
305
 specifically with regard to the 
use of the constitutional exception. The amendment now entitles the executive 
authority to issue provisional laws only when Parliament is dissolved (previously 
dissolved or not in sitting), and if the provisional law is not presented to Parliament 
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during its next two sessions, it is terminated.
306
The visible benefit of the 
constitutional amendment is termination of provisional law by lapse of time. 
Nonetheless, the SL of 2002 is still provisional law, and has never been brought to 
Parliament. 
To summarise, a situation of excessive political power had existed, as a vehicle for 
the government to meet its international obligations, despite violating the 
requirements of the Constitution.
307
 International political and economic pressure 
on Jordan, to implement financial reform allied and underpinned with misuse of 
executive authority to the constitutional exception answer Research Question 1) – 
Why was insider dealing prohibited in Jordan?  
To understand Jordan’s financial reform, it is necessary to examine the historical 
evolution of Jordan’s securities market. 
2.1.2.2 The development of the securities market - a historical overview 
In the early 1930s, securities of public shareholding companies were traded, 
although the securities market was not established.
308
 Stock transactions conducted 
by brokers and estate agents
309
formed the nucleus of an unorganised securities 
market. This situation prompted the government to set up an organised securities 
market.
310
 As a result, during the years 1975 and 1976, joint action by the Central 
Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) resulted in the formal launch of Jordan’s first organised market, the Amman 
Financial Market (AFM).
311
 Note that the establishment of this financial market, in 
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coalition with the WB, illustrates the early influence of international policy in 
setting up the financial market, just as later it influenced its reform. 
During the same period Jordan had its first financial market legislation, the Amman 
Financial Market Law of 1976 (AFML 1976).
312
 A year later, the Cabinet created 
the Amman Financial Market Administration Committee (AFMAC), the first 
financial regulator in the country. AFMAC had a dual function, as financial 
regulator and traditional stock exchange.
313
 
At that time and in contrast to London’s prominent financial role and the diversity 
of its financial services, the pioneer shareholding companies were: the Arab Bank 
(1930); Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes (1931); Jordan Electric Powers (1938); and 
Jordan Cement Factories (1951).
314
 
Despite this difference in the financial position and its influence on the regulatory 
structure between the UK and Jordan, a common regulatory objective can be seen: 
to regulate the issuance of securities in a way that provides a sound financial 
market.
315
 
The AFM was reformed and renamed the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) after the 
enactment of the SL of 1997. Since its establishment, the Stock Exchange has 
continued to develop and strengthen its role.
316
 
2.1.2.3 The securities modernization regime 
Jordan seems therefore, to have embarked on a comprehensive programme of 
financial reform, intended to underpin the private sector, increment and improve the 
domestic economy, and enhance securities regulation.
317
 The legal framework for 
this was put in place with the enactment of the SL of 1997.
318
The SL of 1997 was 
intended to restructure the regulatory framework of the Jordanian capital market, 
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and provide an infrastructure that met international standards, primarily for 
transparency, efficiency and a sound market.
319
 
As regards transparency, this was to be assured by providing a regulatory disclosure 
obligation – to be discussed in the next chapter.320 As for transparency in the sense 
of why and under what circumstances the SL of 1997 was enacted, there has been 
no official announcement. This lack of regulatory transparency – reported in most 
of the IMF and OECD published assessments of Jordan’s financial market321 – is a 
key issue which must be addressed if the quality of JSC supervision and 
enforcement is to be enhanced. The dearth of government declarations, 
consultations or media conferences
322
 made it difficult to establish underlying 
policy and rationale, with regard to financial reform. For this reason, external 
sources, such as the World Bank (WB) and IMF assessments, were the main source 
of information, along with articles addressing economic and political reform in 
Jordan. This situation highlights the different level of regulatory transparency 
between the UK and Jordan. The policy underpinning reform in the UK is officially 
announced, while in Jordan such regulatory transparency, at the time of writing this 
study, remains unachieved.
323
 
Regarding the restructuring of financial institutions, an impressive level of 
restructuring was achieved in the separation between the traditional exchange role 
and the regulatory role.
324
 Three bodies emerged from AFMAC to cover the two 
roles: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) with a supervisory and legislative 
role, and Amman Stock Exchange (ASE)
325
 and the Securities Depository Centre 
(SDC)
326
 with an executive role (listing securities, dealings and other activities in 
the exchange). 
I. The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The JSC is the most striking example of developments in the securities industry. It 
is entrusted with legal powers to regulate and develop the capital market in a way 
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that ensures fairness, efficiency and transparency, and protects investors.
327
 The 
legal powers entrusted to the JSC were presented in a non-exclusive list of twenty 
powers to satisfy its administrative needs.
328
 In addition, the JSC has the authority 
to conduct investigations whenever law violations occur, and to impose 
sanctions.
329
 To ensure the high performance of the JSC, the SL of 2002 stressed its 
financial and administrative independence.
330
 However, based on the previous 
discussion, the independence of the JSC arguably can be questioned. If the 
country’s general economy is subject to donor and lender conditions, JSC 
independence is put in doubt, not least because JSC commissioners are appointed 
by the Council of Ministers, based on the Prime Minister’s recommendation, 
endorsed by a Royal Decree from the King.
331
 Given this situation, it could be 
argued that national political policy might tend to shape the approach to regulation 
of the financial regulator (JSC). This issue is discussed further when trying to 
justify the JSC rare enforcement approach in Chapter 5.
332
 
II. Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The ASE under the SL of 2002 enjoys administrative and financial autonomy
333
. 
The ASE was established in 1999 as a private company (non-profit)
334
 and its 
members consist of authorised financial brokers and dealers
335
. 
The ASE is the only organised securities market
336
 at the date of this study. The 
securities traded in the exchange are: equities (stocks) and bonds (corporate bonds, 
public entity bills and bonds, and Treasury bills and bonds).
337
 There are clear 
differences between the UK financial markets (their size and operation) and the 
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diversity of their listed securities – described in Chapter 4338 – and the Jordanian 
financial market.
339
 As regards size, the ASE market profile states that: 
 “[ASE] capitalization of more than JD21 billion, the ASE is one of 
the largest stock markets in the region that permits foreign 
investment. The exchange currently has 802,866 shareholders, 
43.5% of the shares are held by Jordanian corporate and individual 
investor, foreign investors account for 49.6% of share ownership, 
and the government through the Jordan Investment Corporation 
holds 6.9%
340” 
As regards issuers, only public shareholding companies’ securities are permitted to 
be traded on the ASE
341
 unlike in the UK. Such clear differences between the UK 
and Jordanian financial markets, among other things, justify their choice of the 
regulator structure as shown below. 
III. The Securities Depository Centre (SDC)342 
The SDC is a public utility institution with administrative and financial 
autonomy.
343
 According to the SL of 2002, the function of the SDC is to register, 
deposit, clear and settle securities.
344
 To carry out these functions, the SDC is 
legally empowered to draw up by-laws and instructions.
345
 All securities 
transactions must be confirmed by the SDC (for example: sell/buy orders, price and 
quality). After the transaction is done, the SDC amends the list of equity holders for 
the issuer in question.
346
 
To summarise, the key feature of Jordanian financial regulatory reform is the 
existence of three different institutions, splitting the functions of regulation and 
supervision. It will be apparent that the regulatory structure in Jordan differs from 
the one in the UK. While the financial regulatory model in the UK changed to the 
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Twin Peaks model, Jordan adopted the institutional regulator model.
347
 This model 
(the institutional regulator model) is a good example of a classical form of financial 
regulator which does not adjust well to moves towards integration in financial 
services.
348
 One of the reasons for choosing the unified structure of the abolished 
FSA, was the move towards integration in financial services provided by firms in 
the UK. Yet, this is not the case in Jordan, where for every financial sector there is 
a separate financial regulator. Banks are under the supervision of the Central Bank 
of Jordan (CBJ),
349
 the insurance sector is regulated through the Insurance 
Commission (IC),
350
 and the Companies Control Department (CCD),
351
 a 
department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, is responsible of companies’ 
registration, services and control. 
It is clear then that the conglomerate regulatory structure is the distinguishing 
feature of the financial regime in Jordan, unlike in the UK where banking, 
insurance and securities services can be provided by one firm. 
2.1.3 Concluding remarks 
Citing and extracting reasons for regulatory reform was not a challenge in the UK, 
compared to Jordan. A suggested reason for this was that Jordan’s financial reforms 
represent a case of legal transplantation.
352
 Another justification could be that 
securities regulation in Jordan is, at the date of this study, provisional law. Thus no 
parliamentary debates are available to clarify why the prohibition of insider dealing 
was established. With regard to the regulatory model, it was highlighted that both 
countries have chosen different structures: the Twin Peaks model in the UK and the 
institutional model in Jordan.  
The section explored the reasons that led to the current regulatory structure in both 
countries. Despite the announced reasons for reforms in both countries (financial 
scandals, the move towards integrated financial services, global 
competitiveness…etc. in the UK and the economic reform in Jordan), most likely 
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the hidden factor was public political policy. In the UK this policy – allied with the 
influence of elite market players, who favoured self-regulation – influenced the 
choice of the regulatory structure and any later reforms. In Jordan it was initially 
the conditions for granting loans from the IMF and WB that triggered economic 
reform, and led to the creation of the JSC. Having said this, it can be argued that 
issues of regulatory independence exist in both countries. Political and economic 
influence, discussed in this section, does not end with the choice of regulatory 
model – it manifests itself in the regulatory approach to regulation and 
enforcement, as Chapter 5 discusses. 
This section also provided an answer of Research Question 1) – Why was insider 
dealing prohibited in Jordan? The imposed international financial reforms, along 
with the internal political pressure to bring Jordan’s financial market up to 
international levels, were the true reasons for establishing prohibition of insider 
dealing in the SL of 2002. 
52 
2.2 Section 2: The Geneses of Insider Trading Prohibition 
The difficulty of establishing substantive standards for financial firms and market 
transactions has refocused the attention of regulators worldwide on the issues of 
insider dealing and market abuse,
353
 especially with the growth of internationally 
active companies, and the increase in foreign investment activities. Therefore, some 
degree of international cooperation is needed to tackle insider trading and market 
abuse, considering their threat to market integrity and investor confidence, and this 
is presently manifested in the work and initiatives carried out by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
354
 The previous section 
presented justifications of creating the UK and Jordan financial regulators and the 
influential factors of such evolution, enter alia, the necessity of tackling insider 
dealing that sought to hinder the regulator objectives in maintaining investors’ 
confidence and market integrity
355
. 
This section explores the evolution of insider dealing prohibition and its historical 
development in the UK and Jordan. It covers only theoretical aspects of prohibition. 
The substantive legal regimes of the UK and Jordan are covered in Chapter 4. 
2.2.1 The geneses of insider dealing prohibition in the UK 
In the UK, decades ago, any individual who took advantage of his company’s 
inside information was counted gifted or blessed.
356
 Before 1980
357
 there was no 
statutory ban on the practice, nor did the common law identify insider dealing as a 
proscribed practice.
358
 Nevertheless, there were calls for legislative action to control 
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insiders who were unfairly privileged by their position.
359
 Although these calls did 
not prompt the Parliament to take action until the late 1960s,
360
 they were 
implemented in the Jenkins Committee Report recommendations.
361
 For instance, 
the Jenkins Committee Report recommended prohibiting directors from purchasing 
their company’s options on the basis of inside information, and requiring them to 
disclose any dealing in their company’s securities. 362  These recommendations, 
which were later implemented in the Companies Act of 1967,
363
 formed the basis 
for the prohibition on insider dealing in options. But this prohibition was rarely 
invoked.
364
  
Despite the government’s failure to develop restrictions on insider dealing before 
1980,
365
 two Self-Regulatory Organisations – the City Panel on Takeover and 
Mergers (the Panel)
366
 and the London Stock Exchange (LSE)
367
 – had established 
rules and guidelines that restricted insider dealing and tipping inside information.
368
 
As mentioned in the previous section, those rules and guidelines were never firmly 
enforced
369
 and lacked statutory support,
370
 as the Panel stressed more than once.
371
 
For this, inter alia, the Panel called for a legislative base to tackle insider dealing, 
and also favoured criminalizing this misconduct.
372
 The Panel’s calls were echoed 
in other self-regulatory bodies and influential organisations in the City, especially, 
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as Rider emphasised, in the face of a strong perception that insider dealing was a 
serious, widespread threat to investor confidence in the industry.
373
 
By 1980, and after several failures of legislative attempts to prohibit insider 
trading,
374
 it eventually became a crime in the UK,
375
 under the Companies Act of 
1980 (CA of 1980).
376
 The geneses of prohibition can be found in the definition of 
an insider, in Section 37(1) of the CA 1980, as someone who is a director of a 
company or a related company. This targeting of directors brings us to the fiduciary 
theory. This theory originated in the US when the Georgia Supreme Court 
introduced the “minority” or “duty to disclose” rule, affirming that directors must 
hold the information they had obtained by virtue of their positions in the 
corporation, in trust for the benefit of the shareholders.
377
 Thus, a fiduciary 
obligation exists, requiring directors to disclose material non-public information to 
shareholders before trading with them.
378
 Furtherance of this claim can be found in 
the explicit connection requirement, an essentially condition for prohibition.
379
 
Being restricted to directors – while overlooking officers, employees (classic 
insiders) and those having a professional or business relationship with the company 
(constructive insiders), and shareholders (majority or controlling)
380
 – detracted 
from the effectiveness of the prohibition regime. 
Its narrow ambit was not the only deficiency in the prohibition regime: obstacles to 
securing evidence manifest themselves as well. Prosecutors in insider dealing cases 
were required to prove that the accused person was in a position that gave him 
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access to confidential price-sensitive information, and to prove that he knowingly 
possessed inside information relating to his company.
381
 
The insider dealing prohibition of the CA of 1980 was later consolidated in the 
Company Securities (Insider dealing) Act of 1985 (CA of 1985).
382
 The prohibition 
under the CA of 1985 was significantly expanded to embrace persons (insiders) 
who had access to material non-public information by virtue of their position in the 
company (connected persons such as directors, officers, employees… 383). Such 
persons were prohibited from tipping inside information, and from dealing in the 
securities of their company while possessing such information.
384
 In addition, 
tipped persons were prohibited from dealing on the basis of that inside 
information.
385
 The prohibition also encompassed persons possessing non-public 
information related to a proposed takeover of a company, from dealing in the price-
affected securities using such inside information.
386
 
Although the CA of 1985 was important in banning insider dealing, securing 
evidence was as challenging as under the CA of 1980. The prosecution would have 
to prove: the insider’s connection with the company through his employment, 
business or profession
387
; that he dealt in securities while in possession of inside 
information; and that he knew it was inside information.
388
 As for tippees, the 
prosecution had to prove they were tipped inside information from a person 
connected with the targeted company, and were aware of that connection.
389
 The 
Fisher case
390
 highlighted loopholes in the CA of 1985. In that case, Fisher was 
acquitted from two charges of insider dealing even though he was tipped inside 
information. The defendant contended that the CA of 1985 was concerned with 
dealings of closely connected persons with the company, rather than an outsider 
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who was given the information without requesting it.
391
 In other words, Fischer’s 
(tippee) liability was impossible to establish because the connectedness with the 
company was not proved.  
Therefore it could be said that although insider dealing prohibition under the CA of 
1985 provided a modest improvement in substantive terms (included classic and 
constructive insiders),
392
 the connectedness requirement (or fiduciary duty) 
remained the essential requirement for insider liability.
393
 
Because of these difficulties in proving the insider dealing offence, the CA of 1985 
attracted criticism that pointed to the low conviction rate for insider dealing 
violations. This was due to the higher burden of proof required in the criminal 
procedures,
394
 as well as the connection requirement.  
The most noticeable regulatory reform of insider dealing prohibition came in the 
Criminal Justice Act (CJA of 1993), which illustrated the government’s endeavours 
to adopt the EC Directive of 1989,
395
 and the need to enhance the sanctions against 
insider dealing.
396
 Although the scope of the CJA of 1993 was considerably 
extended – regarding the persons, markets and securities involved – critics 
contended that the criminal law was again the chosen method of preventing insider 
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dealing, and it proved to be insufficient.
397
 The government’s stance was not 
influenced by the Directive of 1989, which acknowledged member state discretion 
regarding the form and methods of prohibiting insider dealing.
398
 Rather, it was its 
unwillingness to develop restrictions on insider dealing using the civil regime.
399
 
Despite criticisms for criminalizing insider dealing, significant changes in the UK 
prohibition approach were introduced with the CJA of 1993 – mainly in the 
migration from companies law to capital market law.
400
 In other words, insider 
dealing prohibition under the CJA of 1993 reflected a shift in underlying policy on 
prohibition, from being a breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate insider
401
 to full 
knowledge of possessing inside information (access to information), regardless of 
how it was acquired.
402
 This mirrored the Directive of 1989 prohibition policy: 
investors are placed on an equal footing and should be protected against improper 
use of inside information.
403
 
Although the CJA of 1993 enhanced the efficiency of the prohibition regime, critics 
argued
404
 that the failure to adopt civil liability/sanctions hindered the effectiveness 
of prohibition, as a result of difficulties in securing evidence under the criminal 
regime.
405
 Also, it was argued that because the CJA of 1993 is confined to 
individuals, corporations and other legal persons cannot be charged for insider 
trading.
406
 The discussion in Chapter 5 presents a contrasting argument that shows 
how prohibition under the CJA of 1993 can include legal persons.
407
 To this end, 
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the prohibition of insider dealing was based on the requirement of having access to 
inside information, which as previously argued was hard to prove. 
Gaps in the CJA of 1993 were filled by the promulgation of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act (FSMA of 2000) which set out a new civil regulatory regime for 
tackling insider trading and market abuse, under Part VIII, as being a form of 
misuse of information.
408
 
 Insider liability, under the civil offence of insider dealing in the FSMA of 2000, is 
based on “parity of information” – providing equal access to information necessary 
for investor investment decisions.
409
 This illustrates an important aspect of the 
market abuse regime – the legal duty of all regulated market investors to 
disseminate information that is vital for investor decisions.
410
 Thus, a significant 
shift was made in the rationale for insider dealing prohibition, from “information 
access” towards “parity of information”. 
In 2003, and inspired by the UK civil regime, the EC Directive on Insider Dealing 
and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) (2003/6/EC) (MAD)
411
 was launched, to 
tackle insider dealing through harmonization mechanisms between the EU states. 
The civil offence of insider dealing, and the geneses of prohibition under MAD 
were akin to those under the FSMA 2000 regime. 
To summarise, the UK had developed a prohibition ambit for the offence of insider 
dealing that was at first based on the connectedness requirement/fiduciary duty, 
then on access to inside information, and has now shifted to parity of information. 
2.2.2 The geneses of insider dealing prohibition in Jordan 
The regulatory prohibition of insider dealing in the UK had developed early, 
whereas Jordanian regulatory prohibition had a long gestation period. The previous 
discussions showed the endeavours to develop a theoretical and regulatory basis for 
prohibiting insider dealing in the UK. The same cannot be found in Jordan. The UK 
had developed its own securities regulation in conformity with market needs. Under 
this, prohibition of insider dealing was developed, based on its threat to market 
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integrity and investor confidence. In this, the UK represent an example how 
developed countries can create their own legal rules and systems, while Jordan 
represents an example of a developing country as a recipient of legal rules and 
systems.
412
 Added to this, the Jordanian securities market is fairly new in 
comparison with the markets of those developed countries. Jordan’s first organised 
market, Amman Financial Market (AFM), was established in 1978,
413
 and reformed 
into the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 1999,
414
 whereas the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) was officially formed in 1773.
415
 
The long experience of such developed countries in regulating market conduct and 
insider dealing, was inspirational in the development of new insider dealing 
regimes in developing parts of the world. For example, as discussed in the previous 
section, Jordan developed its securities regulation initially through reform programs, 
intended to bring its market up to the level of international markets by 
implementing globalization requirements. Such global standards were established 
and developed based on the experience of developed countries in regulating 
financial markets. In light of this, it could be concluded that capitalizing on the 
experience of developed countries explains the lack of a theoretical basis for insider 
dealing in Jordan, and the lack of judicial decisions relating to it. Nevertheless, this 
part of the section attempts to explain the geneses of insider dealing prohibition in 
relevant laws and in the SL of 2002. 
Although the first recognition of an offence of insider dealing was in the SL of 
1997, company insiders (the chairman of the board of directors, board members and 
general managers) were, in conformity with the Companies Law of 1962 (CL of 
1962), under duty to declare, in writing to the board, any securities at their disposal 
or the disposal of their spouses and minor children and they were considered 
trustees of their companies.
416
  
                                                     
412
 Berkowtiz et al (n 37) 
413
 See Jordan Securities Commission official website: 
<http://www.jsc.gov.jo/public/english.aspx?site_id=1&Lang=3&site_id=1&page_id=2011&menu_i
d2=160> Accessed: 1/8/2013 
414
 See ASE official website: <http://www.ase.com.jo/en/about-ase> Accessed: 1/8/2013 
415
 See the official website of LSE at: <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-
exchange/company-overview/our-history/our-history.htm> Accessed: 15/8/2013 
416
 The first Companies Law in Jordan was enacted in 1929 after the British Companies Act. By the 
end of the Second World War, French influence on Jordanian law was manifest, displacing the 
British influence. However, share holding companies were regulated for the first time in the Act of 
1962. See: Malkawi B, ‘Building the corporate governance system in Jordan: a critique of the 
current framework’ (2008) 6 Journal of Business Law 488 
60 
The rationale for the prohibition of insider dealing – which was included in the 
Civil Law of 1976 (CL of 1976)
417
 and retained in all later companies law
418
 – 
could be either based on ‘fiduciary duty’, ‘misrepresentation’ or ‘misleading’.419 
Taking fiduciary duty first, the provisions of the CL of 1976 consider company 
directors agents (trustees) who must work for their company’s interest, and hold its 
information in trust for the benefit of shareholders
420
. For this reason, they were 
forbidden from taking part, directly or indirectly, in any transaction or contract with 
the company where there is “conflict of interests”, or to use its information for 
personal gain. The Companies Law (CL) of 1997 applied, with some expansion, the 
same rationale for prohibition. For that reason, the chairman, any member of the 
board of directors, or any employee, is forbidden from participating in any contracts 
or dealings which result in conflict of interest. Also they are not allowed to practice 
their trade or business in the same activity area of their company.
421
 The concept of 
fiduciary duty is thus at the heart of previous prohibitions, and serves to justify the 
prohibition of insider dealing. 
Misrepresentation
422
 is another possible rationale for the prohibition of insider 
dealing. Misrepresentation exists where one of the contracting parties uses 
fraudulent means (by saying or acting) to deceive the other party into giving 
consent which would not be given otherwise.
423
 The essential elements if an act is 
considered to be misrepresentation are: (a) the use of fraudulent means; (b) the 
consent of the other party was acquired by deceit; and (c) gross cheating resulting 
from misrepresentation. 
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The prohibition of insider dealing can also be justified on the basis of misleading. 
The CL of 1976 considers this to be the concealment of a fact or circumstance, 
misleading to a person who would not have made the contract if the fact was 
revealed.
424
 Misrepresentation and misleading seem to be weak justifications, 
because of the impersonal nature of financial market transactions.
425
 For this reason, 
therefore, prohibition of insider dealing cannot be based on deceit or fraud alone. 
Fiduciary duty, therefore, can be used as a basis for obliging corporate insiders to 
protect the interest of the company whenever a conflict of interests arises, and can 
serve as justification for the prohibition of insider dealing. In that respect, 
protecting a company’s interest means protecting shareholders’ interests, who are 
themselves market investors. Although fiduciary duty was the initial justification 
for banning insider dealing in the UK, it fell short of encompassing all those 
possessing inside information. The fiduciary theory provided a sufficient base for 
prohibiting classic insiders (directors, employees…), but did not provide coherent 
justification for banning constructive insiders (persons with access to a company’s 
inside information through their professional relationship with the company – 
lawyers, auditors, financial analysts….), nor for banning tippees or other outsiders. 
In this extent respect, fiduciary duty under the CL of 1976 and the CL of 1997 only 
provided justification for prohibiting classic insiders. For this reason, the focus 
must now turn to the SL of 2002, and its basis for the prohibition of insider dealing. 
Although the prohibition ambit of the repealed SL of 1997 included insiders and 
tippees,
426
 the definition of an insider again focussed on the fiduciary relationship. 
Article 2 of the repealed SL of 1997 defined an insider as any person possessing 
inside information by virtue of his position or job. This can be seen as mere 
reiteration of the fiduciary duty of company insiders, under the CL of 1997. 
The offence of insider dealing was refined by the enactment of the SL of 2002, 
Article 108, which introduced the criminal offence, and referred to the offender by 
using the term “person” instead of “insider”. This means that the legislator 
extended the prohibition ambit to include all those possessing inside information. 
This suggests that fiduciary duty is no longer the basis of prohibition; rather it is 
“parity of information”. The emphasis on using “person”, puts the emphasis on 
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prohibiting persons possessing inside information from taking advantage of that 
information ahead of all market players. However, the SL of 2002 retained the old 
definition of insider, under the repealed SL of 1997. The problem with that, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Sec.2), is that the JSC interpretation of “person”, using this 
definition, was to narrow the ambit of prohibition to classic insiders. 
2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
This section has shown how, in general but to different degrees, prohibiting insider 
dealing in the UK and Jordan stemmed from breaching a fiduciary duty, whether 
that duty was imposed explicitly or implicitly. The company directors and 
employees who have access to inside information through their relationship with 
the company, were considered fiduciaries / trustees, and should not therefore abuse 
their positions to secure personal gain. The geneses of prohibition in the UK moved 
from “information connectedness” (or fiduciary duty) 427 to “information access”, as 
a result of implementing the Directive of 1989 in the CJA of 1993. This cast the 
(prohibition) net wider, to catch any person possessing inside information. With the 
promulgation of FSMA of 2000, which introduced the civil offence of insider 
dealing, a huge leap was made in the geneses of prohibition. Under the FSMA of 
2000, the underpinning rationale of prohibition became “parity of information”, the 
necessity of ensuring that investors have equal access to new information necessary 
for their investment decisions. 
The rationale for the prohibition of insider dealing in Jordan was also based on 
fiduciary duty, under both the CL of 1976 and the CL of 1997 as previously 
discussed. Although the SL of 2002, which introduced the criminal offence, based 
prohibition on parity of inside information, the classic definition of insiders kept the 
focus mainly on corporate insiders. In other words, fiduciary duty remained, in 
practice, the basis for prohibition. This is more fully explained in the substantive 
analysis of the Jordanian prohibition regime, in Chapter 4. 
In addition to the legal and regulatory justifications for prohibiting insider dealing 
in the UK and Jordan, as covered in this section, law and economics scholars have 
provided further justifications for prohibition, as illustrated in the debate over 
prohibiting insider dealing, in the next section. 
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2.3 Section 3: The Legal and Economic Debate over Prohibiting Insider 
Dealing 
The debate in the literature of law and economics scholars, over the merits of 
prohibiting insider dealing, has been long running. The SEC enforcement action in 
Cady, Roberts & Co
428
 triggered the debate, and this was fuelled in the case of 
Texas Gulf Sulphur.
429
 The SEC justified the prohibition of insider dealing as 
necessary to address the “inherent unfairness”.430 Also the normative premise on 
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeal built its decision on Texas Gulf Sulphur 
case, was that “all investors trading on impersonal exchanges should have 
relatively equal access to material information.” 431  The nub of the debate, 
conducted in the law and economics literature, revolved around whether insider 
dealing is economically efficient, and, if so, whether there is any need to regulate 
it.
432
 
This section presents the scholarly arguments over prohibiting insider dealing. The 
theoretical aspects covered are all Western, as no similar justifications were found 
in the Middle East. The previous section highlighted how Jordan, an example of a 
developing country in the Middle East, implemented the international standards 
required of it. However, it did not develop any specific theoretical basis to justify 
the prohibition of insider dealing. 
2.3.1 Opposing arguments for deregulating insider dealing 
Manne
433
 abruptly shifted the focus of the debate from the prevailing normative 
framework of fairness and morality surrounding insider dealing, to its economic 
efficiency and consequences.
434. His article “What’s so bad about insider trading” 
contended that the argument for prohibiting insider trading, to ensure full disclosure 
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of all information related to corporate securities,
435
 was fallacious. Fresh 
information, according to Manne is not valueless, or a ‘free good’. 436  On the 
contrary, it is a valuable commodity that stimulates market competition.
437
 This 
valuable information, when scarce, can increase stock prices, but is valueless once 
disclosed (once it assumes the character of a free good). Manne also emphasised 
that full disclosure serves only the wrong persons: 
1) Short-term traders, who trade on fundamental factors, but sell or buy because 
of any recent changes in price, and value “technical factors”.438 For those 
traders insiders are competitors, so traders would profit more if insiders were 
kept out. 
2) Speculators, who depend, when trading, on their ability to predict future price 
changes, rather than relying on fundamental factors
439
. Speculators favour 
abrupt fluctuations, resulting from full disclosure. 
Manne, therefore, argued that prohibiting insider dealing seemed to encourage more 
gambling activities. 
In Manne’s second defence of deregulating insider trading, he argued that insider 
trading allows information to be rapidly incorporated in securities prices, which 
enhances the efficiency of financial markets.
440
 To evaluate this defence, it is 
necessary first to briefly present the Efficient Capita Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH).
441
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The ECMH is an empirical hypothesis which claims that market prices are quickly 
influenced by new information, and adjust accordingly.
442
 According to the ECMH, 
the market is efficient if a securities price adjusts promptly to particular information 
in a way that makes it impossible for the average investor to profit from trading in 
it
443. For example, if an investor decides to sell his shares in response to a “Toyota” 
announcement of defects in its cars, which will reduce its profits, he will find out 
that, by the time he calls his broker, the price of the stock has already declined. 
Stout similarly stated that: “It is impossible for the average investor to beat the 
market by trading on public available information.
444” 
The ECMH claims that the market is efficient, even if the value of information is 
only recognised by a small number of investors.
445
 In this, Fama
446
, Gilson and 
Kraakman
447
 asserted that information influences price, through informed investor 
trading, and that less informed investors are then able to deduce information from 
the transactions of informed investors. In other words, Gilson and Kraakman 
argued that market efficiency depends on the arbitrage trading of minority investors 
to drive prices to their appropriate level. Following its development, the ECMH 
was empirically examined and analysed by researchers. Their findings showed that 
prices respond simultaneously, or within hours, to new information, and that this 
was easy for investors to understand (mergers, takeovers….). However, the ECMH 
did not provide an answer to what happened if the information was technical or 
difficult to understand.
448
 
Further defects of the ECMH appeared in the examination by Chang and Suk
449
 of 
the effects of secondary dissemination on stock prices, when information was 
published in the “Insider Trading Spotlight” column in the Wall Street Journal. 
Although the column contained information already disclosed through regulatory 
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channels, this secondary dissemination abnormally increased stock prices. Thus, 
Chang and Suk concluded that secondary dissemination affected securities prices 
more than the initial public disclosure, which was contradictory to the ECMH. 
Based on this, it is arguable that the premise that market capability of correcting 
securities prices by reacting promptly to fresh information, is not sustainable. As 
Chang and Suk stated, markets prove that allowing time after dissemination of 
information is vital for securities prices to fully incorporate and adjust to new 
information. This justifies the use of “information not generally available” in the 
FSMA of 2002, when regulating the offence of insider dealing – which replaces the 
old term “inside information.450” 
The ECMH continued to attract criticism, especially when the Dow Jones Index of 
Industrial Stocks mysteriously lost twenty three percent of its value in a single 
trading session (October 19, 1987).
451
 Stout cited recent failures of the ECMH: “In 
the spring of 2000, the Standard & Poors Index of 500 leading companies topped 
1,500. By October 2002 S & P Index was hovering near 775, and nearly fifty 
percent decline in value.
452” It should be noted here that the belief in the ECMH 
legend, was one of the contributing factors in the recent UK banking crisis, as the 
Turner Review Report revealed in 2009.
453
 The ECMH, as Turner Report stated, 
played a role in shaping the FSA’s regulatory approach: “that a key goal of 
financial market regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce 
inefficient and illiquid markets.
454” 
Scepticism about the ECMH was illustrated in these incidents, and also expressed 
in Manne’s second defence of permitted insider trading. Insiders, according to 
Manne, were capable, through their dealing, of increasing market efficiency. Thus, 
firms benefit from insider dealing as they depend on securities prices to support 
their investment and capital decisions. Therefore any increase in price efficiency 
will result in higher levels of economic output.
455
 Carlton and Fischel
456
supported 
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Manne’s argument by stating that investor uncertainty will be reduced by the 
increase in price brought about through insider dealing. Hence, the function of a 
security price, as a more complete and truthful signal of its underlying value, would 
be best achieved through the actions of insiders, which thereby enhance market 
efficiency. 
Further support of Manne’s argument was in Engle,457 with his claim that insider 
dealing was good for the economy, and that any economic activity related to stock 
trading would be best resolved through common law tort of deceit, or by contract 
law, but not by banning insider dealing. Engle contended also that the ECMH,
458
 
the keystone of insider trading theory, and used by courts as a system to prevent 
market distortion, was empirically and demonstrably wrong. Engle justified this by 
pointing out that the distortion which courts aimed to prevent, was not distortion at 
all. On the contrary, prohibiting insider trading actually produced it.
459
 Engle 
considered inside information to be rare, valuable information, and the function of 
any natural market was to link a company’s profitability and fundamental economic 
value, to the price of its securities. Adding to this, Engle stated: 
“If the presumption of ECMH (that information flow is perfect, 
instantaneous, and cost free) is true, then it would be impossible to 
defraud, and regulation would be unnecessary.
460” 
Engle continued by pointing out that, in practice, there would be a delay of 
information flow for several reasons, such as communication, language barriers, 
culture barriers …etc. Thus, information flow is imperfect and consequently the 
ECMH is practically inefficient
461
. For this reason, prohibiting insider trading will 
not make it efficient. 
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A similar argument by Welle
462
, pointed out that companies were used to handling 
risk successfully, and they can do this with inside information, using either trade 
secrets or contract law. Consequently, the regulatory prohibition of insider dealing 
was unnecessary. 
Manne’s third defence of insider dealing was in his article “In defence of insider 
trading”.463  In this article, Manne invented the “entrepreneurial reward theory” 
which was based on the assumption that insider dealing is the only effective 
compensation for entrepreneurial services and activities within large companies. 
The entrepreneur, according to Manne, is a person who finds new products, or new 
ways to make or sell an old one; and can either be a corporate promoter, or perform 
the job of selecting and guiding managers. Unlike managers or other corporate 
employees, the entrepreneur’s efforts cannot be correctly compensated, until the 
corporation realises the benefits of his work. In other words, the manager’s function 
is simply to administer company business according to its policy; his wage can 
therefore be calculated in advance, equivalent to the market price of his managerial 
skills. However, the entrepreneur’s efforts cannot be truly estimated unless his 
“new idea” is practically examined.464  Therefore, any salary agreed in advance 
would be insufficient; the only way to fairly compensate him is by allowing an 
element of insider dealing – using the new idea invented, and price-sensitive 
information not yet made public, to deal in corporate securities. Using this method 
of compensation, the entrepreneur is motivated to do more for the corporate benefit. 
Therefore insider dealing is economically efficient.
465
 
Manne
466
 also added that the market was, at any particular time, influenced by a 
legion of new corporate managers (entrepreneurs) who generate fresh and 
imaginative, if untested, ideas. If they were subject to the same compensation as 
uncreative managers, they would lose the motivation to innovate. 
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It should be said that the ‘entrepreneur legend’ was one of the neo-liberal 
ideologies that was endorsed in the UK, as Chapter 5 discusses.
467
 In this, the FSA 
placed more weight on the senior management of issuers, in assessing their risks. 
This was one aspect of the FSA light-touch approach to regulation (minimum 
regulatory intervention), that arguably affected the effectiveness of FSA 
enforcement actions against insider dealing incidents.
468
 
Manne’s theory was refined by Carlton and Fischer469, who agreed that advanced 
payment was prejudicial to the value enhancement potential of entrepreneurial 
activities. Their explanation was that, by virtue of engaging in insider dealing, the 
entrepreneur is able to revise his own compensation without further negotiations 
with the corporation. 
These economic arguments of Manne triggered a debate and ‘ruffled feathers’ 
among scholars. His arguments provoked scepticism about the conventional view 
of morality in the stock market, and distorted the aims of securities regulation. In 
fact, the orthodox rationales underpinning the prohibition of insider dealing were 
based on fairness and equity.
470
 Those rationales were first used in US court 
interpretations of Rule10b-5, when applying to cases of insider dealing.
471
 
The problem with that economic debate, is that most of the arguments of law and 
economics scholars lacked any empirical evidence, and merely revolved around 
theories, hypotheses or court decisions. However, as the Turner Review
472
 put it, the 
banking crisis in 2008 was arguably the newest empirical evidence on the failure of 
the ECMH, and refuted the arguments of its supporters. Also, the majority of 
scholarly argument has been restricted to the US, which raises the question of 
whether the US justifications, mentioned in this section, are appropriate in other 
jurisdictions? 
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Opponents of insider dealing prohibition provoked further reactions from 
prohibition supporters. Schotland
473
, in his reply to Manne et al, emphasised that 
insider dealing erodes public confidence in the financial markets, and is contrary to 
free, open, and healthy markets. In short, Schotland stated that, even if permitting 
insider dealing increased economic efficiency, ethical questions meant that any 
gains would be unfair to uninformed investors.
474
 
Brudney supported Schotland’s argument by stating that: 
“The antifraud provisions (U.S securities laws) are said to serve, 
principally, a protective function – to prevent over-reaction by public 
investors – and only peripherally as an efficiency goal.475” 
2.3.2 Proponent arguments for regulation 
According to Bainbridge
476
, scholarly arguments for prohibiting insider dealing fall 
into two categories: noneconomic and economic. The noneconomic arguments are 
mainly based on the benefits of mandatory disclosure, and on fairness. The 
economic arguments are premised on: (1) the harm caused by insiders to investors 
and issuers; and (2) considering inside information as a property right. 
2.3.2.1 The noneconomic arguments 
I. Insider dealing and mandatory disclosure 
These arguments emphasise that regulating insider dealing is necessary to protect 
the mandatory disclosure system. In this system, firms are subjected to regular 
disclosure of non-public information, to ensure that investors have equal access to 
information. This disclosure policy reflects the level of regulatory transparency – 
which is discussed in the next chapter. 
Bainbridge and Cox
477
argued that prohibiting insider dealing is necessary to ensure 
the efficiency of the mandatory disclosure system. Specifically, timely disclosure of 
price-sensitive information, just as much as premature disclosure, threatens a firm’s 
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interest.
478
 To explain, Bainbridge
479
 argued that, even with mandatory disclosure 
rules, asymmetry between investors and insiders still arises. This is because 
mandatory disclosure allows firms to withhold certain material information from 
disclosure. To protect such investors from the effects of insider trading, immediate 
disclosure of material information is required. 
In highlighting the benefit of mandatory disclosure, proponents emphasised that, 
although corporate disclosure is costly, adopting regulatory disclosure 
spontaneously enhances the accuracy of a firm’s share price.480 Conversely, Manne 
argued that firms can enhance the accuracy of stock prices, at no cost, though 
insider dealing.
481
 By allowing insiders to trade using non-public information, the 
securities price adjusts to the news more efficiently than by banning insider trading. 
It also overcomes problems of premature disclosure and cost. Scholars, responding 
to Manne’s argument, formed a consensus favouring traditional mandatory 
disclosure over insider trading
482
 
Also in response to Manne, and to clarify how insider dealing misleads investors, 
Goshen
483
argued that only information traders – the so-called sophisticated 
professional investors (institutional investors, money managers and other market 
professional players) – and analysts ( sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts, and 
independent analysts) would be adversely affected by insider trading.
484
 When 
insider trading affects the price of securities, information traders cannot extract 
information from volume or price movement. Because they collect, analyse, and 
react to securities information they will always lose in the battle against insiders.
485
 
Accordingly, when insider selling is based on negative non-public information, 
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causing a decline in prices, the information trader will analyse this as being under-
valuation of the stock price, and buy it. The same is true of a rise in prices. 
To summarise, scholars have shown that mandatory disclosure reduces the cost of 
investor research and passes this cost to the firm. For the firm, this is merely a by-
product of managing the firm.
486
 The point of arguments which favour mandatory 
disclosure is to place investors on an equal footing, regarding access to securities 
information. Thus, prohibiting insider dealing curbs corporate managers, and others 
having access to non-public information, from taking advantage of that information. 
This justifies the underlying rationale for implementing disclosure regimes in the 
UK and Jordan. 
II. Insider dealing and fairness 
Fairness can be seen as the flipside of the principle of ‘equality of access to 
information’, and many US courts have seen it as this. 487  Though many 
commentators endorsed the US court stance, the fairness justification remained 
vague and lacked a precise framework. Bainbridge
488
 explains that notions of 
fairness are insufficient justification for prohibiting insider trading, because they 
lack rational standards.
489
 Similarly, Scott states that: “…..Judging by opinions and 
commentaries, unfairness is one of those qualities that exist in the eye of the 
beholder and elicit little effort at explanation.
490” Accordingly, it can be argued that 
fairness is something emotional and subjective – susceptible to uncertain definition, 
depending on personal opinion – rather than being a coherent norm. In that respect, 
basing prohibition on mere fairness is unreasonable. 
Bainbridge provides evidence on why the “fairness” argument is unconvincing: 
“A Harris poll found that fifty five percent of the respondents said that 
they would inside trade if given the opportunity. Of those who said they 
would not trade, thirty four percent said they would not do so only 
because they would be afraid the tip was incorrect. Only thirty five 
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percent said they would refrain from trading because insider trading is 
wrong. Here lies one of the paradoxes of insider trading.”491 
It is clear that most people would like to use insider trading if they could be sure of 
the accuracy of non-public information; only those who could not be sure 
considered it unfair. Therefore, arguments about investor protection and 
maintaining investor confidence in the market, do not justify the prohibition of 
insider trading. Nevertheless, the UK and Jordan have endorsed the rationale of 
investor confidence when prohibiting insider dealing.
492
 
2.3.2.2 The economic arguments 
I. Insider dealing is harmful to investors and firms 
Some proponents argue that insider trading harms investors economically, by 
causing them to trade at the wrong price. According to Bainbridge
493
, this argument 
is unconvincing, because the investor who trades in securities contemporaneously 
with insiders, should claim for injury, on the basis that insider gain was his loss. 
The problem is that his claim would not be confined to that insider alone; rather it 
would extend to all purchasers at the same time, whether insiders or not.
494
 
Other proponents justify prohibiting insider trading on the basis of specific harm 
caused to the issuer.
495
 In order to benefit from inside information, the insider 
(corporate manager for instance) would delay transmitting that information, for 
example by taking action or impeding corporate plans. So by giving himself an 
incentive to use inside information, the insider injures his firm’s financial position 
and reputation. Macy illustrated issuers’ reputational injury with an example where 
the Wall Street Journal fired a Mr. Winan, one of the newspaper’s most widely-
read writers, because he used valuable stock tips, collected during his 
employment.
496
 The rationale was that, if Journal readers thought that Journal 
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financial news was collected for the personal benefit of its writers, Journal 
credibility would decline; therefore, advertising incomes would reduce.
497
 
A similar case took place in the UK
498
 where two columnists of the Daily Mirror 
News Paper purchased shares using information that was about to be published in 
their column. Shortly afterwards they sold the shares to benefit from the increase in 
share price after the information was published in the column. The Crown Court 
ruled that tipping of shares in which the journalists had interest, created a conflict 
of interest and failure to disclose that interest.
499
 
Bainbridge describes how the principal problem with the reputational argument of 
Macy and likeminded scholars, is: 
“…the difficulty investors have in distinguishing those firms in which 
insider trading is frequent from those in which it is infrequent. If they 
are unable to do so [distinguish between the two], individual firms are 
unlikely to suffer a serious reputational injury in the absence of a truly 
major scandal.
500” 
 On the same subject of reputational damage, Millett
501
 stated that equity in the 
commercial field deploys two principal concepts: the fiduciary and the constructive 
trust. Thus, equity forbids a trustee / the insider from making a secret profit (inside 
information) from his trust/the insider’s company.502 Therefore it could be argued 
that insider dealing causes damage to the firm, such as reputational damage. This 
damage, it is argued, is based on breaching the trustee’s position (fiduciary duty)503 
by putting personal interest ahead of the interest of the company.
504
 This argument 
justifies the concept of “conflict of interests”, which was adopted in Jordanian 
companies law to justify prohibiting corporate insiders from entering into 
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contractual relations with their companies.
505
 The trustee/fiduciary was the initial 
justification for prohibiting insider dealing in the UK and Jordan, as discussed in 
the previous section. 
As for economic harm to a corporation resulting from delay in transmitting 
information, supporters of this argument criticised Manne’s “entrepreneurial reward 
theory”.506 They argued that permitting insider trading only creates incentives for 
managers and entrepreneurs to delay the transmission of information to 
superiors.
507
 Such delay will be maximised in large companies and enterprises, 
where information is transmitted up through many levels before it reaches senior 
managers. The more levels, the greater the possibility of leakage,
508
 distortion, or 
delay intrinsic to the system.
509
 Moreover, this delay in delivering information 
highlights the amount of fiduciary loyalty.
510
 Easterbrook added that delay caused 
by insiders would probably make outsiders aware of the information before 
corporate decision makers.
511
 Also, permitting managers and other corporate 
employees to trade ahead, may reveal the information prematurely, causing harm to 
the corporation.
512
 
Cox
513
, in challenging Manne’s entrepreneurial theory, added that in practice it 
would be difficult to ensure that entrepreneurs were the only ones to benefit from 
the information they have generated. In short, insiders not only expose market 
investors to harm by depriving them equality of access to information, they also 
expose their corporations to losses. 
II. Insider dealing and corporate right 
Some proponents justify prohibiting insider trading on the basis of the property 
right. Macy
514
argued that the owner of inside information (the issuer) is the one 
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who should be able to claim for damages resulting from insider dealing. It is his 
property right that was injured
515
. Confidential information belongs to corporations, 
and from a property rights perspective, insider dealing should be banned.
516
 
 Karmel
517
 pointed out the weakness in Macy’s property right argument, by 
contending that property right is a malleable premise that can easily be used by 
opponents to justify permitting insider trading. As long as the inside information is 
a property right, then its owner can use it freely, even in his trading in securities. 
Karmel
518
 added that the notion of property rights totally ignores the public interest, 
while the purpose of securities regulation is to preserve fairness, honesty, and the 
integrity of public securities markets – which will only be achieved through the 
mandatory disclosure system. 
2.3.3 Concluding remarks 
Based on the foregoing arguments, it is clear that, although insider dealing is 
prohibited globally, there are still arguments favouring insider dealing on several 
counts. There is certainly no consensus on the merits of banning insider dealing. 
However, the economic argument of ECMH and the fairness argument, appear to 
be the most influential. The myth of ECMH and the ability of markets to correct 
themselves without any regulatory interference, had its impact on the UK regulator 
approach to regulation and enforcement. The FSA’s light-touch approach is a good 
example of this, as Chapter 5 argues. With regard to fairness – the flipside side of 
investor confidence – it could be said that this was implemented in the regulatory 
objectives of financial regulators in the UK and Jordan. It was also advanced with 
the implementation of mandatory disclosure, which acknowledged the necessity of 
regulatory prohibition for the benefit of the market and investors. This explains the 
implemented disclosure regimes in the UK and Jordan, which the next chapter 
addresses. 
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter described the evolution of the UK and Jordanian financial regulators, 
and set out their general framework for the prohibition of insider dealing. The 
chapter described the establishment of the financial regulator in the UK and Jordan, 
given their vital role in applying and enforcing the regulatory regime for prohibiting 
insider dealing and market abuse. An examination of the regulatory structure in 
both countries revealed the underlying issues, and the reasons for their creation and 
reform. It was found that many factors had influenced the creation of the UK 
financial regulator, and later reforms such as: the scandals of insider dealing; the 
failures of the SROs in tackling insider dealing; the integration of financial 
services; globalization; and, recently, the banking crisis in 2008. 
By contrast, in Jordan, the establishment of financial regulation emerged from 
financial reforms influenced by WB and IMF reform programs. In spite of these 
differences, government political policy was equally influential in both countries. It 
was suggested that political policy, allied with the economic forces of elite market 
players, had an impact on the chosen regulatory model, as well as on later reforms. 
This impact also extended to regulator independence, influencing its approach to 
regulation and enforcement, as Chapter 5 claims. 
As for the chosen regulatory structure, the chapter showed how both countries had 
adopted different regulatory models for different reasons, one of which was the 
different nature of financial services to be regulated. Integrated financial services in 
the UK explained the unified regulator model (the FSA), followed by the Twin 
Peaks model. In Jordan the institutional model was chosen, on the basis that each 
financial sector (banking, insurance, securities) has its financial regulator, however 
the integration in services is not recognised. 
As part of the discussion about the evolution of the financial regulator in Jordan, 
Research Question 1) – Why was insider dealing prohibited in Jordan? – was 
answered. It was one the consequences of the financial reforms dictated by the WB 
and the IMF, if the country was to be granted loans. 
The legal and regulatory geneses of insider dealing prohibition in the UK and 
Jordan were examined from a theoretical perspective. Both the UK and Jordan 
considered insider dealing to be a threatening to market integrity and eroding of 
78 
investor confidence. Initially, their common justification for prohibition was based 
on the fiduciary duty theory. The UK justification later developed, and is now 
based on parity of information – the need to give investors equal of access to 
information. Similar justification, arguably, existed in the Jordanian regime. 
Discussion of financial regulatory models and the geneses of prohibition in both 
countries, revealed transparency problems in Jordan. In contrast to the UK, 
regulatory transparency with regard to providing official announcements, 
government declarations, consultations, Parliamentary debates…etc. did not exist in 
Jordon. 
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Chapter 3 The Disclosure Regimes of the UK and Jordan - a 
precautionary measure in tackling insider dealing 
The nub of insider dealing prohibition is prohibiting those possessing inside information 
from taking advantage of that information ahead of market investors. This was seen by 
the UK and Jordanian regulators as an acute threat to markets’ integrity and as eroding 
investors’ confidence in the securities markets. Thus, to ensure that investors are placed 
on an equal footing in respect of having access to information necessary for their 
investment decisions, regulators put massive effort into controlling the dissemination of 
inside information and into preventing any possible leakage. This is ensured through the 
implementation of a disclosure regime. Arguably the disclosure obligation is at the front 
line in tackling insider dealing as it requires issuers both to identify their insiders and to 
control their inside information. Therefore, the more disclosure obligation is sound and 
properly enforced, the less the leakage will be and the fewer the incidents of insider 
dealing. 
This chapter will examine the UK and Jordanian disclosure regimes and assess the 
levels of transparency provided.
519
 To do this, the disclosure regimes of the FSA and the 
JSC will be analysed, presenting the ambit of these regimes, the imposed obligations, 
and both regulators’ enforcement actions (disciplinary actions). Other forms of 
disclosure are excluded as the focus will be on only the listed issuers in the regulated 
markets. For comparison purposes, the regulatory transparency criteria will be used. The 
chapter aims at paving the answer of the second Research Question: Is the recently 
introduced regime effective (in tackling the release of inside information to the market)? 
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3.1 Section 1: The FSA/ FCA Disclosure Framework 
Though the FCA
520
 replaced the FSA, inter alia, as UK Listing Authority (UKLA),
521
 it 
retained the FSA’s disclosure regime in its Handbook 522  (any differences will be 
highlighted). Therefore, this section will cover the FSA’s disclosure regime. The FCA 
has not yet, till the time of writing this study, issued any separate guidance or new 
technical notes. 
When acting as securities regulator,
523
 the FSA was referred to as the UK Listing 
Authority (UKLA)
524
 in conformity with Part VI of FSMA 2000. The FSA regulated the 
disclosure of listed companies by putting in place and enforcing the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTRs), the Listing Rules (LRs) and the Prospectus Rules (PRs) 
which formed the “UKLA Rules”.525 These rules had replaced the old listing rules, 
“Admission of Securities to Quotation or Listing”, that were established and enforced 
by the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
526
 
Successful implementation of a regulatory infrastructure for disseminating inside 
information was critical for the FSA to meet its statutory objectives.
527
 The FSA, 
through imposing a continuous disclosure obligation particularly on listed companies 
and their staff
528
, aimed at protecting investors and fostering appropriate standards of 
transparency.
529
 This approach by the FSA provided continuity of policy, since the old 
listing regime
530
, stemming from Chapters 9 and 16 of the Listing Rules, also required 
on-going disclosure of price-sensitive information (PSI).
531
 
                                                     
520
 See the FCA website at: http://www.fca.org.uk/ Accessed: 5/4/2013 
521
 More details at: <http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/ukla> Accessed: 5/4/2013 
522
 The FCA Handbook at: <http://fshandbook.info/FS/index.jsp> Accessed: 5/4/2013 
523
 FSMA 2000 Part VI ss. 72 and 73 
524
 For more details see UKLA web page at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/doing/ukla> Accessed: 
2/11/2010  
525
 These rules were part of the FSA Handbook and remained part of the FCA Handbook 
526
 Those rules formed the UK listing regime from 1966 till 2000. For more details see: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/listing_rules> Accessed: 7/11/2012. Also see: FSA Discussion 
Paper (DP14), ‘Review of the listing regime’, 1 Jan 2002 
527
 FSA statutory objectives were set in FSMA 2000 Part 1 ss. 2.2, 3, 4, 5: “1) market confidence, 2) 
public awareness, 3) protection of consumers, 4) reduction of financial crime.” 
528
 Marsh J and McDonnell B, ‘Handling and disclosing inside information: A guide to the disclosure 
rules’ (2007) 45 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1   
529
 See UKLA web page (n 524) 
530
 FSA DP14 (n 526) 23 at 4.15; the FSA Final Notice for Universal Salvage PLC, 19 May 2004. The 
FSA fined Universal and its former CEO £90,000 for delaying the announcement of inside information, 
which comprised a violation of LR 9.1  
531
 For details about the old LRs and their application see: Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
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Those chapters were replaced by the Disclosure Rules of 2005 (DR of 2005) as a result 
of implementing the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).
532
 In this regard, note that MAD’s 
underlying policy of enforcing the disclosure obligation was merely a reiteration of old 
listing regime policy: maintain an orderly securities market that ensures investors’ 
confidence. Thus, it can be said that the UK already had an established disclosure 
regime and that the LRs and DTRs were only subject to reform due to the 
implementation of further EU Directives that re-emphasised continuous disclosure 
requirements.
533
 
Disclosure under DTRs will be covered in this section. The disclosure obligation under 
the Listing Principles (LPs) will not be included as no resemblance disclosure is 
required under the JSC disclosure regime. The LPs apply to listed companies
534
 with 
equity shares
535
 with a premium listing.
536
 The JSC disclosure regime applies to any 
kind of listing. 
3.1.1 The Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTRs)537 
The FSA used the DTRs to ensure prompt disclosure of inside information.
538
 The 
DTRs
539
 encompass issuers whose financial instruments are admitted to trading on a 
                                                     
532
 MAD art 6 sets out the disclosure obligations on all issuers whose securities are traded on a regulated 
market in an EEA member state.  
533
 The Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC was implemented in the Prospectus Regulations of 2005, 
available at: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_eufs_pd.htm> accessed: 6/11/2010; FSA Consultation 
Paper 04/16, October 2004, “The Listing review and implementation of the Prospectus Directive”, 
<http://fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp04_16.pdf> accessed: 6/11/2010.  The Directive requires listed companies to 
submit an annual document that contains all regulated information that has been published. The 
Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC was implemented on 20 January 2007 by supplementing the 
Disclosure Rules with additional rules to become the Disclosure and Transparency Rules. The directive 
set out the requirements for periodic information, i.e. annual and half-yearly financial reports; quarterly 
interim management statements; and the notification of acquisition or disposal of major shareholdings.  
For details see: Shutkever C, ‘The Transparency Rule in Practice’ (2008) 23 Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 346; Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
534
 LR 7.2.2G 
535
 The LP glossary definition of equity shares is: “shares comprised in a company's equity share capital.” 
536
 In April 2010 the FSA reshaped the listing regime by offering companies a choice between a premium 
listing and a standard listing. The premium listing refers to what used to be known as a full listing. The 
standard listing refers to what used to be known as the old secondary listing (which was available only for 
non-UK companies). The policy underlying the reform is to ensure equal treatment for all listed 
companies, regardless of where they are incorporated. Significantly, premium listing demands higher 
standards from applicants, i.e. a three years’ revenue-earning track record. For more see: Beavan R, 
‘Changes to the UK Listing Regime’ (2009) 16 Company Secretary’s Review 33; the UKLA CP 09/24, 2 
December 2009 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/CP/2009/09_24.shtml> accessed:1/11/2010   
537
 The old Disclosure Rules were expanded, as mentioned, to implement the Transparency Directive 
2004, see FSA CP 06/04, “Implementation of the Transparency Directive / Investment entities, listing 
review”, 2006. <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Listing/Policy/CP/2006/06_04.shtml> accessed:6/11/2010 
538
 The FSA stated that although the new rules expanded the scope of the old Listing Rules, they broadly 
followed the Listing Rules’ concepts and operation. See: FSA and HM Treasury joint CP, “UK 
implementation of EU Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC)”, 2004 at 
<http://www.fas.gov.uk/pubs/other/eu_mad.pdf> accessed:5/11/2010;  Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
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regulated market in the UK (the main market of the London Stock Exchange) or who 
have requested an admission to trading.
540
 Also they apply to the persons discharging 
the managerial responsibilities of those issuers (including directors and connected 
persons).
541
 To this extent, the general ambit of the disclosure regime of the UK is akin 
to the Jordanian. However the detailed analysis of both regimes will highlight key 
differences, as will become clear after presenting the Jordanian disclosure regime. 
The DTRs
542
 oblige an issuer to notify, as soon as possible, Regulatory Information 
Services (RISs)
543
 of any inside information that directly concerns the issuer, albeit not 
yet formalized.
544
 For instance, if there is accurate information regarding a takeover bid 
but the price has not yet been set.
545
 An issuer must also take reasonable care to ensure 
that the disclosed information is not misleading, false, or partially omitted in a way that 
might affect the accuracy of his statement.
546
 Otherwise the issuer will be in a breach of 
his disclosure obligation, as in the case of the Shell Company.
547
 Although the case was 
raised under the old disclosure regime, it is a good example of the same current 
obligation of prompt disclosure. Note that, in Jordan, the RISs are not recognised under 
the JSC disclosure regime where issuers’ disclosures are made directly to the JSC. This 
could be because of the small number of listed issuers
548
 in Jordan compared to the 
UK.
549
 
                                                                                                                                                           
539
 Mainly DTR1.1.1 R 
540
 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) has not been a listed regulated market for this purpose since 
2004. See FSA and HM-Treasury joint CP (n 538); Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer guide, ’Release and 
control of inside information’ Sep 2010 (here, and after, Freshfields guide) 
<http://www.freshfileds.com/publications/pdfs/sep10/28789.pdf> accessed:10/11/2010 
541
 DTR 1.1.1R and DTR 3 
542
 Precisely DTR 2.2.1 
543
 The RISs are primary information providers that were approved by the FSA upon meeting required 
criteria. The glossary definition of RISs was at: <http://www.fsahandbook.info/fsa/glossary-
html/handbook/clossary/R?definition=G1691> Accessed: 1/11/2012. Companies subject to DTRs and/or 
LRs are required to make announcements to investors via one of the RISs set out in the FSA list. The list 
can be found at: <http://fsa.gov.uk/pages/doing/ukla/ris/contact/index.shtml> Accessed: 6/11/2010. The 
FSA required criteria are at: <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/fsa-ris-criteria.pdf> Accessed: 
6/11/2010. Information about RISs is currently available on the FCA website at: 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/ukla/information-dissemination> Accessed: 5/4/2013 
544
 DTR 2.2.1R and DTR 2.2.2R 
545
 Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
546
 Ch. 9 and 17 of the Old Listing Rules 
547
 FAS Final Notice, Shell Transport and Trading Company Plc, 14 Aug 2004 
548
 The number of listed companies by the end of 2012 was 243. See the ASE website at: 
<http://www.ase.com.jo/en/capital-markets-profile> Accessed: 11/9/2013 
549
 The number of listed companies on the LSE main market is over 2,600. See the LSE website at: 
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/main/market.htm> 
Accessed: 11/9/2013 
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Although the DTRs require prompt disclosure, the information can be legally delayed if 
DTR 2.5.1R requirements are fulfilled. The following discussion will cover the 
substantive aspects of the disclosure obligation. 
3.1.1.1 Disclosed information 
Inside information, for the purposes of the DTRs application, is defined in Section 118 
C(2) of the FSMA of 2000
550
. It is defined as: precise information not generally 
available, which relates directly or indirectly to the issuer, and which if made public 
would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the issuer’s securities. (The 
exact meanings of, and differences between ‘precise’ and ‘significant’ will be discussed 
later in Chapter 4 in connection with the criminal offence of insider dealing.
551
) 
The FSA in DTR 2.2.3G clarified that the first step in determining whether the 
information amounts to inside information or not must be through a reasoned 
assessment made by the issuer and its advisors.
552
 In making that assessment, the issuer 
should take into account how a “reasonable investor” 553  might react towards this 
information, and whether his investment decisions relating to the relevant financial 
instrument might be affected by such information.
554
 Note that the “reasonable investor 
test” is vital, not just in assessing the information’s nature at the time, but potentially 
later on as well in proving the occurrence of abusive behaviour. In the context of 
proving abusive behaviour, the reasonable investor test has been given an evidential 
weight greater than the consideration of the information’s effect on prices.555 Further 
discussion of this test is provided in the next chapter.
556
 
In applying the reasonable investor test, the FSA acknowledged that it is impossible to 
set a fixed standard for all situations as many factors may influence the reasonable 
                                                     
550
 FSMA 2000 s.118 C was amended by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) 
Regulations 2005 SI 2005, Number 381. There are three definitions of inside information under the new 
section, however for the purpose of this section, the definition under s.118 C(2) is relevant. 
551
 Chapter 4, s.1 
552
 DTR 2.2.7G states that: “An issuer and its advisors are best placed to make an initial assessment of 
whether particular information amounts to inside information.” 
553
 DTR 2.2.4G (2) 
554
 DTR 2.2.5G, FSMA 2000 art 118 C(6) as amended by FSMA 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005 
states that: “information would be likely to have a significant effect on the price if, and only if, it is 
information of a kind which a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis of his 
investment decisions.” 
555
 The Upper Tribunal case David Massey v FSA (FIN/2009/0024)  
556
 In chapter 4, s.1 under the civil market abuse offence. 
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investor’s investment decisions.557 The test should therefore be applied on a case-by-
case basis when assessing whether particular information may have had a significant 
effect on a financial instrument’s prices.558  Note that in Jordan, the JSC disclosure 
regime implemented the reasonable investor test only indirectly, and less explicitly, by 
requiring issuers to disclose their ‘material’ information.559 This test, however, was not 
discussed or explained by the JSC, in contrast to the FSA’s approach with the DTRs. 
In addition to the FSA’s guidance on the DTRs, and other informal guidance relating to 
inside information
560
, the then Committee of European Securities Regulator (CESR)
561
 
issued non-binding guidance to clarify the concept of “inside information” likely to 
have a significant price effect.
562
 According to CESR guidance, the precise or 
significant nature of inside information depends on the information itself and the 
surrounding context, which vary from one case to another.
563
 The CESR Guidance also 
included useful indicators to be used when considering what information would amount 
to inside information, such as pre-existing analysts’ reports and how the issuer itself has 
previously dealt with similar events.
564
 The FSA provided similar illustrations.
565
 
                                                     
557
 Such factors, according to DTR 2.2.6G, could be: the aggregate of issuer activities; the financial 
situation of the issuer; the available information in the market regarding the issuer source of business; the 
reliability of the source of information; etc. The FSA provides guidance on how to identify inside 
information when applying the “reasonable investor test” in DTR 2.2.4G.  
558
 DTR 2.2.4G (2) states that: “an issuer should be mindful that there is no figure (percentage or 
otherwise) that can be set for any issuer when determining what constitutes a significant effect on the 
price”. See also the FSA Final Notice, Woolworths Group, June 2008, stressing that there exists “no 
percentage or other figure to determine whether there is a ‘significant effect on price’”; FSA Final Notice, 
Photo-Me International, 21 June 2010, states that the “reasonable investor test” is not necessarily 
determined by calculating the particular profit impact.” 
559
 This was inferred from the statutory definition of “material fact” in the SL of 2002 art 2. In that 
definition, information is material if it is considered so by the reasonable investor. 
560
 List! Issue No.9 (Newsletter), June 2005, “Dealing with inside information, Advice on good practice”, 
UKLA Publications. <http://www.fas.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/list_jun2005.pdf> accessed:4/11/2010 
561
 On Jan 2011 CESR became the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). For more details 
see: “The New Architecture for the European Financial Supervision: from CESR to ESMA”, Arp 2012. 
At : http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/calendrier/2012/04/seminaire-surveillance-
financiere/index.html Accessed: 11/5/2012 
562
 CESR Market Abuse Directive, “Level three - second set of guidance and information on the common 
operation of the Directive of the Market”, July 2007, CESR/06-562b. (here, and after, CESR/06-562b 
Guidance) <http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=4683> accessed: 8/11/2010. This guidance could 
change due to the European Commission’s (EC’s) review of MAD. See EC “Public Consultation on a 
revision of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)”, 25 June 2010. (The consultation was closed on 23 July 
2010.) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mad/consultation_paper.pdf> 
accessed: 8/11/2010 
563
 FSMA 2000 s. 118 C(5) states that information is precise if it indicates situations or events that exist, 
or may reasonably exist, and is quite specific about the way that a conclusion can be drawn as to the 
possible effect of those events or situations on the price of relevant instruments. 
564
 CESR/06-562b Guidance (n 562) para 1.14,p.6 and para 1.5,p.4 
565
 List! Issue No.16, July 2007, UKLA publications, para 7.5 p.16. 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/list_jul07.pdf> accessed: 8/11/2010 
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3.1.1.2 Systems for the control and disclosure of inside information 
The FSA stressed that the policy of identification, control and dissemination of inside 
information is the responsibility of the issuer’s board of directors because they are best 
placed to assess what amounts to inside information.
566
 In some cases, the responsibility 
may be delegated to a committee of directors who can react more promptly to inside 
information issues.
567
 Understandably, the FSA wanted issuers to give immediate notice 
of inside information, without the delay caused by administrative procedures such as the 
notice required for a full board meeting.
568
 In this context, the FSA will not accept 
excuses for delaying disclosure such as the difficulty of convening a full board 
meeting,
569
 or the time required to prepare presentations to analysts, or to prepare for a 
press conference.
570
 
Issuers are required to implement and periodically review systems and procedures to 
effectively control the dissemination
571
 of inside information. Choosing those systems 
depends on the nature of the issuer and its type of business.
572
 Issuers should use the 
systems as follows. 
1) To determine what information is deemed to be inside information.573  In this 
regard, an issuer must bear in mind that it is ultimately its decision whether 
information is inside information or not, and consequently if a disclosure 
obligation is due.
574
 If it is difficult for the issuer to decide, professional advice 
from lawyers, financial advisors, auditors and public relation advisors
575
, sought 
in a timely manner, will be vital.
576
 
2) To identify the individuals responsible for dealing with information that could 
                                                     
566
 This perception of issuers, specifically senior management, was manifest in the FSA light touch 
approach and risk-based approach. In these approaches, minimum interference from the FSA occurred, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, section 1. 
567
 List! Issue No.9 (n 560), para 2.2, p.3; DTR 2.2.8G  
568
 Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
569
 FSA Final Notice, Photo-Me (n 558): the FSA did not accept a director’s failure to open his email 
attachment as an excuse for the company to delay disclosure.  
570
 List! Issue No.16 (n 565) para 7.3, p.16  
571
 The UK Corporate governance Code, June 2010, Provision C.2.1 states that “the board should, at least 
annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s risk management and internal control 
systems” at: <http://frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcode.cfm> accessed: 11/11/2010  
572
 FSA CP 05/7, “The Listing review and Prospectus Directive”, April 2005 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp05_07.pdf> accessed: 9/11/2010 
573
 FSA Final Notice, Photo-Me (n 558) para 2.1, p.3; Burger R, ‘Plugging the leaks’ (2007)157 New Law 
Journal 1222 
574
 Ibid 
575
 Marsh and McDonnell (n 528) 
576
 Johnson H, ‘Disclosure obligations’ (2009) 1 Company Secretary’s Review 1; FSA Final Notice, 
Entertainment Rights, 19 January 2009. FSA stated that: “Entertainment Rights failed to take professional 
advice in a timely manner in relation to a disclosure obligation.” 
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amount to inside information. 
3) To report this to the company’s decision makers to decide whether such 
information needs to be announced.
577
 
4) To ensure that those employees having access to inside information are aware of 
their legal and regulatory duties; and of the sanctions imposed upon misuse or 
improper circulation of such information.
578
 
The obligation to adopt systems and procedures to assess and release inside information 
is not recognised in the Jordanian disclosure regime. Although prompt disclosure is 
required, the mechanisms implemented arguably do not ensure timely disclosure. This is 
discussed in more details in the next section. 
Thus, in the UK, an issuer’s failure to identify or process inside information through the 
implemented systems constitutes a breach of DTRs.
579
 Also, an issuer refraining from 
disclosing inside information because of a confidentiality agreement with a client also 
amounts to a breach of the DTRs.
580
 Note that listed companies are required to promptly 
disclose inside information even if it is negative information. For example, withholding 
adverse performance figures because of positive expectations that the company will 
overcome or mitigate the negative impact
581
 is not permitted by the FSA.
582
 
Nevertheless, there are cases where disclosure can be delayed as will be discussed 
hereunder. 
3.1.1.3 Delaying disclosure 
Because delaying disclosure is an exceptional situation, it must be justifiable and it is 
subject to the FSA’s judgement.583 A short delay may be acceptable if the issuer faced 
unexpected and significant events where a process of first clarifying the situation was 
                                                     
577
 The Association of General Counsel and Company Securities of the FTSE 100: Guidelines for 
establishing procedures, systems and controls to ensure compliance with the Listing Rules (hereinafter, 
GC100 guidelines), May 2007 updated January 2008. 
http://Idportal.precticallaw.com/jsp/binaryContent.jsp?item=40571392 accessed: 9/11/2010 
578
 DTR 2.8.9R 
579
 DTR 2.2.1R 
580
 FSA Final Notice, Wolfson Microelectronics, 19 January 2009. The FSA stated that, “in any event, 
however, companies must not withhold price sensitive information due to confidentiality agreements with 
their clients.” 
581
 FSA Final Notice, Sportsworld Media Group, 29 March 2004 
582
 FSA Final Notice, Entertainment Rights (n 576). The FSA said that, “offsetting negative and positive 
news is not acceptable. Companies should disclose both types of information”. See also: List! Issue 
No.22, August 2009, para 10, p.5 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ukla/list_aug09.pdf> accessed: 7/11/2010 
583
 DTR 2.2.9G (4) states that an issuer may consult the FSA in cases of doubtful delay.  
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necessary.
584
 In such cases the length of delay must be proportionate to the 
circumstances. The FSA enforcement actions show that it has accepted delays of 
minutes and hours rather than days.
585
 The decision to delay disclosure is the issuers’ 
responsibility. As mentioned earlier, the FSA believes that issuers are best placed to 
assess and control their own inside information.
586
 
In justifiable short delay situations, the issuer, in a preliminary announcement, must set 
out why a full statement cannot yet be drawn up, and include a guarantee to announce 
details as soon as possible.
587
 Otherwise, if the issuer is unable or unwilling to make an 
announcement, a decision to suspend trading in its financial instruments may be 
appropriate.
588
 Note that permission for a short delay does not cover, as previously 
stated, delay due to managerial difficulties or issuers’ technical problems in announcing 
inside information.
589
 
In addition to a justifiable short delay, the DTRs allow listed companies further 
opportunity to delay disclosure in certain circumstances to protect their legitimate 
interests
590, but only on condition that such delay must not be “likely to mislead the 
public”.591 A practical illustration of this situation is the case of Northern Rock Bank 
(NRB). In this case, the bank delayed disclosure of an imminent financial danger 
threatening the bank’s financial position. The delay was due to the NRB negotiations 
with the Bank of England (BoE) on the possibility of implementing a lender-of-last-
resort operation.
592
 The issue was whether DTR 2.5 (permitting delay) would allow the 
NRB to delay disclosure. For approval to be given, delaying the disclosure could not be 
held to be misleading, and the confidentiality of NRB negotiations with the BoE had to 
                                                     
584
 DTR 2.2.9G (2) 
585
 For example see: FSA Final Notice, Marconi, 11 April 2003. The FSA said: “The period of time which 
is reasonable for a listed company to take in making an announcement… regarding a change in its 
expectations, will depend upon all the circumstances relevant to the listed company’s particular situation 
in which the change occurs”. Though this case was decided under the old LRs, it will fall now under DTR 
2R. See also, Freshfields guide (n 540) 
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 DTR 2.2.7G 
587
 DTR 2.2.9G (2); Marsh J and McDonnell (n 528) 
588
 DTR 2.2.9G (3) 
589
 List! Issue No.16 (n 565) para 7.3, p.16 
590
 DTR 2.5. The Disclosure Rule did not defined the “legitimate interests” but some demonstration was 
provided in DTR 2.5.3R: transaction negotiations and decisions or contracts made by an issuer but 
requiring an approval form from another issuer to become effective. CESR/06-562b Guidance, para 2.8, 
p.10 (n 562) provides examples of legitimate interests: where a contract was being negotiated, but had not 
been finalized, and the disclosure would jeopardise the conclusion of the contract, or threaten its loss to 
another party, and where the issuer needs to protect its rights in product development, patent, inventions, 
etc.   
591
 DTR 2.5.1R (1); DTR 2.5.4G 
592
 Starr T, ‘Mad for it?’ (2007)157 New Law Journal 1560 
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be ensured.
593
 In the event, the confidentially requirement was not fulfilled. A day 
before the House of Commons’ Treasury Committee held its meeting on the NRB 
request, the BBC ‘scooped’ the NRB financial difficulties and its negotiations with the 
BoE. 
DTR 2.5.4 had posed another hurdle for the NRB. It states that any financial difficulty 
encountered by an issuer is not an acceptable justification for delaying disclosure. Since 
the prompt disclosure policy endorsed in the DTRs mirrored the MAD disclosure 
regime, MAD was blamed when the BoE did not bail out the NRB
594
, as Mervyn King, 
then Governor of the BoE, declared.
595
 
DTR 2.2.2R created further complexities. Under this rule the issuer is required to make 
a prompt disclosure if the “coming set of circumstances or the occurrence of an 
event
596 ” is likely to have a significant effect on the issuer’s securities price. An 
example of this in practice can be found the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgement 
in the recent Markus Geltl v Daimler AG case
597
 which mirrors DTR 2.2.2R. The ECJ 
in this case confirmed that information relating to intermediate steps, whether 
completed or expected, should be disclosed if it was sufficiently concrete to draw a 
conclusion that might significantly influence the relevant securities’ price.598 On the 
process of determining what could reasonably be expected, several academics have 
argued that even if the likelihood of the occurrence of an event (which might amount to 
inside information) was below 50%, it would be sufficiently concrete as long as there 
was a strong potential for it to affect the securities’ price.599 If the ECJ ruling were to be 
applied (retrospectively) to the NRB situation, prompt disclosure would have been 
required. 
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 DTR 2.5 
594
 MAD arts 6.1, 6.4. Two requirements under MAD should be satisfied to allow delay: (1) ensuring the 
confidentiality of inside information (2) where a non-disclosure decision would not be likely to mislead 
the public. For more details see: HC Treasury Select Committee Written Evidence, “Memorandum from 
the Tripartite Authorities”, Jan 2008 at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasury/56/56we05.htm>Accessed: 
5/11/2010 
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 Quoted from his statement to the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (ibid) on 20 Sep 
2007  
596
 DTR 2.2.2 R 
597
 ECJ judgment in Markus Geltl v Daimler AG C-19/11, Luxembourg, 22 Jun 2012 at: 
 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CC0019:EN:HTML> Accessed: 
15/9/2012  
598
 Ibid 
599
 See: Olson J, ‘European Court tightens disclosure rules’ (2012) Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Rules, 1 Aug 2012 at: 
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/08/01/european-court-tightens-disclosure-rules/> Accessed: 
11/12/2012. Olson stated that this concept, presented by the ECJ, was transplanted from the US securities 
law but has no basis in European law. 
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Because of these difficulties, the FSA in 2008 amended the Disclosure Rules (DR of 
2005).
600
 In the aftermath of the NRB nationalization, the amended DTRs allow a 
financial institution to delay disclosure if it is in lender-of-last-resort negotiation with a 
Central Bank and if confidentiality is ensured.
601
 The FSA’s justification was that 
immediate disclosure might damage the company’s current financial position and 
thereby threaten its solvency.
602
 
Based on this discussion, it appears that the FSA was in favour of keeping the options 
for delaying disclosure as restricted as possible to ensure prompt release of new 
information to the markets. In delaying disclosure, certain exceptional justifications are 
allowed, like negotiations with a Central Bank for liquidity support (as long as they are 
kept confidential
603
) or where public disclosure will seriously jeopardize the interests of 
the issuer.
604
 
Arguably, in cases involving the financial difficulties of one of the elite market players, 
as the case of NRB, it would be difficult to ensure confidentiality. Delaying disclosure 
would probably allow leakage of inside information or at least generate rumours. 
Consequently, delay would have a more adverse effect on the relevant securities’ price 
than if disclosure was made immediately. Thus, if investors’ confidence and market 
integrity is to be maintained, disclosure of such financial difficulties should be prompt. 
Turning to Jordan, although the JSC disclosure regime does not cover the situation of 
delaying disclosure of financial difficulties, the Arab Bank situation was an instructive 
practical example. Arab Bank, an elite market-player, was expecting to face financial 
difficulties after losing the lawsuit brought against it in the USA, New York, for 
financing terrorism. In the US court judgement, the bank was fined $1bn.
605
 This case 
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MAD disclosure regime and the twofold notion of inside information: The available situation’ (2009) 4 
Capita Market Law Journal 323 
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was only the first of many to be brought to court. The JSC, in trying to protect the 
bank’s financial position and reputation606, did not require prompt disclosure to the 
industry. This concealment and delay in disclosure worsened the financial situation of 
the bank after rumours of the bank’s problems became widespread among investors. 
This resulted in a severe decline in its securities’ price. This case is an example of the 
undue economic influence of elite market players over the JSC, and discussed further in 
Chapter 5 (Sec.2). 
It may be suggested, therefore, that concealing the financial difficulties of an issuer in 
either the UK or Jordan, even temporarily, might give rise to concerns about the 
regulator’s transparency among ordinary investors. 
In the light of this discussion and the sensitivity of the issue of delayed disclosure, the 
proposed new MAD II
607
 will remove the discretion of issuers to delay disclosure. It 
will require them to inform the regulator without delay of their intention to delay.
608
 It 
will be then the regulator’s responsibility to decide whether delay is to be permitted or 
not, in contrast to the current situation. Currently, under MAD and DTRs (DTR 2.5.1R) 
issuers have discretion to delay disclosure subject to the FSA’s hindsight.609 However, 
in the UK, the new proposal will not affect existing discretion to delay disclosure. The 
UK has chosen not to opt into the proposed MAD II
610
, considering that it can be merely 
recommended as good practice. 
The final situation in which delaying disclosure is not permitted is where an issuer 
delays disclosure until Friday evening. “Friday Night Drop” occurs when most of RISs 
are closed for business, which means that the announcement will be sent out the 
following Monday morning. Arguing that the information was legitimately 
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Accessed: 14/5/2012 
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disseminated to the public, but delayed because the RISs were closed will not be an 
acceptable excuse.
611
 
In previous discussions it was mentioned that the issuer, in assessing the information, 
might consult other parties. This situation presents a case of selective disclosure as will 
be considered now. 
3.1.1.4 Selective disclosure (disclosure to a third party) 
The DTRs acknowledge that the financial environment and business relations between 
companies may involve selective disclosure of inside information (eg: to other group 
companies, to lenders, etc.).
612
 As such, selective disclosure is legitimate if it occurs in 
the normal exercise of employment, profession, or duties.
613
 Also, the issuer must 
ensure that the selective persons are under a duty of confidentiality, especially where 
delaying disclosure is permissible.
614
 This duty may rise from an employment contract 
or agreement (with a lawyer, financial advisor, etc.).
615
 Otherwise, disclosure via an RIS 
is required immediately or as soon as possible.
616
 Obviously, selective disclosure should 
be used strictly where it is vital for the issuer’s interests, and at the same time, is 
reasonable and justifiable.
617
 
The case of selective disclosure is not recognised in the Jordanian disclosure regime. 
Even when dealing with situations that influence issuers’ disclosure like market 
rumours and press speculations, the JSC gives discretion to issuers to deal with them 
without requiring prompt regulatory disclosure first. This is discussed under the 
Jordanian regime of disclosure. 
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3.1.1.5 Dealing with analysts and journalists (under embargo) 
Issuers seek analysts’ assistance, where possible, in forming a view of their activities 
and business prospects. Analysts also play a vital role in establishing the price accuracy 
of a stock, and in helping investors understand and value an issuer’s securities 618 . 
Acknowledging that listed companies may divulge unpublished information when 
dealing with analysts, the FSA offered helpful guidance to help issuers avoid 
infringements of the relevant DTRs.
619
The FSA was aware that not all unpublished 
information conveyed to analysts is inside information. But if it is, it must be disclosed 
in compliance with the DTRs.
620
 Otherwise, a case of market abuse might arise.
621
 
It is therefore of great importance for issuers to set out policies and establish procedures 
to avoid such breaches
622
. For instance, when meeting with analysts the FSA advised 
that the meetings should be brief, and the extent and nature of the information discussed 
should be restricted. The FSA also recommended the attendance of more than one of the 
issuer’s representatives and that accurate records of all discussions623 should be held. 
Another sensitive area for issuers is analysts’ reports and whether they have to respond 
to them. The FSA allowed companies latitude to comment on those reports, albeit this 
does not mean that issuers are compelled to correct the material included in the reports. 
Sometimes, however, correction will be necessary if the incorrect information is likely 
to result in serious distortion of, or misapprehension in the market.
624
 
From the above, it can be concluded that dealing with analysts is a sensitive area, given 
the possibility of inside information leakage. Despite this, the FSA was of a view that, 
with cautious and prudential measures in place, holding meetings with analysts, the 
press, or sometimes the public, would help the dissemination and absorption of market 
information and would also help in raising an issuer’s profile625. These benefits were 
overlooked in the JSC disclosure policy. The JSC did not in fact consider dealing with 
analysts and how issuers should react to their reports. 
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A similar risky area for issuers is dealing with press speculation. The FSA clarified that 
issuers should not provide inside information to journalists and others under embargo (a 
sort of selective disclosure)
626
, unless this information had already been disseminated 
via one of the RISs.
627
 In relation to this issue in Jordan, the JSC does not require 
issuers to disclose inside information promptly via the JSC. Instead, issuers are urged to 
hold a press conference to deal with the speculation. Such a situation would arguably 
result in an increased likelihood of leaking inside information.
628
 
3.1.1.6 Dealing with rumours 
Rumours or unverified information are endemic in the market. They stem from many 
sources: wishful thinking, rumours to deceive, speculations, etc.
629
 
The FSA recommended, in cases of rumour, merely adopting a “no comment” policy 
whenever the press were demanding issuers to comment on the rumour.
630
 The same 
applies under the FCA’s DTRs, but the difference is that the issuer is also required to 
carefully assess whether the rumour amounts to inside information.
631
 This is because 
the FCA, like the FSA, considers the issuer and its advisors to be best positioned to 
assess and judge whether the information amounts to inside information.
632
 In 
connection with this, the FSA has encouraged issuers to build up internal procedures 
and to provide written guidelines on the treatment of rumours
633
, to ensure that their 
employees are “aware of the potential consequences of circulating false rumours”634 
However, if quite unfounded information has had a deleterious effect on investors’ 
confidence or the issuer’s shares price, the FSA advised that a formal announcement 
would be the best practice
635. In this situation, the FSA’s view was that the decision to 
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make an announcement should not solely be triggered by the reaction of the issuer’s 
share price to a rumour. Other factors should also be considered
636
. In particular, if there 
was evidence that a breach of confidentiality might have occurred
637
, the FSA would 
give the issuer latitude to use its own judgement
638
 about a formal announcement. The 
FCA currently takes a different position. It urges issuers to make a disclosure as soon as 
possible in accordance with DTR 2.6.2 R. 
From the previous discussion it is clear that the FCA takes a somewhat different 
approach when dealing with rumours and speculation that might amount to inside 
information. Arguably this approach could be a more effective in controlling possible 
leakage of inside information. Giving more latitude to the issuer to assess the situation, 
as under the FSA, could result in misjudgement or allow further leakage. 
To minimize the possibility of inside information leakage and to ensure that it is only 
properly disclosed, issuers are not only required to adopt effective systems and 
procedures to control dissemination, but they are also required to hold insiders lists. 
3.1.1.7 Insiders lists 
The DTRs require issuers to provide details of persons who have access to inside 
information, whether regularly or occasionally, to preclude any possible leakage.
639
 This 
stringent requirement, which arose from the implementation of MAD
640
, obliged 
issuers
641
 to draw up and maintain an updated
642
 and comprehensive list
643
 of employees 
and persons acting, directly or indirectly, on their behalf who have access to inside 
information.
644
 The list should be provided to the FCA upon request.
645
 Every insiders 
list must contain: 
                                                     
636
 List! Issue No.9, para 5.9, p.7 (n 560) 
637
 DTR 2.7.2 G 
638
 List! Issue No.9, para 5.4, p.7 (n 560). Also CESR/06-562b Guide (n 562) provided a similar opinion 
to the FSA’s 
639
 DTR 2.8.1 R. Clear guidance about insiders lists can be found in: FSA Market Watch “Markets 
division: newsletter on market conduct issues”, Issue No.12, June 2005, p.5 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/newsletters/mw_newsletter12.pdf> Accessed: 31/10/2010 
640
 MAD art 6. The same is required under the proposed MAD II art 13  
641
 FCA DTR 2.8.1 R, and previously the FSA DTR 2.8.5R, require an insiders list to be prepared by the 
issuer itself, or by persons acting on its account or on its behalf. 
642
 FCA DTR 2.8.4R; FCA DTR 2.8.6G states that maintaining an updated list is solely the issuer’s 
responsibility. 
643
 FCA DTR 2.8.2 and previously FSADTR 2.8.4R 
644
 In DTR 2.8.1R the FSA gave examples of persons who could be insiders. Also see: FSA, Market 
Watch “Markets division: newsletter on the market conduct and transactions”, Issue No.24, Oct 2007, p.7 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/newsletters/mw_newsletter24.pdf> accessed: 31/10/2010. Also CESR/06-
562b Guide (n 562) provided examples of possible insiders who may act on the issuer’s behalf, such as: 
auditors, lawyers, accountants, investment banks, IT agencies, etc.     
95 
1) persons who have access to inside information (an issuer’s employees and its 
principle contacts at other firms who act on the issuer’s behalf646); 
2) justification of why those persons are on the list; 
3) the date of drawing up the list.647 
An issuer may be exempted from maintaining a list of all individuals working for, or 
acting on behalf of, another company, if they are listed by that company and the issuer 
is sure (based on a contract or agreement) that the other company maintains an insider’s 
list.
648
 The issuer must also take all necessary measures to ensure that its insiders 
understand the legal and regulatory duties entailed on them, and are aware of the 
sanctions that may be imposed when a breach happens.
649
 
From the previous discussion, it can be argued that the insiders list is a cornerstone in 
controlling any possible leakage of inside information. It will be of great help in 
identifying the person responsible in leakage cases where there are indications of 
involvement of the issuer’s insiders. Such insider lists have a dual purpose: 
identification of insiders and raising awareness of legal duties and possible sanctions. In 
Jordan, the importance of holding insiders list is not recognised in the JSC disclosure 
regime, as will be shown in the next section. 
The final aspect of the UK disclosure regime is the disclosure obligation imposed on the 
persons discharging managerial responsibilities. 
3.1.1.8 Disclosure of Persons Discharging Managerial Responsibilities (PDMRs) 
One of the DTRs more onerous disclosure obligations relates to PDMRs (included in 
insiders lists) and persons linked with them, regarding their transactions in the financial 
instruments of the issuer.
650
 PDMRs and their connected persons are defined in the 
FSMA of 2000.
651
 Nevertheless, the FSA tended to broaden the statute’s scope to 
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include senior employees who are members of the executive committee of an issuer but 
are not board members.
652
 Note in this regard the role of the financial regulator in 
expanding the statutory ambit, which is unfortunately something that the JSC did not 
do, although it has the mandate to do so. 
The FSA added that “PDMRs might be persons employed by any company within the 
issuer’s group” who regularly have access to inside information and make effective 
decisions in the course of the issuer’s business and its development. 653  The same 
rationale is adopted by the FCA under DTR 2.8.7G. 
The obligation on PDMRs of disclosure (but not that on connected persons) is common 
between the UK and Jordanian disclosure regimes. Arguably, the underlying rationale 
of this obligation in both countries is the fiduciary duty.
654
 The DTRs require PDMRs 
and their connected persons to notify the issuer in writing
655
 of all their transactions in 
the issuer’s shares or financial instruments within four business days of the transaction 
day.
656
 Thereafter, the issuer should notify an RIS of all its PDMRs’ transactions as 
soon as possible, but no later than the end of the business day following its receipt of the 
PDMRs’ notifications.657 Additionally, the issuer should post PDMRs’ transactions on 
its own website by the end of the business day following its sending of information to 
the RIS, if the information concerned amounts to inside information.
658
 Since 2007
659
 
issuers are required to include in their annual reports and accounts all the interests in 
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their shares or any financial instruments held by the directors, i.e. PDMRs and their 
connected persons.
660
 
The FCA’s DTRs, like the FSA’s DTRs, do not explain in detail what is meant by 
PDMRs’ “own account transactions”. However, it is possible to refer to the principles 
laid down by the FSA to help identify the meaning. Here the definition is given as: a 
“transaction which is the result of an action taken by PDMRs or otherwise taken under 
their consent; a transaction whose beneficiaries are mainly PDMRs and transactions 
having a material impact on PDMRs’ interests in an issuer.661” 
3.1.2 The FSA enforcement actions (Disciplinary actions)662 
The FSA’s enforcement actions in cases involving breach of disclosure obligations were 
not limited merely to its disciplinary regime. The FSA could have dealt with cases 
outside its administrative regime if the disclosure breach amounted to civil market abuse 
(improper disclosure offence) or, indeed, under the criminal regime of the CJA of 1993 
if, for instance, the improper disclosure took the form of tipping inside information. 
However, the discussion here will focus on the FSA disciplinary process against 
breaches of disclosure obligation. Other enforcement actions under the civil market 
abuse regime and the criminal insider dealing of the CJA of 1993 is discussed later in 
Chapter 5 (Sec.1). 
When the FSA doubted an issuer’s compliance with one or more of the rules 
constituting the disclosure regime, it made a start on the case by conducting an informal 
investigation, requesting information or documents from the issuer in question which 
had to be provided by a fixed deadline.
663
 Following the submission, the listed company 
would either hear nothing from the FSA, or would be subject to further (formal) 
investigation if there were a suspected breach of one or more of the disclosure rules. 
The formal investigation carried out by the FSA team might hold discussions with the 
company or its individuals and require documents. If the investigation results clearly 
proved the breach, the decision on whether an enforcement action should be taken or 
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not would then be made by the Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC).
664
 If the RDC 
decided to take enforcement action, the issuer subject to the decision had twenty eight 
days to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber).
 665
 This Tribunal 
might either increase or decrease the sanction that was initially imposed (the amount of 
fine or the censure) by the FSA. However, if there was no appeal, a final notice would 
be published. The FSA would impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) 
impose a fine; (2) suspend the companies’ securities from trading; (3) publish a censure; 
or (4) issue a private warning. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the FSA would also 
bring cases of market abuse or insider dealing to court.
666
 
                                                     
664
 Woodcock Tony, ‘Market practice as a defence in regulatory proceedings’ (2010) 25 Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law 91 
665
 This was known as the Financial Services and Market Tribunal. Note that it is not an appellant body, 
but a tribunal of first instance, which will consider all evidence and give its own decision.  
666
  See Margaret Cole’s speech, then FSA Director of Enforcement and Financial Crime, FSA 
Enforcement Conference, 22 June 2010 at <http://fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Events/pdf/enforcement.pdf> 
Accessed: 17/11/2010 
99 
3.2 Section 2: The JSC Disclosure Regime 
Since the enactment of the first Securities Law (SL of 1997), the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC) has dedicated its efforts to ensuring equal access to the information 
necessary for investors’ investment decisions.667 Like the FSA, the JSC acknowledges 
that the disclosure obligation is vital for protecting investors, as well as ensuring 
fairness and transparency.
668
 The regulatory framework of disclosure obligation was 
broadly covered under the Securities Law of 2002 (SL of 2002)
669
 but it required 
detailed clarification. The JSC’s Disclosure Instructions of 2004670 were supposed to 
explain and demonstrate the application of those general rules and expand the detail in 
their requirements, but they did not, as will be shown. It is worth noting that the SL of 
2002 and the JSC disclosure regime are not the first disclosure regimes in Jordan. That 
regime can be traced back to the Companies Law (CL) of 1997 and its precursors.
671
 
The following discussion will cover the disclosure regime under the CL of 1997, then 
the SL of 2002. 
3.2.1 Disclosure under the CL of 1997 
The disclosure regime under the CL of 1997 focusses on the financial position of a 
listed company,
672
 its prospectus plans, and its decision makers (chairman, board 
members, and directors). Under the CL of 1997, the board of directors is required to 
prepare three financial reports. 
1) The annual report on the company’s activities, including forecasts for the 
following year, accompanied by the annual audited balance sheet (its profits, 
losses and cash flows).
673
 The report has to be submitted to the Companies 
Controller within three months of the end of the fiscal year of the company
674
. 
2) The semi-annual report (every six months) including “the financial position of the 
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company, the results of its operations, profit and loss account, cash flow, and the 
clarifications of the financial statements certified by the company auditors”.675 
The Controller should be provided with a copy within sixty days of mid-year.
676
 
3) A detailed report on the expenses, remunerations and privileges of the chairman 
and the members of the board of directors.
677
 This report should be placed in the 
company headquarters at the disposal of the shareholders, at least three days prior 
to the meeting of the general assembly.
678
 A similar obligation is imposed under 
the SL of 2002 and forms part of the JSC disclosure regime, as will be shown. 
This sort of financial disclosure arguably differs in its sense and meaning from the 
disclosure of inside information. The latter focusses on controlling the timely on-going 
dissemination of new information that would be likely to affect the securities’ prices 
once disclosed. The information in the financial reports is mostly old. It is based on an 
already past period of the company’s financial activities and is likely to have little 
influence on the securities’ prices. Therefore, it might be concluded that controlling and 
disclosing inside information falls outside the net of this annual reports obligation. (An 
important exception to this conclusion is discussed below in 3.2.2.) 
The second type of disclosure, of inside information, can be found under the CL of 1997 
in the disclosure obligation of the Persons Discharging Managerial Responsibilities in 
the company. Under this obligation they are required to provide written statements of 
their shares, and their wives’ and children’s shares, in their company and in any other 
company. The statement should be provided to the board of directors at its first meeting, 
and should be copied to the Companies Controller.
679
 Obviously this disclosure aims at 
identifying persons who have access to inside information, either in their own 
companies or in other companies, where the owned shares in those companies might 
affect the discharging of managerial responsibly. Thus, it can be argued that this 
disclosure has, to a certain extent, a similar purpose to the PDMRs’ disclosure required 
by the FCA. 
However, there are key differences in the ambit of obligation. Under the CL of 1997, 
the obligation is limited to senior management in the company, and does not include 
connected persons or those representing them. Also, it does not include persons who 
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have access to inside information by virtue of their positions or employment. Therefore, 
the effect of this disclosure on controlling inside information is arguably insufficient. 
This situation can be explained by the fact that the insider dealing offence is not 
expressly recognised in the CL of 1997. Rather, the underlying obligation represents a 
broad fiduciary duty on corporate insiders, which is at least a first step towards 
prohibiting insider dealing in Jordan.
680
 
Significantly, the ambit of this obligation under the JSC disclosure regime remained the 
same, as will be shown. In fact, this old rationale of targeting classic corporate insiders 
(directors, board members, managers) had to a large extent affected the JSC’s 
understanding and interpretation of the term “person” in the insider dealing offence. 
This led to a narrowing of the prohibition ambit of the insider dealing offence under the 
SL of 2002.
681
 
The disclosure obligation of the CL of 1997 arguably aimed at prohibiting those having 
access to inside information from dealing on the strength of it to secure illicit gains. To 
this end, the CL of 1997 explicitly prohibits the chairman, any board member, the 
company general manager and any of his employees, and any related parties
682
, from 
dealing directly or indirectly in the shares of their company on the basis of inside 
information acquired by their position or employment.
683
 Also the company’s external 
auditor and his employees, because of their also having access to inside information,
684
 
are prohibited from disclosing that information
685
 or dealing on the strength of it.
686
 
3.2.2 Disclosure under the SL of 2002 and the JSC Disclosure Instructions687 
The SL 2002 provided for general disclosure obligations which, to a large extent, 
reiterated the CL of 1997 disclosure regime. One addition was in the preparing of 
annual and semi-annual financial reports that now had to be submitted to the JSC
688
 and 
to the Corporate Controller.
689
 This obligation, as previously argued, would not control 
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the dissemination of inside information because the information in the reports would 
mostly be out of date. However, in the case of the report forecasts about expected 
projects or future agreements for the coming year, if these were definite enough and 
likely to happen
690
 there might be a case of inside information. In such a case, the 
double submission of the financial reports to the JSC and the Controller would create 
chances for possible leakage of sensitive inside information. Part of this problem is to 
whom the annual report should be submitted first? 
In addition, if the two submissions have to be made within a maximum of three months 
from the end of the company’s fiscal year,691 will this constitute timely disclosure? 
Arguably not, because three months is a long period in the context of a policy of timely 
disclosure designed to ensure prompt dissemination of inside information equally to 
market investors. 
The lack of any memorandum of understanding between the JSC and the Controller in 
regard to submitting the annual reports
692
 gives companies discretion to decide where to 
submit their reports first. For example, ‘X’, a telecommunication shareholding 
company, was to be granted a new 4G operation license from the government, and this 
was mentioned in its annual report under the future financial forecast for next year. This 
piece of information almost certainly constituted inside information, considering that 
negotiations were in the final stages. If the company opted to submit the report to the 
Controller first, then later to the JSC, and leakage of inside information happened, 
would the company nevertheless be legally liable for improper disclosure? It is difficult 
to answer “yes”, as submitting the report to the Controller is required under the CL of 
1997 and the SL of 2002. 
Note that yet another organisation could be involved where the issuer is a bank. In this 
case, the submission of financial reports should be to the Controller, the JSC and the 
Central Bank.
693
 The Central Bank requires submission to it first, and it could be 
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difficult to ensure confidentiality or prevent leakage considering the possible problems 
in identifying and controlling who had access to inside information. 
To sum up, the required disclosure of financial reports as mentioned falls outside the 
disclosure regime for inside information, yet company forecasts within the financial 
reports can amount to inside information. The submission to different departments 
arguably leads to leakage of that information. Finally, the timetables for submission do 
not ensure timely disclosure, which is one of the acute deficiencies in the JSC disclosure 
regime, as the discussion below will show. 
3.2.2.1 Disclosure of senior management 
Although this obligation was recognised under the CL of 1997, the JSC disclosure 
regime does not provide any further elaboration, or extend the classes of persons subject 
to disclosure. The JSC merely added that issuers must disclose any change of the share 
ownership affecting the management. The JSC considered this as a material fact
694
 that 
required prompt disclosure.
695
 This shows that the JSC recognises that major 
shareholders have influence over the company’s management and investment decisions, 
and they might exploit the company’s inside information for their own benefit. 
However, this recognition is triggered only when the shareholders happen to be 
members of the issuers’ board. Overlooking major shareholders’ impact on their 
companies if they are not in any managerial position is a critical deficiency in the 
disclosure regime, considering the personal nature of the securities market and its 
structure in Jordan. The World Bank Report revealed that the dominant structure of 
Jordanian listed companies is family ownership. Such an economic structure suggests 
that leakage of inside information could be both likely and possible on a large scale.
696
 
The situation requires a sound disclosure regime. It is worth remembering that 
investment decisions in Jordan are based mainly on friendships and family relationships 
rather than financial studies or analysis.
697
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Arguably the JSC’s focus on senior management relates to the orthodox origins of 
controlling insider dealing, when directors and senior managers were regarded as the 
company’s trustees or fiduciaries. 698  At the same time, the SL of 2002’s narrow 
definition of an insider (director, manager)
699
 arguably has also influenced 
implementing this sort of disclosure and directing it towards senior managers and 
directors. This old-style understanding of insiders suggests that the decision makers and 
drafters at the JSC lack the required skills and experience in this area of market 
misconduct. 
Berkowitz and Pistor et al, in their comparative-analysis of transition countries, drew 
attention to this problem. They found that developing countries like Jordan, which 
instituted reform programs and voluntarily imported legal rules in the “hope to increase 
the prospects of foreign investments
700”; subsequently faced effectiveness problems. 
One of the reasons for this, as Berkowitz and Pistor emphasised, was the unfamiliarity 
on the part of domestic lawyers and legal institutions with the received legal rules.
701
 In 
fact the human capital inefficiency will manifest itself more when discussing the 
prohibition regime in the next chapter, and the JSC’s enforcement problems in Chapter 
5.
702
 
The conclusion from all this is that imposing the disclosure obligation on corporate 
insiders in the way it has been done in Jordan has provided neither effective nor 
transparent regulation. For an optimal level of transparency combined with prompt 
dissemination of inside information, the disclosure regime must target any person who 
may have access to inside information. 
3.2.2.2 Notification of important changes 
Before discussing this obligation, it is important from the outset to look at the nature of 
the information which is subject to disclosure obligation. The JSC Disclosure 
Instructions of 2004 obliged companies to disclose any material fact, but not inside 
information.
703
 There is a critical difference between the two in regard to the 
implemented underlying test. For the information to amount to inside information it 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/MENA_Sep_03_Focus_Group_ExSummary.pdf 
Accessed: 18/7/2011 
698
 See this in Chapter 2, s. 2 
699
 This is discussed under the substantive analysis of the Jordanian prohibition regime in Chapter 4, sec 2  
700
 Berkowtiz et al (n 37) 
701
 Ibid 
702
 In s. 2, under the JSC enforcement actions and policies. 
703
 JSC Disclosure Instructions of 2004 art 8 
105 
should be of a kind that would be likely to affect the relevant securities’ price when 
made public. On the other hand if the information was of a kind that an investor would 
be likely to consider in his investment decisions, it would be material.
704
 
It is difficult, given the absence of explanation or guidance from the JSC (part of a 
wider lack of regulatory transparency) to understand why only material information 
should be disclosed. Considering that the insider dealing offence is based on inside 
information, not material, this poses a critical problem. A detailed discussion on this 
problem and its effect on the soundness of the prohibition regime will be found in 
Chapter 4.
705
 
The JSC requires listed companies to disclose any emerging material fact
706
 
promptly
707
, and thereafter to issue a public notice. These material facts are “any 
important changes that affect the company’s assets, long and short-term obligations, 
capital structure, credit rating, major transactions and rescissions, and any change in the 
share ownership that may have influence on the control of the company.
708” Also, the 
listed companies are required to notify the JSC swiftly of any important decisions that 
might affect the securities’ price such as mergers, voluntary liquidation, and buy-back 
of their own shares.
709
 
Moreover, any change in the board members or the formation of a new board should be 
notified urgently, with a statement attached that justifies that change. The statement 
should include the appointee’s qualifications710, if he was new to the company board or 
was appointed as a general manager, and if this change could have an effect on the 
securities’ price. In the statement, the JSC requires the issuing company to provide 
details of the names, positions and qualifications of appointed or resigning senior 
executives, and details of management change within one week of their occurrence
711
. 
(The same period is required for the previous changes in material facts.) This sort of 
disclosure is in addition to senior managers’ disclosure obligations mentioned earlier. 
                                                     
704
 SL of 2002 art 2 (glossary definitions) 
705
 Chapter4, s. 2 
706
 SL 2002 art 2 states that a material fact is “any event or datum that, to a reasonable person, would have 
an effect on making a decision to buy, hold, sell or dispose of a security.” A thorough discussion and 
examination of this concept will be in the next Chapter, s. 2 
707
 Although JSC Disclosure Instructions of 2004 art 8 states “without delay and through any means that 
ensure the required swiftness”, art 9(a) requires the statement or report to be provided within a week of its 
occurrence.  
708
 Disclosure Instructions 2004 art 8(a)(b)(e) 
709
 Ibid art 8(f) 
710
 Ibid art 8(i) 
711
 Ibid art 11 
106 
Yet all this focusses solely on traditional insiders (the board members). Under the UK 
disclosure regime it was shown that PDMRs’ disclosure goes well beyond the ambit of 
JSC disclosure in this regard. While the JSC targets traditional insiders, the FAS had 
extended the meaning of PDMRs and their connected persons to include as an insider 
any employee who operates below board level with access to inside information and is 
able to make managerial decisions.
712
 
Thus, the JSC is likely to be more concerned with job titles rather than considering the 
real substance of a role or the access it gives to information.
713
 For these reasons, the 
JSC has overlooked persons connected to PDMRs
714
 and persons who are acting on 
behalf of the company, for example lawyers, tax advisors, and IT agencies. This does 
not apply to auditors, who are prohibited to deal on the basis of inside information under 
CA 1997, as was mentioned.
715
 The names and qualifications of existing board 
members, and any future changes, are considered to be material facts that should be 
promptly disclosed.  
Targeting only these insiders suggests that the preparation and maintenance of updated 
insiders lists over a period of time is not recognised as important in Jordan, unlike the 
practice in the UK. Thus the JSC has a loose grip on the identity of issuers’ insiders, and 
its narrow view does not promote effective identification of possible sources of leakage. 
In addition to the material facts in regard to corporates’ boards, the JSC requires prompt 
disclosure of any material information without delay, and the making of a public 
announcement on the emerging fact.
716
 The crucial issue here is identifying the time of 
disclosure. If this disclosure through the JSC is on the same day as the public 
announcement by the relevant issuer, how is it possible to identify the exact time of the 
official disclosure? 
Let us assume that the JSC for some reason delayed posting the inside information on 
its website, or faced technical problems, while at the same time the relevant company 
made its announcement at a press conference. This would result in disseminating the 
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information to the public before its being disclosed through the regulatory channels. 
Thus, one of the people attending the press conference might possibly call his broker to 
place an order to buy shares in that company (if the inside information was likely to 
raise the share price) and thus get in ahead of market investors and thereby secure 
financial gain. 
This situation poses the question whether the company and the person who bought 
shares could be accused of disclosure breach or insider dealing. According to the 
underlying policy of disclosure, that is, providing information to the market investors 
equally, the answer is likely to be “yes”. However, the misconduct in this case was not 
intentional but resulted from a deficiency in the regulatory requirement. Consequently, 
it is highly recommended that making a public announcement should happen only after 
the JSC has disclosed the information to the market. In addition, sufficient time should 
be allowed between the JSC disclosure and the company’s announcement to make sure 
that the market has absorbed the new information. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the JSC disclosure regime does not ensure 
timely disclosure. If the precise time of disclosing inside information cannot be 
identified, how is it possible to determine whether the offence of inside information has 
happened or not. As the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) assessment 
pointed out: 
“Under current practice in Jordan, establishing the precise time at 
which the news becomes public is difficult. According to information we 
received, firms transmit material news to the JSC and/or Exchange, but 
may release this to the media prior to its arrival at either the Exchange 
or the regulator
717.” 
In the light of this, it could be suggested that the JSC should urgently amend the 
disclosure mechanism to ensure timely disclosure. The current disclosure regime, in 
contrast to the UK disclosure regime, does not provide the transparency aimed at by 
imposing disclosure. Also, in regard to the means of releasing the information, in 
contrast to the FSA’s RISs, the JSC have not identified any particular means of release. 
If the JSC is in favour of being itself the only vehicle for disclosure, the disclosure 
                                                     
717
 Polansky S, Kulczak M and Fitzpatrick L, ‘NASD Market Surveillance Assessment and 
Recommendations - Final report’ 22 Oct 2004 At: <http:// pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADB391.pdf> 
Accessed: 5/4/2011 
108 
department staff must expand. With only a small monitoring team
718
, the JSC cannot 
expect to be able to make a thorough assessment of disclosure content, nor expect to be 
able to ensure compliance with the disclosure standards.
719
 
3.2.2.3 The disclosure system and control of inside information 
The Disclosure Instructions of 2004 do not require issuers to establish internal 
procedures or systems to identify, control, and deal with inside information. They only 
require issuers to form an audit committee
720
 composed of three non-executive board 
members, which among other things would be responsible for assessing inside 
information.
721
 Such a committee is unlikely to be sufficient to tackle the problem as it 
would have no power to impose controls on persons who may have access to inside 
information. Also it would be unlikely to be effective, especially in critical cases that 
involve consulting third parties (lawyers, analysts, financial advisors, or even the JSC). 
It would also have difficulties in assessing whether information amounts to inside 
information or not. 
The absence of any requirement on issuers to implement internal systems and 
procedures to identify and control inside information suggests that another important 
factor is being overlooked. That is the absence of understanding on the part of issuers’ 
employees of the nature of inside information, and what improper behaviours amount to 
insider dealing and market abuse. The importance of such understanding is 
acknowledged in the UK disclosure regime, and is strongly recommended to Jordan. It 
is a cornerstone for enhancing awareness of the offence and thus for ensuring 
compliance with the disclosure requirements. In this regard, the JSC should require 
issuers to ensure that their employees are familiar with the offence. Also, the JSC 
should provide informal guidance to clarify the general disclosure rules, especially as 
the SL 2002 does not provide any explanatory appendices. In sum, the previous 
discussion is evidence of the inexperience and insufficient skills of the JSC’s members 
in failing to provide an effective and transparent disclosure system. 
                                                     
718
  WB Report on Jordan (n 692). The report stated that the number of staff was eight: up to now the 
number has increased by just two. 
719
 Ibid 
720
 Disclosure Instructions 2004 art 15(4) 
721
 Ibid. 
109 
3.2.2.4 Dealing with media speculations 
From the outset it should be said that, unlike the UK financial media, the financial news 
in Jordan is restricted to the financial pages of daily newspapers. They report mainly the 
market index and any general financial news of issues, IPOs, acquisitions or mergers. 
Therefore, any piece of news ‘scooping’ a financial transaction is likely to be either 
mere rumour, or based on improper disclosure. To deal with media speculations, Article 
9(3) of the Disclosure Instructions of 2004 states: 
“The company shall promptly issue a public statement to confirm, deny 
or correct any news item about a material fact pertaining to the issuing 
company, which is published in the media, and shall provide the copy of 
such statement.” 
Evidently, the Article places the responsibility on companies when dealing with the 
media, without a requirement to notify or consult the JSC first. Giving discretion to 
companies in this manner could result in premature disclosure that jeopardizes the 
interests of the company, or causes a leakage of material information. Nor have 
companies been trained or guided by the JSC on how to deal with such situations, which 
again highlights human capital problems in both the JSC and market players.
722
 
Although the disclosure regime in the UK allows similar discretion to issuers, the 
sensitivity of dealing with media speculation has been carefully considered. Issuers 
were guided by the FSA and advised on how to deal with journalists, where a “no 
comment” policy was the starting point723, in contrast to the JSC that encourages issuers 
to make statements. 
The JSC urges the involved issuer to make a statement that clarifies whether the media 
speculation amounts to inside information or not. In cases of unfounded or false 
information this policy can be justified, but in cases where the press speculation is true 
it cannot. This is because leakage of inside information has most probably happened, 
and prompt disclosure should be made to the JSC to control any further leakage of 
inside information. This shows the difference between the FSA/FCA and the JSC stance 
in this regard. Where prompt disclosure is required in the UK, in Jordan the JSC leaves 
issuers to deal with justified media speculations. This policy could arguably expand the 
leakage and disseminate inside information outside the regulatory channels. 
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Additionally, in such a situation it would be challenging to identify the exact time of 
disclosure and thereafter to decide whether an insider dealing offence took place or not. 
Considering these problems, the FSA/FCA way of dealing with justified journalistic and 
media speculation is optimal. A change in policy in Jordan would be particularly 
advantageous considering the size, structure (family oriented
724
) and nature of 
investment decisions (to a large extent based on personal connections)
725
 of Jordan’s 
financial markets. Therefore, it is to be highly recommended that the JSC should require 
prompt disclosure instead of the company making a public announcement. Otherwise, 
manipulators can take advantage of any time prior to the company’s statement to deal 
on the basis of inside information. 
3.2.3 The JSC enforcement powers 
Similar to the FSA’s situation, the JSC, in addition to dealing with improper disclosure 
cases under its disciplinary regime, has the authority to take actions against perpetrators 
using the insider dealing regime. The discussion here will highlight the JSC’s 
administrative regime (disciplinary procedures) in cases of disclosure obligation 
breaches. Other enforcement actions will be discussed later in Chapter 5 (Sec.2). 
In suspected cases of violating disclosure requirements under the SL 2002, the JSC 
would start by conducting an investigation, or holding a hearing, to determine whether a 
breach of disclosure existed or not. The authorisation for conducting the investigation 
should indicate the nature of the suspected violation and set forth the scope of the 
authority to investigate. Thereafter, a notice of hearing at a fixed date and time should 
be sent to the respondent, clarifying his right to present evidence
726
. Upon concluding 
the investigation, if the JSC found that the involved person had violated, or had taken 
preparatory measures to violate, any provisions of the SL of 2002 or the Disclosure 
Instructions of 2004, it could take one or more of these measures: (1) cease or suspend 
any activity relating to the securities or a specific security; (2) suspend the public 
offer
727
; (3) impose a monetary fine of no more than JD50,000.
728
 The Board may 
publicize any violation, along with the subsequent measures that have been taken
729
. 
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Despite this power to publicize, disclosure breaches are published only very briefly in 
the JSC annual reports. They merely name the person or company that breached the 
disclosure obligation, then cite the number of the violated article and the JSC 
enforcement action (usually a fine). Thus, no investigation details or summary of the 
case facts or circumstances are mentioned to clarify how and why the action was taken, 
although this could be done according to Article 21(b)(1).
730
 Therefore, the industry’s 
awareness is simultaneously hindered from two sides: the lack of JSC guidance and 
technical notes on regulatory disclosure, and the lack of detail about enforcement 
actions from which the industry could learn. 
Enhancing the industry’s awareness of improper disclosure offences and other market 
misconduct is vital for ensuring ordinary market compliance with the regulatory 
obligations. This situation raises another aspect of regulatory transparency, specifically 
the lack of any guidance, consultation, or technical advice issued by the JSC
731
. Thus, it 
is difficult for the industry to clearly understand the disclosure obligations it must 
comply with and how to avoid future breaches. This lack of regulator transparency 
extends to JSC enforcement actions, as will be discussed later in this study.
732
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3.3 Summary 
One of the justifications, as mentioned in the previous chapter, for prohibiting insider 
dealing was to ensure that investors are placed equally in regard to accessing market 
information. Enforcing disclosure obligation was considered to be the optimal way to 
control the timely dissemination of inside information. To this end, implementing the 
disclosure obligation will not merely ensure that insiders will not take advantage of 
inside information prior to market investors, but it will also underpin the market’s 
transparency and integrity. For these reasons, this chapter made a careful scrutiny of the 
UK and Jordanian disclosure regimes. 
The discussion showed the disclosure obligation is the first mechanism for tackling 
insider dealing. The more the disclosure regime is sound, the less the leakage of inside 
information, and the more investors’ confidence in the market will grow. Critical 
analysis of the disclosure regime in the UK and Jordan showed that the UK has 
implemented a thorough and sound regime. The regulatory regime is supported by 
guidance, technical notes, examples, etc., to ensure the regulated issuers understand 
their disclosure obligations and what systems and controls they have to adopt to comply 
with the regulatory requirements. 
In contrast, the disclosure regime in Jordan has critical problems, not just in its ambit 
and requirements, but also in the drafting of the disclosure regime itself. This points to 
inexperience and problems of professionalism in the JSC itself. Many loopholes were 
discussed: most serious was the lack of a precise, timely disclosure obligation which, in 
turn, will severely hinder any enforcement of the insider dealing offence. In general, the 
JSC disclosure does not provide the same level of transparency that the FCA provides. 
Suggestions to reform the Jordanian disclosure regime and enhance its effectiveness are 
provided in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 4 The Regulatory Matrix of Insider Dealing and 
Market Abuse in the UK and Jordan 
One of the important elements for an effective prohibition regime is sound regulation.
733
 
The more the regulation is well drafted and capable of conveying what is regulated, the 
more compliance will be achieved and the more enforcement will be effective in 
punishing and deterring.
734
 This chapter critically analyses the statutory prohibition, first 
in the UK, then in Jordan. 
Section 1 examines the UK criminal and civil prohibition regimes. The examination 
starts with the criminal offence of insider dealing. This covers regulatory elements of 
the offence, and the regulatory prohibition ambit as regards prohibited behaviours and 
persons committing the offence. Problematic issues around securing evidence are 
highlighted, as well as how this has influenced the creation of the FSMA of 2000 civil 
market abuse regime. Critical analysis is used to explore the differences in prohibition 
ambit (prohibited behaviours and persons) under the civil regime, compared to the 
criminal regime. A comparison is also made between the civil regime under the FSMA 
of 2000, prior to, and post, implementation of MAD. The study considers, for example, 
whether this implementation enriched the UK original civil regime. 
This critical review of the ‘rich’ UK experience, based on criminal and civil regimes, is 
used to inform and throw light on an examination of the Jordanian regime. The criminal 
nature of the Jordanian regime provides common ground for comparison with the UK 
regime. Having the UK regime in the background helps keeping the Jordanian regime in 
focus, as regards the prohibition ambit and the regulatory requirements for the offence. 
The study also looks at how the regime was presented in the SL of 2002: whether it was 
well drafted, and clear enough for both the financial regulator and industry. Regulation 
clarity is the key criterion used in the comparison, as well as whether issues of poor 
clarity have affected the efficacy of JSC staff (human capital). 
The aim of this chapter is to answer Research Question 2): Is the recently introduced 
Jordanian law effective? The importance of this question lies in the effect an unclear 
regime can have on regulatory enforcement. Exploring this critical issue paves the way 
                                                     
733
 Carvajal and Elliot, ‘The challenges of enforcement in securities markets: Mission impossible’ (n 31) 
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 Ibid; Berkowtiz et al (n 37) 
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to answering subsidiary Research Questions, such as: why there has been no 
enforcement action against insiders and manipulators in Jordan. 
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4.1 Section 1: The UK Criminal Insider Dealing and Civil Market Abuse Regime 
This section first examines the criminal offence of insider dealing under the CJA of 
1993, then the civil offence of market abuse under the FSMA of 2000, both prior to, and 
post, implementation of MAD. 
4.1.1 The criminal offence of insider dealing 
The significant breakthrough of the CJA of 1993 was in establishing the liability of the 
insider dealer on access to inside information, instead of the insider’s nexus with the 
company in question, as discussed earlier
735
. However, insider dealing retained its 
criminalized character, despite opposing voices from the City and the LSE, and 
Parliament calling for the inclusion of civil procedures and sanctions.
736
 In this regard, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) believed such civil sanctions “in most 
cases to be wholly disproportionate to the damage done by the insider dealers.”737 Also 
the government provided another justification for rejection by stating that: 
“…it was in the public interest to penalize individuals who conducted 
themselves in a particular way. That is the classic reason for creating a 
criminal offence. The government accordingly believes that the criminal 
law remains appropriate.
738” 
Inside information is the nub of the offence, when a person is deemed to act knowingly 
on the basis of such information, whether as an insider or a tippee.
739
 This section 
examines the statutory requirements of the crime: inside information, insiders and the 
prohibited acts. The general and special statutory defences in Section 53, 58 and 
Schedule 1 respectively
740
 are not covered in the discussion, partly because the focus is 
on the statutory offence, and also because the SL of 2002 did not provide any defences 
for comparison. 
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 The geneses of prohibiting insider dealing in the UK in Chapter 2, s.2 
736
 Rider, ‘The control of insider dealing - Smoke and mirrors’ (n 147); Rider, ‘Civilising the law - The 
use of civil and administrative proceeding to enforce Financial Services Law’ (n 144); Ashe, ‘The crime 
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 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), White Paper, Company Investigations, Aug 1990 (Cm. 1149) 
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 Stallworthy M, ‘Reforming insider dealing law in the United Kingdom’ (1993) 4 International 
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 The onus of proof is on the accused person to show that he is entitled to the benefit of the defence. For 
more details see: White (n 394) 
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4.1.1.1 Inside information 
Section 56 of the CJA of 1993 defines inside information as meeting certain 
‘requirements’ – specifically it is information that: 
1) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular 
issuers of securities but not to securities in general; 
2) is specific or precise; 
3) has not been made public; 
4) if made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any 
securities
741
. 
Each of these requirements is now explored in turn. 
I. The first requirement of inside information 
This requirement clarifies that inside information can relate to a particular issuer or to a 
whole sector.
742
 For example, if the government decided to make drinking alcohol 
illegal, this would amount to inside information before announcing it to the alcohol 
industry, even if it did not relate to a particular company in the sector. In addition, 
inside information is not confined to information about a company’s current situation, 
but includes any information which may affect the company’s financial prospects or 
business plans.
743
 This may include information about a company’s major clients, 
providers or competitors.
744
 In any of those cases, information amounting to inside 
information should have a significant effect on the price of relevant securities.
745
 Under 
the SL of 2002, inside information should have an effect on the price of relevant 
securities when made public, but the noteworthy point is that this effect should not be 
significant. In this, any slight change will fulfil the statutory requirement. 
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 The section definition shows a high degree of assimilation of inside information characteristics 
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II. The second requirement of inside information 
The second requirement mandates that information be, disjunctively, of a ‘specific’ or 
‘precise’ nature. Although the CJA of 1993 did not define the meaning of either term, 
746
the Parliamentary debate during the passage of the CJA of 1993 provided 
clarification.
747
 Note that the Directive of 1989 only used the ‘precise’ requirement but 
the government added ‘specific’. The Economic Secretary to the Treasury justified this 
addition because of government concerns that “precise” alone might be interpreted too 
narrowly by the courts.
748
 The government attempted to make it easier for the courts to 
identify what would be considered inside information, without the need to prove that the 
individual knew some or all of the details.
749
 For instance, if a person knows that a 
merger between two companies is imminent but does not know the exact price of the 
transaction, his knowledge would be specific but not precise
750
. This regulatory 
approach encompasses any relevant inside information, with the exception of mere 
rumour.
751
 The same approach can be found under the SL of 2002, which did not 
demand that information be precise. 
III. The third requirement of inside information 
The third requirement is that inside information can be used legally when made 
public.
752
 The government was at first inclined to let courts interpret the phrase “made 
public”, and considered issuing guidance to ensure proper interpretation. 753  This 
approach was not plausible for many in the City, nor for professional groups.
754
 
Substantive amendments were therefore made to the Criminal Justice Bill, in the 
Sanding Committee, 
755
to clarify the meaning of made public.
756
 
Under Section 58 of the CJA of 1993, information is public when: 
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 McCoy and Summe (n 357) 
747
 See for instance Mr Darling MP question to the Economic Secretary in the HC Standing Committee B, 
Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993, col. 173 
748
 Ibid cols.173-174 
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 Wotherspoon (n 396). See also R v Cross [1991] BCLC 125 at 132, the Court of Appeal realized the 
jury’s confusion regarding the meaning of specific under the Act of 1985. 
750
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751
 Ibid cols.173-174 
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 CJA 1993 s.58(2)(3) provides that when information is made public or may be treated as made public. 
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 See for example Earl of Caithness clarifying the Government intention at HL Deb 19 November 1992, 
vol.540, col.772 
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 Wotherspoon (n 396); Rider et al, Market abuse and insider dealing (n 384) 
755
 See Mr Nelson discussing the Government amendments to clarify the meaning of made public, HC 
Standing Committee B (n 747)  cols.182-183  
756
 Now are provided under Section 58 of CJA 1993 
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1) It is published in compliance with the disclosure rules757. 
2) It is contained in public records758 that can be inspected by the public, such as: 
company records, patent registers or in publications such as the Official 
Gazette.
759
If the information is published in an obscure publication or non-
statutory register it would not be made public.
760
 
3) It can be “readily acquired by those likely to deal” in the related securities.761 
It can be inferred that “readily acquired” means that information is already 
incorporated in securities prices, and thus not regarded as inside information. As 
for “likely to deal”, it was argued that the phrase refers only to market 
professionals, like market makers,
762
 as they frequently deal in the market. Rider 
gave a different opinion on “likely to deal” as referring to “the market in shares 
itself”.763 Arguably, Rider’s opinion seems to be more coherent, considering the 
provision was not enacted only for market professionals, but rather for all possible 
dealers in the market. 
4) It can be derived from information already made public.764Although this may 
seem tautological, the purpose of the statute was to protect legitimate practices in 
the market, such as those conducted by analysts or financial advisors who can put 
together public knowledge about a company and an industry in a way that reveals 
inside information.
765
 
In addition to these non-exhaustive
766
 instances, Section 58 enumerates five 
circumstances, mostly akin to the situation of derived information, in which 
information is regarded as being public, even though it is not yet public.  
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 Initially, disclosure was governed by the Listing rules Ch.9 issued by the Stock Exchange and now 
under DTRs as discussed in chapter 3, s.1. 
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763
 Rider et al, Market abuse and insider dealing (n 384); Alexander, ‘Insider dealing and the market 
abuse’ (n 358) 
764
 CJA 1993 s.58(2)(d) 
765
 Alexander, ‘Insider dealing and the market abuse’ (n 358) 
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 This was stressed in HC Standing Committee B (n 747) cols.180-182 
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Note that the statutory clarification of the requirement “made public” provides an 
example of regulation clarity which cannot be found, to the same level, under the 
SL of 2002 prohibition regime, as discussed later in this chapter. 
Despite statutory clarification of “made public”, this requirement would still allow 
insiders to deal on the basis of inside information
767
, ahead of market investors. It 
would mean that they were not prevented from using the advantage of that 
information to secure gains.
768
 In this, it is generally accepted that markets do not 
readily assimilate information once it has been made public. Markets take time to 
respond to new information
769
 and adjust their securities prices.
770
 Therefore the 
“made public” requirement may not support the underlying policy of prohibiting 
insider dealing (taking advantage of inside information ahead of investors).
 771
 
Even if a person is accused of insider dealing on the ground that information was 
not widely disseminated, he can benefit from the statutory defences.
772
 For this 
reason, using “information not generally available”, as required in the civil insider 
dealing offence, seems optimal.
773
 It allows markets time to incorporate new 
information into securities price, and gives investors sufficient time to recognise 
it. 
IV. The fourth requirement of inside information 
The final characteristic of inside information is its price-sensitivity
774
. Information is 
price-sensitive if it would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of securities 
if it were made public.
775
 This vital feature of inside information is the key determinant 
for courts in insider dealing cases.
776
 Courts may rely on price movement after proper 
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 White has the same opinion as the writer: “..it appears to allow insiders to deal as soon as information 
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770
 Rider et al, Market abuse and insider dealing (n 384) 
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nd
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774
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776
 Rider et al, Market abuse and insider dealing (n 384) 
120 
disclosure is made, and on the number of transactions of the affected securities prior to, 
and post, dissemination of inside information.
777
 However, there is no theoretical 
percentage movement in price that can be applied in all cases.
778
 
4.1.1.2 Insiders 
The CJA of 1993 stressed that someone with direct access to inside information will be 
an insider even if no nexus with the concerned company exists.
779
 The underlying 
prohibition policy, in this sense, has shifted from “abuse of confidence”/fiduciary duty, 
to “inequality of information”. 780  The CJA of 1993 classifies persons (only 
individuals/natural persons
781
) who might commit the crime into:
782
 
1) primary insiders, who knowingly possess inside information through being director, 
employee or shareholder of an issuer or have access to such information by virtue of 
their position; this wide range of individuals reflects the impact of the 1989 
Directive on the CJA 1993;
783
 
2) tippees, who knowingly acquire inside information from an insider.784 
I. Primary insiders 
A person has information as a primary insider if he has direct knowledge of inside 
information through being a director, employee or a shareholder of an issuer of 
securities, or any person has information by virtue of his employment or office, such as 
lawyers, bankers, auditors…etc.785 Note that the CJA of 1993 applies for the first time 
to shareholders.
786
 In addition, the CJA of 1993 is applicable to employees who would 
have access to inside information regardless of their position in the company.
787
 Thus if 
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a janitor at the CFO’s office came across a financial report and read the confidential 
prospects of the company, he would fall within the primary insider scope.
788
 
Also, the “by virtue” requirement is wide enough to encompass public servants whose 
official duties give them access to inside information.
789
 What narrows the requirement 
is the way it is interpreted, which is to establish a business or professional relationship 
between the individual and the relevant issuer.
790
 For instance, the taxi driver might 
overhear inside information in a conversation between two company employees, by 
virtue of his profession as a driver, however he cannot be a primary insider by any 
mean.
791
 
II. Secondary insiders (tippees792) 
According to Section 57(2)(b), a secondary insider, or tippee, is someone who knows 
that he has inside information, directly or indirectly, from an insider. Thus, the example 
of the taxi driver may fall within the scope of tippee, if he knows that
793
: (1) it is inside 
information; and (2) the source of this information is an insider, whether he knows the 
identity of his informant or not.
794
 Accordingly, tippee liability, under the CJA of 1993, 
exists immediately whenever he is aware that he possesses inside information from an 
inside source, whether this acquisition was passive or active. 
To establish this notion, the CJA of 1993 eliminated the word “obtain”, which was in 
the CA of 1985, and caused contradictions when interpreted by courts. For example, the 
Crown Court at Southwark ruled, in the Fisher case, that the word obtain meant 
secured, procured or acquired, not merely received. Therefore, Fisher was acquitted 
because he passively received a tip from an insider.
795
 Nevertheless, when the Attorney-
General asked for the opinion of the Court of Appeal on whether the word obtain might 
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have a wider meaning,
796
 both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held that no 
further effort is required than to have received the inside information.
797
 A similar 
rationale was adopted under the SL 2002, that merely possessing inside information is 
sufficient, regardless how it is obtained. 
To summarise: primary insider and tippee liability is based on knowing the nature of 
information, regardless how this it was acquired.
798
 
4.1.1.3 The offences under the CJA of 1993 
The offences are ultimately based on taking advantage of inside information while 
knowing its nature. Thus, a person is considered to have acted with full knowledge if he 
knew that the information was inside information, and he acquired it as an insider or as 
a tippee.
799
 The prohibited conducts relate to the offences of dealing, encouraging and 
disclosing
800
. The CJA of 1993 reduced twelve offences in the CA of 1985 to just three, 
however they replicate the previous ones.
801
 
I. The dealing offence 
For the dealing offence to be established two requirements are essential: (1) the 
aforementioned insider requirement; and (2) dealing in securities on the basis of inside 
information (not made public and having an effect on the relevant securities price).
802
 
Thus the prosecution has to prove that the individual knew that his information was 
inside information, and that it was generated from an inside source.
803
 This offence is 
akin to the insider dealing offence, under the SL of 2002, although broader in its ambit 
in regard of persons. The offence covers natural and legal persons, whether insiders or 
not. The SL of 2002 is narrower in the meaning of trading (buying or selling) and the 
covered securities (shares and bonds). This is covered in the next section. 
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The CJA of 1993 covers broad kinds of securities: shares, debt securities, warrants, 
depositary receipts, options, futures and contracts of differences.
804
 Also government 
and local authority securities
805
 were included, in line with the Directive of 1989
806
. The 
CJA of 1993 also expanded the definition of “dealing in securities”, to cover any 
acquisition or disposal of securities,
807
 including any agreement to do so, and pre-
contact negotiations.
808
 Note that the critical time the offence is committed is considered 
to be the time of the agreement, whether the individual was acting as principal or 
agent.
809
 For example, if an agent, at the time of executing the securities transaction 
upon his principal order, possessed inside information, he would fall within the scope of 
the offence, even though he did not know the nature of the information nor personally 
gain from the transaction.
810
. For such cases the CJA of 1993 provides statutory 
defences.
811
 
The scope of the dealing offence also embraces the situation where a person procures 
another person, directly or indirectly, to acquire or dispose of securities.
812
 The CJA of 
1993 provides non-exhaustive circumstances to illustrate procurement prohibition.
813
 
This sort of prohibition provoked discussion in the House of Commons Standing 
Committee during the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill. Specifically, the debate was 
over the phrase “a person who is acting at his (the procuring person’s) direction” 814. In 
responding to the debate over this case, the Economic Secretary provided an example to 
illustrate the rationale behind the prohibition: 
“An obvious way of doing that is to be the sole shareholder of a 
company. As sole shareholder, one uses one’s influence over the 
company to get it to deal in the shares. Any profit made or loss avoided 
would accrue to the company, but, as sole shareholder, one would 
benefit from the company’s increased profitability.815” 
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 Rider et al, Market abuse and insider dealing  (n 384) 
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The Jordanian regime similarly recognises sole shareholders of companies, however this 
situation, and the possible effects on the company, were overlooked under the criminal 
insider dealing offence.
816
 This is discussed in Section 2. 
II. The encouraging offence 
Section 52 of the CJA of 1993 prohibits an insider or tippee from encouraging another 
person to deal in securities on the basis of inside information, where the insider or 
tippee knows, or has reasonable reason to believe, that the individual receiving the tip 
will trade, either on a regulated market, or off-market through a professional 
intermediary
817
. Thus, the essential element of the offence is the imparting of advice in 
contravention of the disclosure rules
818
 whether the recipient knew or did not know the 
nature of the information. This brings us to the disclosure offence, which is also 
recognised under the SL of 2002. 
III. The disclosing offence 
This offence is based on the disclosure of inside information, as opposed to proper 
disclosure in the course of the insider’s employment, office or profession.819 To prove 
the offence, it is enough for the prosecution to prove that the individual who disclosed 
the inside information was aware of its nature and source at the time of committing the 
illegitimate disclosure. It may be argued that this offence falls within the scope of the 
encouraging offence, if the recipient knew that it was inside information. Although this 
argument is understandable, what distinguishes the disclosure offence is that it does not 
require specific action by the recipient; the offence is committed simply by virtue of the 
improper disclosure. The improper disclosure offence is covered under the SL of 2002 
but of a different nature. The offence is considered civil, as discussed later. 
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4.1.2 Market abuse under FSMA 2000, prior to and post MAD 
4.1.2.1 The regime and its reform in light of the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 
Critics argued that reliance solely on criminal law to regulate insider dealing was 
neither efficient nor effective, and that the use of civil sanctions would be more 
appropriate,
820
 and that it would ease the evidential burden.
821
 Rider clarified those 
criticisms by stating that the criminal justice system in the UK was insufficient, on its 
own, to provide enforcement in the market abuse arena.
822
 Most insider dealing cases do 
not involve false or misleading statements, by word or conduct (fraud), to persons with 
whom the insider is dealing, especially when transactions take place on impersonal 
markets.
823
 Thus, establishing insider liability under the traditional criminal system 
would be difficult.
824
 In support of this argument White stated: 
“Between the introduction of the offence in 1980 and the 
commencement of the new law in 1994 only 33 cases were brought, of 
which 18 have resulted in convictions. The cases involved 52 
individuals, of whom 24 were found guilty. Yet over the same period 
there were 210 referrals by the Stock Exchange.
825” 
In fact, the failure of a number of high-profile criminal trials, due to prosecution 
difficulties
826
paved the way for the introduction of the civil market abuse regime. 
Interestingly, the proposed civil regime was concerned only with the effect of improper 
behaviour in hampering market integrity and efficiency, regardless of perpetrator 
intention.
827
 The government proposal for civil procedures of market abuse reflected 
government policy; markets must operate in an open and transparent manner to maintain 
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 sitting, 2 Nov 1999, col.673, Mr Allen-Jones described the proposed civil 
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market confidence in the UK financial system.
828
 For this, the proposed regime 
empowered the FSA with the necessary powers to combat market misconduct.
829
 The 
FSA was entitled to impose unlimited monetary sanctions, or other administrative 
penalties, on those (or induced others) engaged in market abuse
830
. 
Although the civil regime created by FSMA 2000 was claimed to have increased 
effectiveness and enforcement, and maintained investor confidence in market 
integrity,
831
 it was not introduced to replace criminal sanctions against insider dealing 
and market manipulation.
832
 Overall, the complementary nature of having criminal and 
civil weapons in the regulatory armoury was considered vital to the effectiveness of the 
financial regime.
833
 
Regardless of the claimed advantages of the civil regime, it had a rough passage through 
Parliament.
834
 Criticism centred on the lack of certainty in the general definition of 
market abuse behaviour, the sweeping civil sanctions, and the compatibility of the 
proposed regime with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
835
 In his 
evidence to the Joint Committee, Sir Sydney Kentridge (the Treasury’s legal advisor) 
justified the wide-ranging definition of market abuse behaviour, by explaining that: “the 
more you define, it has sometimes been said, the more loopholes there are.
836” 
The rationale was clearly to design a broad statute definition, which established a 
flexible, robust and effective regulatory system, proportionate to rapidly changing 
                                                     
828
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First Report (n 832) 
836
 Sanding Committee A (n 827) col.676 
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financial markets.
837
 To achieve that flexibility, a level of openness in the regime was 
essential, to cover unexpected and unpredicted developments.
838
 In this, the FSMA of 
2000 merely created and defined the outer limits of the civil offence of market 
abuse.
839
The same flexibility rationale could be said to justify the broad framework of 
the SL of 2002. However, the role of regulators in the UK and Jordan, in elaborating 
and explaining the general ambit of prohibition, differ completely. The efforts of the 
JSC in this regard, are totally unlike those of the FSA, which, as will be shown, played a 
vital role in clarifying and detailing broad statutory prohibition. 
The FSMA of 2000 was remodelled in 2005
840
 following the implementation of the EU 
Market Abuse Directive (MAD).
841
 Implementing MAD not only affected the FSMA of 
2000 but also the FSA Handbook, specifically: the Code on Market Conduct (MAR), 
the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTRs) and the Listing Rules (LRs).
842
 
Nevertheless, the underlying policy of MAD – to ensure equal access to information for 
market investors, to maintain the integrity of the markets, and thus to enhance investor 
confidence in them – merely mirrored UK market abuse policy.843 
In implementing MAD, the government had considered two main approaches: 
1) retain the original offences of market abuse, which had wider scope than those 
under MAD; 
2) mesh the original offences with MAD offences, to align with MAD 
requirements.
844
 
The rationale was to maintain a more wide-ranging prohibition regime than required by 
MAD.
845
 The Government’s approach was strongly opposed, on the grounds that the 
UK should prohibit only what was required by MAD, and because MAD regime was 
                                                     
837
 The Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Miss Melanie Johnson, Standing Committee A (ibid) 
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specific (more detailed), in contrast to the UK’s original broad regime.846 Despite these 
arguments, the government kept the original offences, as it was mindful of the narrow 
scope of MAD, and the possible adverse consequences or risks of this narrowing.
847
 
Also the government wanted to give the original regime more time to prove its 
effectiveness, as MAD was being implemented just three years after the creation of the 
UK civil regime.
848
 
In retaining the original regime, the so-called “super-equivalent” or “sunset” provisions 
(original civil offences) were meant to be temporary, for just three years at the time. 
Thereafter, they would have fallen away automatically unless legislation was introduced 
to retain them. Since implementing MAD, the life of these “sunset” clauses has been 
extended twice, and they only now expire on 31 December 2014.
849
 
4.1.2.2 The Code of Market Conduct (COMC)/ FSA Code of Market Conduct 
(MAR) 
In order to clarify and explain the general statutory prohibition, the FSA was required to 
produce a Code of Market Conduct, to illustrate what constituted abusive behaviour, by 
setting out the types of acceptable or unacceptable behaviours and relevant guidance.
850
 
Before doing this, the FSA had protracted consultations with the industry,
851
 on a 
version of the Code, before the draft Bill was published and introduced.
852
 In 
conformity with the FSMA of 2000 requirement,
853
 the FSA Code of Market Conduct 
(COMC)
854
 was eventually published, allowing the FSA some flexibility to adapt and 
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amend its rules or guidance, in line with any changes in market practices.
855
 This meant 
that the FSA was required to keep the Code up to date, while ensuring that it did not 
inhibit innovation
856
. 
The FSA COMC was substantially reformed after implementing MAD, and was 
renamed to Market Conduct (MAR), forming part of the FSA Handbook.
857
 The MAR 
provided lengthier guidance material, examples of behaviour that did or did not 
constitute market abuse, and listed non-exhaustive factors
858
 that should be considered 
when determining whether behaviour was abusive or not.
859
 In an early case of market 
distortion, the FSA clarified that, even if the Code did not provide examples of 
distortion involving short selling, determining whether abuse had happened could still 
be on the basis of the statutory definition, market standards and the regular user test.
860
 
This stance of the FSA was challenged in the Winterflood case
861
. At the Financial 
Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT), the applicants contended that merely satisfying 
the statutory definition of market abuse is not sufficient and it is necessary to read the 
FSA Code with the statute. The FSMT defeated these allegations and confirmed that the 
Code’s definition of what constitutes market abuse is not conclusive. The FSMT 
decision was affirmed in the same case by the Court of Appeal.
862
 
It is important to note that, where the FSA described behaviour as being abusive, this 
would not be conclusive. Rather, it would still be open to the FSMT to take different 
action.
863
 This was because the Code only had an evidentiary weight in determining 
whether or not an abuse had occurred.
864
 On the other hand, if the Code expressly 
provided that behaviour did not amount to abuse, then this would be conclusive
865
 (the 
Code’s safe harbours). 
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4.1.2.3 Key issues in the civil market abuse regime 
Before analysing the market abuse offences, it is necessary to understand: the statutory 
requirements for behaviour to amount to market abuse; the reasonable investor test; the 
scope of the regime; and its nature (civil or criminal?) 
I. The general statutory requirements for abusive behaviours 
According to Section 118 (1) of the FSMA of 2000, prior to implementing MAD, any 
behaviour amounting to market abuse had to satisfy three conditions: 
1) behaviour (whether committed individually or jointly) taking the form of one or 
more of the statutory abusive behaviours; 
2) behaviour relating to qualifying investments traded on a prescribed market; 
3) behaviour likely to be regarded by the regular user of the market as a failure of the 
perpetrator to observe the standards of market behaviours. 
After implanting MAD the FSMA of 2000 retained the same requirements with more 
expansion and some differences.
866
 The obvious first difference was the narrow scope of 
the abusive behaviour required for the new offences, by which positive action only was 
needed – specifically in the case of insider dealing (acquiring, disposing or the attempt 
to do either).
867
 On the other hand, behaviour under the original regime encompassed 
action or inaction
868
 (refrain from taking required action), whether intentionally or 
recklessly.
869
 From this, it is clear that the intention requirement was omitted, which 
constituted an impediment to proving criminal insider dealing cases. 
This regulatory stance was not welcomed during the passage of the Bill, and faced 
considerable opposition.
870
 The concern was that, without requiring intention, some 
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legitimate practices that might have negative impacts on the market, could be 
considered market abuse.
871
 In disregarding these concerns the Economic Secretary 
explained the government’s point of view, that “market integrity may also be affected 
by people acting without due care and attention.
872” 
With regard to the required information, the new offences relied on the existence of 
“inside information”, 873  whereas the original offences were based on relevant 
information not generally available (RINGA). The use of RINGA, as will be shown, 
has a broader scope than inside information. To be more specific, it does not need an 
insider, nor does it need to have significant effect on the relevant security’s price when 
it is made public
874
.  
Although the original offences do not employ the price-sensitivity test, they use the 
regular user test. In that test, the reasonable investor test was given more evidential 
weight in proving the offence of misuse of information, than the significant effect of the 
information on relevant securities prices upon disclosure.
875
 Note that the Jordanian 
prohibition regime has adopted both tests, the price-sensitivity and the regular user test, 
as discussed in the next section. However, whereas the adoption of the regular user test 
was debated and justified in the UK, in Jordan, adoption, along with price-sensitivity, 
was merely inferred from the statutory definition of inside and material information. 
Thus, it was never clear why two different tests were implemented. This is further 
evidence of the lack of transparency and clarity in the Jordanian prohibition regime, and 
also raises concerns about whether drafters had sufficient experience in dealing with 
market misconduct. 
II. The regular user test876 
The overarching standard in determining whether behaviour amounted to market abuse, 
under the original offences, was the “regular user test”. A regular user “…in relation to 
a particular market, means a reasonable person who regularly deals on that market in 
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investments of the kind in question.
877” In clarifying and justifying the rationale for this 
test, the Economic Secretary
878
 said that the regular user is not an actual user, but, 
rather, an objective user who is familiar with the market in question.
879
 Thereby, in 
situations where the actual user might tolerate the misuse of information, the regular 
user in the test would not. In explaining this philosophy of the test, the FSA clarified 
that the behaviour must be in conformity with market standards that aim to promote 
fairness and efficient operation.
880
 
Those standards, as the FSA argued,
881
 differ from one market to another, from time to 
time, and form case to case, depending on the case circumstances
882
and investments 
concerned.
883
 The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT), currently the 
Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber), in the case of FSA v Arif Mohammed, 
confirmed this approach
884
. The FSMT stated that it did not need expert evidence to 
determine whether or not a regular user was satisfied, rather the presented case facts 
were the basis of its decision, that an abusive behaviour existed (misuse of 
information).
885
 In all cases involving the regular user test, the alleged abusive person 
has the right to apply for FSMT and court review.
886
 In addition, the person may use the 
defence, provided in the FSMA of 2000, that he believed on reasonable grounds that his 
behaviour did not amount to market abuse, or that he took reasonable precautions and 
exercised all due diligence, to avoid behaving in a way that amounts to market abuse.
887
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III. Scope of market abuse 
Unlike the criminal offence of insider dealing, the civil offence of market abuse applies 
to both natural and legal persons (companies, business entities…etc.), 888  whether 
authorised or unauthorised.
889
 Also, the regime applies to behaviour which occurs in 
relation to qualifying investments traded on prescribed markets, whether that behaviour 
was committed: 
1) inside the UK, in relation to qualifying investments traded on markets located in 
the UK; 
2) outside the UK, but in relation to qualifying investments traded on a market 
within the UK.
890
 
The Treasury, in conformity with the FSMA of 2000,
891
 prescribed as qualifying 
investments, all investments of a kind which is admitted to trading under the rules of 
any prescribed market.
892
 
Implementing MAD
893
 meant that a wider range of financial instruments were included: 
transferable securities (shares, bonds and any securities giving the right to acquire 
shares or bonds); units in collective investment undertakings; options; futures; equity 
swaps; forward interest rate agreements; derivatives on commodities and financial 
contracts for difference
894
. Also abusive behaviours amounting to one of the new 
offences after implementing MAD, were expanded to be either in relation to qualifying 
investments, or to “related investments”.895 The added “related investments” are defined 
as investments whose price or value depends on the price or value of the qualifying 
investments.
896
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A practical illustration is the Shevlin case.
897
 Mr. Shevlin made trades in contracts of 
differences (qualifying investments) that referenced the share price of Body Shop 
International plc, a company whose shares were traded at the relevant time on the 
London Stock Exchange. Though the contracts of differences were not themselves 
traded on the market, their price depended on the Body Shop share price. The FSA 
Found Mr. Shevlin guilty of market abuse, as his trades were based on inside 
information that he acquired through the course of his employment at Body Shop. 
Another example is the FSA enforcement action against Jabre.
898
 Mr. Jabre, a fund 
manager for GLG, who, on behalf of GLG, short-sold ordinary shares of SMFG (a 
Japanese bank) on the basis of confidential information. The FSA found that Mr. Jabre 
was in breach of Section 118 of the FSMA of 2000, even though his trades occurred on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, because SMFG shares at the relevant time were quoted on 
the London Stock Exchange’s SEAQ International Trading System (related 
investments). However, Jabre appealed to the FSMT, contending that the term 
“qualifying investments” applied only to shares actually traded on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) – the UK market – not on shares of the same kind traded outside the 
UK. Furthermore, he added that his conduct on the Tokyo Exchange had no effect on the 
shares listed on LSE. The FSMT rejected Jabre’s allegations, stating that the abusive 
behaviour “does not require the identification of any particular shares as being 
qualifying investments to which the behaviour relates”899. Further, the FSMT clarified 
that Section 118(1) of the FSMA of 2000 requires the qualifying investments to be 
“admitted to trading” not “traded on” a prescribed market, therefore SMFG shares were 
“admitted to trading” on LSE.900 The FSMT concluded that as long as the underlying 
policy of prohibiting insider dealing is its effect on reducing confidence in market 
integrity, Jabre’s insider dealing in SMFG securities, whenever it occurred, destroyed 
confidence in the global market for SMFG securities.
901
 
This broad scope highlights a key difference between the UK prohibition ambit and the 
Jordanian. The prohibition regime under the SL 2002 merely covers the abusive 
behaviours relevant to securities traded on the ASE, regardless of any related 
securities
902. Also, and in contrast to the UK’s wide range of financial instruments, the 
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only securities traded on the ASE are shares and government bonds, as discussed in the 
next section. 
As for the markets in which the abusive behaviour may take place, the FSMA of 2000 
entitled the Treasury to prescribe markets to which Section 118 (market abuse 
behaviours) applies, and to determine the qualifying investments which are to be traded 
on those markets
903
. Accordingly, the Treasury prescribed
904
 the markets to include all 
markets (regulated or not) established under the rules of the UK Recognised Investment 
Exchanges (RIEs)
905
 and the OFEX market.
906
 For the new market abuse offences, the 
prescribed markets include: all markets established under the rules of the UK RIEs; the 
OFEX
907
; and all regulated markets based in European Economic Area (EEA) 
countries.
908
 Note that, at a domestic level, the old UK regime is broader, given the 
types of markets (regulated or not) covered by prohibition. The kind of markets covered 
within the prohibition ambit raises another difference between the UK prohibition ambit 
and that of Jordan. The fact that Jordan has only one organised, regulated market 
reflects the narrow ambit of the Jordanian regime. 
IV. Market abuse regime: civil or criminal? 
Although market abuse was proposed as a civil regime, its nature has been debated ever 
since its passage into law. This is an important issue, considering its influence on the 
FSA’s enforcement actions, and the level of effectiveness of the FSA regime in tackling 
insider dealing and market abuse. 
The FSMA of 2000 was the first legislation to come before the Parliament since 
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into the UK Human 
Rights Act (HRA) 1998.
909
 Section 19 of the HRA of 1998 requires ministers to declare 
the status of any new regulation (civil or criminal), to determine whether it is fully 
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compliant with the ECHR. This was a crucial challenge for the government during the 
passage of the Bill. The nub of the contentious argument was whether the new regime, 
specifically its procedures, met the requirements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR. 
Before going any further, it is essential to highlight the requirements of both of these 
articles. 
Article 6(1) which applies to civil and criminal procedures, states that: “everyone is 
entitled to fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.” The FSMA of 2000 seemed to fulfil this ECHR 
requirement. The right of full hearing before the FSMT is granted in any disciplinary 
case amounting to market abuse.
910
 
This was not the only problem though. Lord Lester, the then City legal representative, 
contended that the nature of FSA disciplinary procedures was criminal, as it was not an 
independent and impartial tribunal.
911
 The government opinion
912
, however, was that the 
disciplinary regime is limited to authorised persons and contains categories of 
employees who are part of a regulated community. Thus, the FSA’s disciplinary actions 
are essentially protective, rather than punitive.
913
 Note that the credible deterrence 
approach to enforcement, adopted by the FSA in the aftermath to the banking crisis, and 
now by the FCA, suggests otherwise, and emphasises the punitive nature of disciplinary 
action.
914
 
The debate, thereafter, centred on the remaining requirements under Article 6 and 7 of 
the ECHR. The remaining requirements in both articles, relevant to criminal 
proceedings, require that a defendant: 
1) be assumed innocent until proved guilty and ensure a privilege against self-
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Secretary stated: “……[I have] no doubts that the disciplinary regime…..meets the Convention 
requirements already. They are not criminal either for domestic or Convention purposes……….they are 
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incrimination
915
; 
2) be able to foresee the legal consequences of his action, which means that the 
offence must be clearly defined;
916
 
3) be represented (by lawyers) and independently; also legal assistance should be 
provided “when the interests of justice require”;917 
4) be informed promptly and in detail about the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him – and, additionally, should have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence;
918
 
5) be permitted to examine his witness and cross-examine those against him on the 
same conditions
919
. 
These requirements raised concerns about the impact of the ECHR on the proposed 
regime. The Joint Committee clarified that, although the draft Bill classified market 
abuse as civil, such classification under domestic law was not conclusive for the 
ECHR.
920
 Many areas in the Bill seemed to violate the ECHR, such as:
921
 
(a) the presumption of innocence might be infringed if the standard of proof 
before the FSMT was to be interpreted as balance of probabilities
922
 (as the FSA 
contemplated), rather than proof according to criminal standards or high-level 
standards; 
(b) the very general definitions of market abuse behaviour, provided under the 
Bill, contradicted the certainty requirement under the ECHR; 
(c) the unlimited fines were sufficiently extreme for the offence to be treated as a 
criminal not civil offence (considering the procedural guarantees in the ECHR)
923
. 
In the face of such arguments, the government reluctantly accepted that the market 
abuse regime might be treated as criminal under the ECHR
924
, and significant 
amendments
925
 were made to improve the Bill’s compliance with the ECHR.926 
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But for the unlimited fines, and the view that they were deterring rather than punitive, 
the case for treating market abuse as criminal rather than civil, would have remained in 
doubt
927
 – as would the whole market abuse regime. With this in mind, the effectiveness 
of the civil regime in achieving credible deterrence is to be questioned
928
. 
The first case to challenge the nature of the regime at a domestic level was the FSMT 
Davidson and Tatham case.
929
 Though the case did not involve a market abuse offence, 
the FSMT confirmed that market abuse proceedings are criminal for the purposes of 
ECHR.
930
 This opinion was based on three criteria: (1) the classification of the offence 
in domestic law; (2) the scope of the offence, and whether it applies generally or 
specifically to certain groups; and (3) the nature and size of the penalties.
931
 
As for the first criterion, the FSMT stated that, although the market abuse regime was 
not classified as criminal at a domestic level, the court retained its right to determine its 
nature for the purposes of the ECHR. For the second criterion, the FSMT found that 
market abuse regime was not limited to certain group within the population. In applying 
the third criterion, the FSMT concluded that penalties were of a criminal nature, in light 
of the ECHR, as they were not imposed for a disciplinary matter. Also, the size of 
penalties was clearly of a punitive and deterrent nature, rather than compensatory.
932
 
The FSMT concluded that, in light of Article 6 of ECHR requirements, the market abuse 
regime “opt to be regarded as criminal.”933  
This perception was reaffirmed by the FSMT in the case of Arif Mohammad.
934
 
Although the FSMT in Arif Mohammad agreed with the FSA that the burden of proof 
                                                                                                                                                           
924
 Memorandum from HM Treasury, ‘Part V, VI and XII of the Bill in relation to the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (n 913) 
925
 The Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Standing Committee A (n 827) cols. 653-654 
926
 Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets Bill, Second Report (n 834) 
927
 Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets Bill, Examination of witnesses, question 3, 19 
May 1999 
928
 An assessment of the effectiveness of the civil regime in achieving credible deterrence is provided in 
the next chapter, s.3 
929
 FSA v Paul Davidson and Ashley Tatham, FSMT Case no:31, Feb 2006 
930
 Ibid 
931
 Ibid p.40. It was suggested that this is a direct consequence of the overlap between civil and criminal 
insider dealing, under CJA 1993. Insider dealing is of a criminal nature because it is based mainly on 
fraud; therefore the resultant sanctions have the same nature. For further information see: Coffey J and 
Pinto T, ‘The compatibility of the Financial Services and Markets Act with the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
(2001) 12 International Company and Commercial Law Review 50. On the other hand it was argued that 
the market abuse regime is civil as long as sanctions do not include the penalty of imprisonment, and 
unpaid fines amount to civil debt. See on this: Eadie J, ‘Market abuse and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2001) 3 Journal of International Financial Markets 74   
932
 FSA v Paul Davidson and Ashley Tatham FSMT (n 929) p.41,42 
933
 Ibid at para 50 
934
 Arif Mohammad v FSA, FSMT (n 879) 
139 
should operate on a “sliding scale”, it clarified that the more serious the case, the more 
“cogent the evidence needed to prove it.935” The FSMT opinion gave strength to the 
arguments for criminalizing the market abuse regime, in compliance with the ECHR, 
and was widely applauded by academics.
936
 
Based on this discussion of the market abuse regime and the FSMT stance, it is 
suggested that enforcing this civil regime would no less challenging than enforcing the 
criminal regime. This is discussed further in the next chapter.
937
 
4.1.2.4 The offences - a substantive analysis 
The analysis now considers the market abuse offences presented under Section 118 of 
the FSMA of 2000. The discussion starts with the original offences, then the new ones 
after implementing MAD. This is to compare the flexibility and breadth of the old 
regime, with the new offences – which seem merely to reiterate the old offences, yet 
add new complications of proof. 
Section 118 of the FSMA of 2000 enumerates seven types of abusive behaviour:
938
 
1) civil insider dealing; 
2) improper disclosure; 
3) misuse of information*; 
4) manipulating transactions; 
5) manipulating devices; 
6) disseminating false or misleading information; 
7) misleading behaviour* and distortion*939. 
In addition to those primary offences, there is one secondary offence: the encouraging 
offence.
940
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I. Misuse of information941 
Under this offence, behaviour should fulfil two conditions: the behaviour must be: 
(1) “based on” information which is (2) “not generally available”. 
(1) “Based on”: the meaning of “based on” was raised in the Arif Mohammed case942. 
The FSMT based its interpretation on the FSA’s Code,943 which stated that information 
of concern must have “material influence” on the decision to engage in dealing. The 
FSMT confirmed that such information “must be one of the reasons for dealing, but not 
the only reason.
944” In line with this, the FSA’s Code states that a degree of certainty is 
required.
945
 
Note that the “material influence” on the investment decisions disregards the significant 
effect of information on the securities price in question.
946
 Arguably this test is easier to 
be proved than the “significant effect on prices”, required in criminal insider dealing 
cases. The vital issue is proving the importance of information for the reasonable 
investor’s investment decision947. In confirming this, the Upper Tribunal in the David 
Massey v FSA
948
 case, interpreted the price effect of non-public information as a mere 
condition. In that information would not be considered having a significant effect on the 
relevant securities price if this effect would not have influenced the reasonable 
investor’s decision949. Thus, in misuse offences, the prosecutor needs mainly to show 
the materiality of information for the reasonable investor’s decision, regardless of the 
need to prove price movements in the affected securities.
950
 
 (2) The relevant information is “not generally available”. Note that the FSMA of 2000 
did not use the term “inside information”, which is the most essential in the criminal 
offence of insider dealing. Accordingly, without the need to fulfil the statutory 
requirements of inside information, information “not generally available” will be having 
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wider scope than inside information.
951
 In addition to this advantage, information not 
generally available provides support for the underlying policy of prohibition: equal 
access to information.  
The CJA of 1993 wording, as previously mentioned
952
, permits dealing on the basis of 
inside information once it has been disclosed. This allows the person possessing inside 
information to profit from his deal, ahead of market investors, as markets need time to 
incorporate new information into securities prices.
953
 RINGA provides better protection 
for investors, as it makes dealing illegitimate, even though the inside information was 
disclosed, as long as it is not generally available for investors. 
If RINGA does not allow prompt dealing, when would dealing be permitted? The 
answer depends on when the information is considered generally available. The FSMA 
of 2000 expressly states that information that can be obtained by research or analysis 
conducted by, or on behalf of, users of the market is to be regarded as being generally 
available for them.
954
 In addition, the FAS’s Code listed factors to be considered for 
determining when information is generally available, such as the observation of public 
events and diligent research.
955
 The FSMT adopted the same rationale for the meaning 
of “generally available”: that the information is widely known to those using the 
market.
956
 
It can be concluded that the first market abuse offence, “misuse of information”, 
requires merely a behaviour that is based on RINGA, whether the abuser profited from 
it or not, and whether it had a specific effect on prices or not. In this sense, the offence 
is broad enough to embrace both: a) insider dealing as a civil offence, and b) improper 
disclosure
957
 – which were both added to the market abuse regime after implementing 
MAD. Note that the flexibility of “misuse of information”, because of RINGA, is not 
provided under the Jordanian prohibition regime. The regime recognises only inside 
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information as a statutory requirement for the insider dealing offence – akin to the CJA 
of 1993. 
II. False or misleading impression 
The offence exists when behaviour is likely to give a regular user a false or misleading 
impression as to: a) the supply of, or demand for, qualifying investments, or b) the price 
or value of those qualifying investments.
958
 This offence has parallels in the SL of 2002, 
however it is of a criminal nature. 
In the FAS’s original Code, four types of behaviour were defined under this kind of 
market abuse
959
: 
1) Artificial transactions: the abusive behaviour here is based on the “principle 
effect.”960 In this, artificial transactions take place where a person knew, or could 
reasonably be expected to have known, that his principle effect, falsely, would, or 
would be likely to, inflate or depress the apparent supply, demand, price or value 
of an investment. 
2) Artificial course of conduct: this behaviour is similar to the previous one, but 
covers any course of conduct other than transactions (for example the underlying 
commodity movements).
961
 
3) Disseminating information: here the person disseminates false or misleading 
information, in order to create a false or misleading impression, while knowing, or 
being reasonably expected to have known, the true nature of the information.
962
 
As Alcock emphasised, this an odd definition, since it is difficult to envisage how 
dissemination can have the purpose of creating a false or misleading impression if 
the person did not actually know the nature of information that he disseminated.
963
 
4) Disseminating information through an accepted channel: this occurs when 
information is disclosed through one of the RISs, in compliance with DTRs, but is 
false or misleading information. In this, a positive obligation of taking reasonable 
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care to ensure the authenticity of information is presumed.
964
 
Note, in retrospect, that the aforementioned types of behaviour resemble the new statute 
market abuse behaviours added after MAD (manipulating transactions, manipulating 
devices and dissemination of information)
965
 – to be discussed later. Therefore, it can be 
said that MAD did not substantively enhance the prohibition ambit of the original 
market abuse regime. 
III. Distortion966 
The FSA, in its Consultation Paper No.59
967
, confessed that it was extremely difficult 
to distinguish distortion amounting to market abuse, from market volatility resulting 
from the interaction of major market participants. In the original Code, the FSA defined 
market abuse under this heading in respect of two specific circumstances: (1) Abusive 
squeezes
968
: where a person, with actuating purpose, has a significant influence over the 
supply, demand or delivery mechanisms of an investment or the underlying product, and 
directly or indirectly holds positions that he expects will affect delivery of them; (2) 
Price positioning:
969
 where a person, with actuating purpose of distorting prices,
970
 
enters into a transaction or several transaction to move the price, without legitimate 
commercial reason.
971
 This offence is also recognised under the SL of 2002 but under 
the criminal regime. 
Hitherto, after implementing MAD, the two offences “false or misleading impression” 
and “distortion” had been lumped together in Section 118(8) the FSMA of 2000 and in 
MAR 1.9 of the Code.
972
 The current provisions of the Code define both behaviours 
as
973
; (a) being likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading 
impression as to the supply of, demand for, or the price or value of a qualifying 
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investment; (b) would be, or would be likely to be regarded by a regular user as, a 
behaviour that would, or would be likely to, distort the market
974
. 
In addition to these primary offences, Section 123(1) sets out the secondary offence of 
“requiring or encouraging” market abuse where a ‘person A’, by taking or refraining 
from taking any action, has required or encouraged another person or persons to engage 
in a behaviours which, if engaged in by ‘person A’, would amount to market abuse. This 
offence occurs even if the stimulating person was refraining from taking an action. 
Also, the focus in this offence is on the person encouraging, rather than the person being 
encouraged.
975
 The FSMA of 2000 entitled the FSA to impose civil penalties on those 
circumventing the market abuse prohibition, by encouraging others to do so.
976
 
An example of the FSA’s enforcement actions against encouraging persons, is the 
Jeremy and Jeffery Burley (son and father) case.
977
 Jeremy (the son) was the managing 
director of a company (BMS) which provided vehicles and equipment for oil and gas 
exploration companies in Uganda. One of those companies was Tower Resources 
whose shares were quoted on the AIM London Stock Exchange. Jeffery (the father) held 
shares in Tower Resources on behalf of his son Jeremy. Later, Jeremy acquired negative 
inside information regarding the exploration of Tower Resources, and, prior to 
announcing the information to the public, he passed the news to his father, Jeffery, and 
instructed him to sell all his shares in Tower Resources. The FSA held that Jeremy was 
engaged in two market abuse offences: “insider dealing” and the “encouraging” offence. 
As for the father, he was accused of insider dealing, even though he did not himself 
benefit from his behaviours.
978
 
Before turning to the new market abuse offences, it is clear from the previous 
discussion, that the FSA’s role in clarifying the breadth of statutory offences was vital. 
The guidance and examples provided in the FSA’s Code show the importance of the 
regulator’s role, not only in elaborating the statutory requirements for each offence, but 
also in helping market players to understand the offences. This regulatory role cannot be 
found in Jordan, as the current JSC instructions do not provide any explanation or 
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clarification on the broad prohibition of the SL 2002. Therefore it is to be expected that 
the level of understanding of offences, by market players in Jordan, would not be at the 
same level as in the UK. Also, the missing role of the JSC raises doubts of staff 
understanding of, and familiarity with, the prohibition regime. These issues of human 
capital inexperience are discussed further in Chapter 5.
979
 
IV. Civil insider dealing offence 
This is the first of the new categories of offence, resulting from implementation of 
MAD. This offence is distinct from the criminal offence in the CJA of 1993, but sits 
alongside it. The civil offence of insider dealing exists where an insider “deals, or 
attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or related investment, on the basis of inside 
information relating to the investment in question.”980 This definition is based on key 
terms that need elaboration. 
a. The insider 
Akin to the CJA of 1993, insiders
981
 are classified under the FSMA of 2000 into: 
(1) primary insiders (acquire inside information by virtue of their employment, 
professional relation or shareholding); and (2) secondary insiders or tippees (any person 
other than primary insiders).
982
 
Although both regulations excluded any requirement of “information connection” with 
the source of information “issuer”, the FSMA of 2000 went one stage further by also 
excluding any requirement of “knowledge” of the nature of information983, unless tippee 
liability was triggered.
984
 The FSMA of 2000 is therefore more capable of tackling 
insider dealing than the CJA of 1993
985
, as far as primary insiders are concerned. 
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Note that requiring tippee knowledge is due to MAD.
986
 It would have been better if the 
FSMA had omitted the knowledge requirement, as tippees are in most cases not 
connected with the issuer in question, which makes it difficult to prove their knowledge. 
It seems that the Jordanian regulator was mindful of this hurdle because, as will be 
discussed later, the tippee knowledge of the information nature is not required.
987
 
However, the tippee might be liable under the original offence of misuse of information, 
as it only requires the behaviour to be based on ‘relevant information not generally 
available’ (RINGA), which proves that this offence is more effective in tackling insider 
dealing cases. 
b. The dealing requirement 
Dealing is given a broad definition under the FSMA of 2000, that includes: (1) 
acquiring or disposing of investments, whether the insider was dealing as a principle or 
agent,
988
 directly or indirectly; (2) agreeing to acquire or dispose of investment; and (3) 
entering into or and bringing to an end a contract creating such acquisition or 
disposal.
989
 The dealing in this sense requires positive action, which is narrower than the 
wide definition of behaviour (action or inaction like negligence, reckless and refrain)
 990
 
in the original offences. The SL of 2002 also used the “dealing” requirement, however 
not for the insider dealing offence, as the term trading, with its narrower ambit, was 
used instead.
991
 
c. Inside information 
The FSMA of 2002 provides two definitions of inside information.
992
 The first is given 
in respect of qualifying investments that are not commodity derivatives, and the second 
is in respect of qualifying investments that are commodity derivatives. For the purposes 
of this comparative-analysis between the UK and Jordan, the focus will be only on the 
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first definition, as Jordan does not have commodity derivatives, or markets for such 
investments.
993
 
In respect of qualifying investments (that are not commodity derivatives), inside 
information can be defined as: information of a precise nature which is not generally 
available, relating directly or indirectly to one or more of the qualifying investments, 
and which, if generally available, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of qualifying investments. Obviously, for information to be regarded as inside 
information, key characteristics should exist, as now described. 
(i) Precise 
Information is of a precise nature if it: (a) indicates circumstances that exist or may 
reasonably be expected to come into existence, or an event that has occurred or may 
reasonably be expected to occur; (b) is specific enough to enable conclusions to be 
drawn as to the possible effect of those circumstances on the price of qualifying (or 
related) investments in question.
994
 
Again the requirement of “specific” and “precise”, for inside information, is essential, 
but it is even stricter than under the CJA of 1993
995
. The CJA of 1993 requires the 
information to be either “specific”, or “precise”, but not both.996 Similar debates to those 
raised during the passage of the CJA of 1993, in regard to specific and precise, were 
brought up in civil insider dealing cases. For example in the Morton and Parry case
997
, 
Mr. Parry alleged that the information that he received from Morton was neither 
“clear”, nor “precise”, nor “sufficiently” reliable. These allegations had challenged the 
FSA to prove otherwise. In doing so, the FSA considered many factors, such as the 
effect of information on a reasonable investor’s decision, its impact on the price, and the 
circumstances that the information was given under.
998
 Accordingly, the FSA was 
satisfied that the information was of a precise nature, though the counterparties were not 
given the actual price, nor the definite time, relating to the inside information 
concerned. 
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It can be inferred, then, that whenever the challenge of information being “precise” and 
“specific” arises, the burden of proof is on the FSA, taking into consideration, of course, 
the circumstances of each case.
999
 Note that the original offences are wider in their 
scope, because they used RINGA, without the need to be specific and precise – which 
makes proof much easier.
1000
 
(ii) Information not generally available 
When implementing MAD, the FSMA of 2000 did not adopt the same definition of 
inside information. MAD used “has not been made public”1001, whereas the FSMA used 
“not generally available”, which seems a better usage, considering market efficiency.1002 
As for the advantages of using RINGA, these were discussed earlier, under the misuse 
offence. The FSA Code lists several factors which are to be taken into account when 
determining whether or not information is generally available.
1003
 If any of those factors 
apply, it means it is not inside information
1004
. The listed factors are similar to the 
information made public under the CJA of 1993
1005
, but even wider. They include using 
new technological means (the internet) in generalizing information.
1006
 
d. Dealing on the “basis of” 
For behaviour to amount to insider dealing, a key factor is that of dealing “on the basis” 
of inside information.
1007
 The FSA Code provided factors to be considered when 
determining whether dealing was based on inside information. The following factors are 
likely to indicate that the dealing was not on the basis of inside information: 
1) the dealing decision was made before possessing inside information; 
2) the dealing decision was commenced to satisfy a legal or regulatory obligation; 
3) the dealing decision of a legal person did not involve, or was not influenced by, 
any person possessing inside information. 
                                                     
999
 Example of FSA enforcement action in this regard: FSA Final Notice, Steven Harrison, 8 Sep 2008. 
Mr Harrison committed insider dealing by using inside information (was precise) in his trades. 
1000
 Examples of FSA Final Notices under the old regime of market abuse, and using “RINGA” without 
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1002
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 CJA 1993 s.58 CJA  
1006
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It should be noted that the “on the basis” requirement put the burden of proof on the 
FSA, in that the FSA had to prove that the perpetrator behaviour was based on inside 
information.
1008
 However, in an interesting decision of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), it stated that it was not necessary for the national authorities to demonstrate that 
the person accused of insider dealing had used the inside information with full 
knowledge. Instead, the “use” of inside information is a presumption already embedded 
in the definition of the insider dealing offence. Thus, it is open to the accused person to 
rebut this presumption.
1009
 
e. Having significant effect on prices 
The FSMA of 2000 states that inside information would be likely to have a significant 
effect on investments prices, if and only if, it is information of a kind which a 
reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of his investment decisions
1010
. The 
use of the “reasonable investor” test, in judging whether the information has “significant 
effect”, was discussed earlier within the “based on” requirement of the misuse offence. 
Based on the previous statutory requirements, it is clear that the scope of the new 
offence is narrower than the original offence: misuse of information. That offence, 
misuse of information, was wide enough to embrace not just the offence of inside 
information, but also that of improper disclosure
1011
 – without any of the specifics in 
either offence which might be difficult for prosecutors to prove. For these reasons, it is 
clear that implementing the insider dealing offence did not add anything to the pre-
existing regime. 
V. Improper disclosure 
This offence occurs when an insider discloses inside information to another person 
otherwise than in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or 
duties.
1012
 This offence also requires an insider and inside information, under the 
                                                     
1008
 In all enforcement actions against insider dealing, the FSA was obliged to prove that the behaviour 
was on the basis of inside information. For example: FSA Final Notice, Woolworths Group Plc. (n 558); 
FSA Final Notice, Stewart McKegg, 16 Oct 2008 
1009
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 FSMA 2000 s.118(3) 
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previously mentioned conditions. It is also similar to the tipping offence of the CJA of 
1993.
1013
 
The FSA Code provided guidance and examples on the behaviour amounting to 
improper disclosure, such as that of a director who discloses inside information to 
another in a social context, or where the director (or any person discharging managerial 
responsibilities) gives selective briefings to analysts.
1014
 Note that all of the examples 
provided involved “positive action” – deliberately disclosing inside information – which 
underlines the narrow ambit of this offence, in contrast to that of “misuse of 
information”.1015 This breadth is not provided in the improper disclosure offence under 
the SL 2002, which is akin to the civil improper disclosure of FSMA of 2000 in 
requiring positive action
1016
. 
VI. Manipulated transactions1017 
The nub of this behaviour is using transactions to create a false or misleading 
impression, in order to manipulate market players. The FSA Code illustrates this 
behaviour and provides further guidance.
1018
 The FSA Code also identifies factors to be 
taken into account in deciding whether behaviour amounts to manipulative 
transaction.
1019
 
A practical example of one of those factors is the FSA Final Notice to Winterflood.
1020
 
In the case, FSA held that Winterflood executed trades without legitimate reasons 
(genuine market demand for supply) and thus amounted to market abuse. The FSMT 
and the Court of Appeal
1021
 supported the FSA decision. However the challenge in this 
case was the “actuating purpose” behind the transaction, which MAR 1.6.5 required 
when determining whether there was legitimate reason. The appellants argued that the 
FSA Code relating to market abuse offences required intention or “actuating purpose”, 
and that the case should be interpreted in this light. However, their allegations were 
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 CJA 1993 s.57  
1014
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1016
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turned down, as the FSMA of 2000 does not require an intention to commit market 
abuse. 
Another example of manipulative transaction is the Indigo and Bonnier
1022
case, which 
was dealt with under the original offences “misleading behaviour” and “distortion”. 
This proves again that the old regime was already capable of embracing all abusive 
behaviours, without implementing MAD. 
VII. Manipulating devices 
This abusive behaviour is an extension of manipulating transactions. The behaviour here 
consists of effecting transactions or orders to trade by employing fictitious devices or 
any form of deception or contrivance.
1023
 The main difference between this behaviour 
and manipulative transactions is that it is not necessary that a false or misleading 
impression has occurred. It is sufficient to prove that the activity was itself deceptive or 
factious.
1024
 
The Code contained guidance and examples on this behaviour which, in the FSA’s 
opinion, fell within this kind of abuse.
1025
 In addition, the FSA provided further 
examples in its newsletters, such as those where stake-building activities have been 
spread between different purchasers, to avoid disclosure obligations relating to a single 
stake
1026
. Note that under the SL of 2002, the manipulating transactions and devices are 
presented, but not with the same clarity, and as criminal offences, even though the 
underlying policy of the prohibition is akin to the FSMA of 2000. 
VIII. Dissemination of information1027 
The offence here merely requires a perpetrator, who disseminates information by any 
mean, to give false or misleading impression, regardless of any transactions or 
devices.
1028
 Obviously, the scope of the offence is as broad as the original offences, and 
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1024
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 FSA, Market Watch, Issue 10, May 2007, para.2,3 
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 Alcock, ‘Five years of market abuse’ (n 826) 
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might encompass the previous offences of manipulative transactions and devices.
1029
 An 
example of this abusive behaviour is posting information on an internet bulletin board 
or chat room that contains false or misleading statements about a company takeover.
1030
 
Also this behaviour might occur when a person recklessly discloses false or misleading 
information through RISs.
1031
 
Guidance on abusive dissemination was provided by the FSA Code and FSA News 
Letters, where the FSA clarified that deliberately generating rumours about a company’s 
future plans or developments is considered market abuse.
1032
 
This sort of abusive behaviour is also recognised in the SL of 2002, as will be shown. It 
is worth repeating that the JSC has made no effort to provide guidance or examples, as 
the FSA did. 
Before concluding this section, it should be mentioned that the three main safe harbours 
– share buy-back, price stabilization and conformity with market practices (presented in 
the FSA Code, and similar to those included in MAD
1033
) – are not discussed for two 
reasons. The first is that the aim of this section is to assess regulation clarity with regard 
to statutory offences amounting to market abuse. The second is that the SL of 2002 does 
not provide statutory defences to be compared with FSA safe harbours. 
4.1.2.5 Concluding thoughts 
The foregoing discussion showed how the flexibility of the civil regime enhanced the 
effectiveness of the FSA in combatting misconduct. However, the limited number of 
enforcement actions published by the FSA would suggest otherwise. The FSMA of 
2000 was not enforced promptly after its enactment, and FSA enforcement actions were 
not introduced until 2004
1034
. At that time, only three cases were completed under the 
civil regime: two offences involved individuals who were engaged in market abuse in 
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recklessly spreading false or misleading information through the media or RIS about a qualifying 
investment, or undertaking a course of conduct to give such misleading impression. 
1030
 MAR 1.8.6(1)E 
1031
 MAR 1.8.6(2)E 
1032
 FSA Market Watch, Issue 10 (n 1026); MAR 1.8.4E and MAR 1.8.5E showing that the FSA used to 
consider whether the abuser knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that information was 
false. 
1033
 CESR, Feedback Statements for Level 2 Implementing Measures, Dec 2002, CESR/02-2876 (Paris, 
CESR)   
1034
 FSA, Market Watch, Issue no.10 (n 1026) 
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the form of misuse of information,
1035
 while a third involved Shell, the giant petroleum 
company, which made misleading announcements.
1036
 
Arguably, it was the conjunction of several factors which impacted the effectiveness of 
the regime. The FSA was dealing with a huge new regime that needed to be explained 
and illustrated with guidance – no small task for the FSA, especially during the early 
years of enforcing the FSMA of 2000.
1037
 This challenge was in fact acknowledged in 
the aftermath of the banking crisis, and was considered one of the reasons for FSA 
regulatory failures.
1038
 
Another factor could have been the consideration of the regime as criminal. The 
effectiveness of criminal insider dealing prohibition under the CJA of 1993 was 
challenged by the high standards of criminal proof, whereas civil market abuse was 
supposed to substitute balance of probabilities.
1039
 However, in practice, market abuse 
cases brought before the FSMT showed that the regime was regarded as criminal, for the 
reasons discussed earlier. For this reason, the civil regime never overcame the obstacles 
to securing evidence, encountered under the CJA of 1993. Thus, arguably this 
controversial aspect of the market abuse regime impacted the effectiveness of FSA 
enforcement actions against insiders and abusers. That said, it was not the only factor - 
as discussed in the next chapter. 
The clear drafting of the UK criminal and civil regimes provides evidence of the 
familiarity of drafters, decision makers and regulators with the regimes, and reflects the 
long experience in regulating and combatting market misconduct. Can the same be said 
of the SL of 2002? This is discussed in the next section. 
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4.2 Section 2: The Jordanian Regime under the SL of 2002 
Regulating insider dealing and market abuse offences under the SL of 2002 was 
encapsulated in three broad-based articles in Chapter Eleven (Violation and 
Penalties).
1040
 Typically, the articles in SL of 2002 are general rules which suggest that 
it is, akin to the FSMA of 2000, a principle-based regulation.
1041
 The JSC was required, 
through its instructions, to explain and detail those general rules for effective 
application of the SL of 2002.
1042
 However, the JSC did not issue any instructions to 
detail and clarify the broad statutory prohibition, nor did it establish a code of market 
conduct, or provide any general guidance to explain what statutory requirements should 
be fulfilled for each offence.
1043
 Thus, the analysis of statutory prohibition, covered in 
this section, is based mainly on articles of the SL of 2002. However, the first issues to 
be addressed concern the nature of the regime and its scope. 
4.2.1 The nature of the regime (civil or criminal) 
The SL of 2002 did not expressly state whether insider dealing and market abuse/ 
manipulation are civil or criminal offences. However their penal nature can be discerned 
from the relevant legislative sanctions, which include fines and imprisonment. In view 
of this, some of the prohibited behaviours are clearly criminal offences, while others are 
civil offences. In the absence of any government announcements or regulatory 
justifications, it is difficult to provide a precise answer as to why the nature of the 
prohibited acts differs, even though they were presented under the same Article (for 
example, insider dealing is criminal, while improper disclosure is civil). Such confusion 
indicates regulatory inexperience in regulating this area of market misconduct. This 
becomes clearer when considering the statutory drafting process, and substantively 
analysing the prohibition regime itself. Note that ‘clarity of regime’ is one of the key 
differences between the UK and Jordanian prohibition regimes. 
4.2.2 Scope of the insider dealing and market abuse regime 
To determine the scope of the regime, it is essential to consider what securities, markets 
and persons fall within the domain of prohibition. 
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4.2.2.1 What securities 
Article (3) of the SL of 2002 states that securities: “mean any ownership, rights or any 
evidences local or foreign that are commonly recognised as securities and considered as 
such by the board [of JSC]”. Specifically, securities include: transferable and tradable 
company shares; bonds issued by companies; securities issued by the government, 
official public institutions, public institutions, or municipalities; securities depositories; 
shares and investment units of mutual funds; spot contracts and forward contracts; put 
and call option contracts; and finally, any right to acquire any of the aforementioned 
securities.
1044
 
Despite this range of financial instruments, in practice only two kinds of securities are 
traded on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE); equities
1045
 and bonds.
1046
 Equities 
(transferable securities) are shares of public shareholding companies, whether owned by 
the private of public sector; while bonds are investment units issued by mutual funds 
and the government, or Treasury bonds or bills
1047
. Note that, even if all of the types of 
securities described in the SL of 2002 were listed on the ASE, they would still be very 
limited, in comparison to the variety of securities included under the definition of 
qualifying investments prescribed by HM Treasury in the UK.
1048
 This may be due to 
the limited capitalization of the ASE,
1049
 compared with UK financial markets. Also, the 
financial positions of each market, and differences in their financial experience, have 
influenced the provision and listing of types of securities, to meet the investment needs 
of the industry.
1050
 
4.2.2.2 What exchanges 
The securities market is defined in Article (2) of the SL of 2002 as: “the Amman Stock 
Exchange or any trading market in securities licensed by the Commission [JSC] in 
accordance with the provisions of this law”. The ASE is an organised market, and so far 
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the only platform for dealing in securities.
1051
 It is clear then that the prohibition ambit 
with regard to the ASE market, will be narrower than that in the UK, with its diversity 
of prescribed markets described in the previous section – and because prohibition in the 
UK also covers misconduct outside the UK territorial scope, provided it has an 
influence on traded securities on a UK financial market.
1052
 
4.2.2.3 What persons 
The prohibition under the SL of 2002, to be discussed later, covers any perpetrator, 
regardless of his link or relation to the issuer in question. Also, natural and legal persons 
are fall within the prohibition,
1053
 whether authorised/ licensed or not. This expansion in 
regard of persons is one of the positive characteristics of the SL of 2002. But has this 
advantage been of any benefit in practice? It is difficult to say, given the lack of 
enforcement actions. 
The aforementioned remarks were necessary to highlight general differences between 
the emerging Jordanian regime, and that of the UK, with its developed financial markets 
and long experience in regulating insider dealing and market abuse, manifested in its 
civil and criminal prohibition regime. Such differences are illustrated more clearly in 
the analysis of the offences, below. 
4.2.3 The insider dealing and improper disclosure offences 
Unlike the FSMA of 2000, the SL of 2002 does not exhaustively define both offences. 
Rather Article (108) presents them broadly, in a way that does not clarify the specific 
requirements for each offence, as shown below. Article (108) of the SL of 2002 states: 
“A person shall be in violation of the provision of this law, upon 
committing any of the following acts: A. Trading in securities or 
influencing others to trade in such securities on the basis of inside 
information. B. Using inside or confidential information to attain 
material or moral gains, whether for his own benefit or for the benefit of 
others, including members of the board of directors and employees of 
the market and the centre. D. Disclosing inside information to other 
than the competent authorities or courts.” 
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Although scholars have argued that this Article only regulates insider dealing
1054
, its 
drafting, above, shows otherwise. Two separate offences can clearly be recognised: the 
insider offence and the improper disclosure offence. Scholars have seemingly confused 
the offences, since both are based on inside information. However, they differ not only 
in their statutory requirements, but also in their nature. Insider dealing is a criminal 
offence, while improper disclosure is civil, as will be shown. 
Such scholarly arguments, arguably, are evidence of misunderstanding, and 
unfamiliarity with the offence of insider dealing. It suggests, as law and finance scholars 
have argued, that national legal reforms in one country, encouraged by legal assistance 
and reform programs, can be hindered by lack of proper understanding on the part of 
judges, lawyers, politicians, regulators, legal scholars and other legal intermediaries.
1055
 
This situation seemingly exists in Jordan to a significant extent, as evidenced in the 
previous scholarly misinterpretation of the Article, in the drafting of the SL of 2002 
prohibition regime, and in the JSC’s understanding of it, as highlighted in this section. 
4.2.3.1 The insider dealing offence 
According to Article (108) the insider dealing offence occurs when: (a) a person trades 
or influences another to trade, in securities on the basis of inside information or; (b) uses 
inside information or confidential information to attain material or moral gains for 
himself, or others. 
I. The first requirement: who is involved? 
Remarkably, the Jordanian legislator did not use the term “insider”, or enumerate types 
of insiders, as for UK criminal insider dealing. Instead, the legislator used the term 
“person”. This suggests that the prohibition net was stretched to catch any person 
(natural or legal)
 1056
 regardless of being an insider or not. This stance is akin to the 
situation under the FSMA of 2000, where the civil market abuse regime covers natural 
and legal persons.  
But would this offence be carried out by more than one person jointly on in concert? 
The SL of 2002 definition of prohibited acts states that they include “any action, 
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practice or scheme…” 1057  which makes it possible to state that the insider dealing 
offence can be committed in alliance or collusion with others. 
Despite this breadth, the definition of an insider in the SL of 2002 had adverse effects in 
its interpretation of the term “person”. Article (2) of the SL of 2002 states that an insider 
is: “a person (natural or legal) who possesses inside information by virtue of his 
position or job”. Note here that the Jordanian legislator adopted the definition of 
‘classic’ insiders, being those (directors, employees) who acquire inside information by 
virtue of, or in the course of their employment (direct nexus).
1058
 Obviously the 
legislative definition overlooked other primary insiders having a professional relation 
with the company: secondary insiders or tippees, and shareholders. This, as noted 
earlier, was because the fiduciary theory was the basis of insider dealing prohibition in 
Jordan.
1059
 
Note that shareholders, who are excluded from the definition of insider, are recognised, 
as mentioned earlier, by the JSC disclosure regime
1060
 when their owned shares amount 
to five percent or more of the issuers’ capital. 1061  Arguably this is because that 
percentage would qualify the shareholder to discharge managerial responsibilities, 
which means he could be a classic insider, under the previous definition. 
The question here is to what extent the definition of an insider has impacted the 
interpretation and then the application of Article (108). A comprehensive review of JSC 
actions
1062
 clearly showed that the targeted offenders were mainly classic insiders 
(directors, employees), regardless of the type of violation (mostly breach of disclosure 
obligation.
1063
) This highlights the point that JSC staff, discharging, monitoring or 
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prosecuting, are insufficiently aware of the concept behind the insider dealing 
offence
1064
 and the rationale for its prohibition. The same applies to ASE staff, 
specifically its executive manager.
1065
 To avoid such misunderstanding, the Jordanian 
legislator should either expand its definition of insider, or eliminate it, to ensure proper 
application of Article (108). This critical issue is likely to be one of the key challenges 
to the enforcement process, as it limits the prohibition ambit and shifts the focus to 
corporate insiders only. Further discussion of this human capital inefficacy is provided 
in Chapter 5.
1066
 
Before discussing behaviours amounting to insider dealing, the question of whether 
intention is a statutory requirement arises. In other words, does the SL of 2002 require 
the prosecution to prove that the offender knew or reasonably would have known that 
the information was insider information? Under the FSMA of 2000, the civil insider 
dealing offence excluded any requirement of “knowledge”, as far as primary insiders 
were concerned, in contrast to the criminal insider dealing offence under the CJA of 
1993. As for the SL of 2002, the wording of Article (108)
 1067
 does not refer to, or 
include, any stipulation of “mens rea”. The explicit requirement is trading on the basis 
of inside information or using such information for moral or material gains.
1068
 
However, the imposed sanctions of imprisonment for up to three years and a fine
1069
 for 
committing insider dealing, suggests otherwise. The imprisonment sanction clearly 
points to the offence being of a criminal nature.
1070
 Accordingly, intention is one of the 
essential requirements that the prosecutor has to prove
1071
 in any insider dealing case. 
This is why the SL of 2002 took the same position as the CJA of 1993 in regards of 
requiring the existence of knowledge, which, as previously mentioned, was a hurdle for 
the prosecution, and one of the reasons for the failure to secure conviction in cases of 
criminal insider dealing in the UK.
1072
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Just as in the UK, it will come as no surprise to know that substantive prohibition 
against insider dealing has not been any more successful in Jordan.
1073
 Proving criminal 
intention is yet one more hurdle for the JSC, in enforcing insider dealing. 
II. The second requirement: inside information 
Article (2) of the SL of 2002 defines inside information as: 
“Information relating to one or several issuers or to one or several 
securities which has not been made public and which, if it were made 
public, would likely affect the price of any such security. This does not 
include inferences drawn on the basis of economic and financial studies, 
research and analysis”. 
The elements that should be satisfied to consider information as inside information are: 
a. Inside information is made public 
The SL of 2002 did not clarify when information is made or considered to be made 
public, nor have the JSC Disclosure Instructions of 2004 provided any criterion or listed 
circumstances to determine when information will be considered public. 
In the discussion over the JSC disclosure regime, the crucial problem of providing a 
timely disclosure mechanism was highlighted.
1074
 The lack of specific time, to 
determine when the inside information was disseminated, is a loophole that an accused 
person can benefit from, build his defence upon, and thus render the enforcement 
process ineffective. 
The nature of the required information arguably poses another challenge for the 
enforcement process. JSC Disclosure Instructions of 2004 base the disclosure obligation 
on disclosing “material fact”, not inside information, which is the statutory requirement 
for the insider dealing offence. The “material fact” according to the SL of 2002 is any 
event or datum that, to a reasonable person, would have an effect in making a decision 
to buy, hold, sell or dispose of a security.
1075
 Inside information, on the other hand, is 
defined as having an effect on the securities price in question when made public, 
regardless of its effect on the reasonable investor’s investment decisions.1076 
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It is not stated or explained why the regulator chose to use two definitions. Although 
both seem to complement each other, and serve the underlying policy of prohibiting 
insider dealing and achieving parity of information, a vital difference exists. In inside 
information, the underlying test is price-sensitivity, where the non-public information 
must have an effect on the relevant securities price, otherwise it will not be considered 
inside information. This test is akin to the implemented test for inside information under 
the CJA of 1993.
1077
 By contrast, material information is subject to the reasonable 
investor test, in which non-public information needs to be of a kind that a reasonable 
investor would be likely to consider in his investment decisions, regardless of its price 
effect. The test here is similar to the one used for the misuse of information civil 
offence, under the FSMA of 2000.
1078
 
The nub of the problem, then, is that two different tests are to be applied, depending on 
the type of information: one for the disclosure obligation, and one for the insider dealing 
offence. If the regulator intended to provide two definitions, with two different tests, 
this means that the information that should be disclosed is material information, not 
inside information. 
In practice, this would suggest that there is no regulatory mechanism to disseminate 
inside information – no duty to disclose it – thus, how would it be possible to enforce 
the insider dealing offence? On the other hand, if dealing was based on material 
information, would that mean that the accused person who traded on the basis of 
material information, would fall short of the prohibition ambit? For example, person ‘A’ 
knew that his company, ‘X’, was about to restructure its management, and tipped this 
information to a competitor company for which the information was vital. Let us 
assume that this information would not affect the securities price of company ‘X’, but 
that it would be vital for certain investors. Those who invested in company ‘X’ shares 
because of the reputation of it management, trusted their investment policy and 
decisions and would sell their shares if that management changed. Note that, whether 
‘A’ gained financially from tipping the material information, or was, say, given a senior 
management position in the competitive company (moral gain), he would still not be 
subject to insider dealing prohibition. This is because his improper behaviour was based 
on material information not inside information. This is a crucial loophole in the 
prohibition ambit, and hinders the prohibition policy if the legislator really meant the 
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distinction between the two types of information. Indeed any lawyer of an accused 
person will challenge whether the dealing was based on material or inside information 
and will take advantage of the differences between the two. Thus it can be suggested 
that information subject to disclosure obligation should be of the same nature as 
information required for the insider dealing offence. This drafting problem, which 
cannot have been intended, highlights the unfamiliarity and inexperience of human 
capital in regulating insider dealing. Whether this problem was in the legislator (in the 
SL of 2002 drafting) or in the JSC, such problems do not end there: they also affect the 
enforcement of the regime, as law and finance scholars have emphasised.
1079
 
In light of all this, it is still not clear how inside information might be disclosed, if it is 
not the type of information required for disclosure. 
To return to inside information, the SL of 2002 did not require inside information to be 
specific or precise. Despite this, legal scholars argued that the main characteristic of 
inside information is its certainty, which cannot exist unless information is precise.
1080
 
Apparently, those scholars mistakenly regarded requiring some level of certainty in 
inside information, as akin to requiring it to be precise.
1081
 To explain the difference, 
information about a company’s intention to raise capital is specific inside information, 
but it is precise only if the possessor had full details (time, the amount raised, whether 
free shares would be distributed to shareholders……etc.). Therefore, it can be argued 
that, as long as the SL of 2002 does not expressly require information to be precise, it 
will be sufficient for the prosecutor to prove that the behaviour was based on specific 
inside information. Again, this scholarly point of view is evidence of unfamiliarity with 
the insider dealing offence. 
b. Relates to one or more issuers or to one or several securities 
This requirement mandates that inside information be related to a particular issuer, but 
not to issuers generally. For instance, information should relate to specific industrial 
company, not to the whole industrial sector. Also, information is regarded as inside 
information if it relates to one or several securities, where the information will have an 
influence on the price of such securities. Note that this requirement covers only licensed 
issuers that have listed securities on the ASE, and reflects the narrow ambit of what is 
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covered by the FSMA of 2000 under “related investments. 1082 ” This is due, as 
mentioned earlier, to the territorial scope of the insider dealing offence, to having only 
one exchange (the ASE) in Jordan, and to the limited range of instruments traded on it. 
This requirement is akin to the requirement under the CJA of 1993. 
c. Information has an effect on securities price 
It was mentioned earlier that the SL 2002 adopted, for the insider dealing offence, the 
“price-sensitivity” test, which relies on subsequent evidence of price movement of 
affected securities. A test which, it is argued, would be challenged for “being wise after 
event”. 1083 
This requirement is similar to the criminal and civil insider dealing offence under the 
CJA of 1993 and the FSMA of 2000. However, the price-sensitivity test does not need 
to be of a significant effect; any slight effect on the relevant securities price, when the 
information is made public, will fulfil this requirement. This explains why the JSC 
focusses on monitoring market transactions and price movements, prior to and post 
disclosure, when tackling market misconduct.
1084
 
Apparently the Jordanian legislator, by omitting the “significant” effect, intended to 
extend the prohibition net, to make it easier for the JSC to identify suspicious price 
movements and prove insider dealing offences.
1085
 In fact, choosing the “price-sensitive 
test” seems appropriate for the Jordanian regime, since the ASE is the only securities 
platform, and market players are few
1086
, compared to the UK
1087
 of course. 
III. The third requirement: the prohibited behaviours 
Under the SL of 2002, behaviour amounting to insider dealing could take the form of: 
(1) trading in securities, or influencing others to trade, on the basis of inside 
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information; or (2) using insider or confidential information to attain material or moral 
gains, whether for the offender himself or for others.
1088
 
a. The trading or influencing offence 
For this offence to be committed, two elements have to be shown: (1) a person (whether 
natural or legal) possessing inside information, regardless of whether an insider or not; 
and (2) trading, or influencing others to trade, in relevant securities on the basis of 
inside information. Although Article (108) did not expressly mention knowledge or 
intention as a requirement, classifying insider dealing as a criminal offence means that 
proving intention is vital.
1089
 Note that proving perpetrator intention or knowledge is 
essential if the JSC opts to take enforcement action using the criminal regime, but if the 
JSC takes action using its disciplinary regime, intention is no longer required. 
The scope of the trading offence is limited to the case of purchasing or selling affected 
securities. The limitation is due to the use of the term “trading”, which is defined as 
being a contract of selling or purchasing securities.
1090
 In this sense, the prohibited 
behaviour should be a positive action, similar to the insider dealing offence under the 
CJA of 1993 and the FSMA of 2000. However, it is in contrast to the original market 
abuse offences under the original offences of FSMA of 2002, where behaviour includes 
action and inaction.
1091
 
In regard of the narrow ambit of trading (sell/buy), the noticeable thing is that the SL 
2002 uses the wider term “dealing” but for this offence. The definition of dealing, under 
Article (2) of the SL of 2002, embraces many forms of transactions, such as public 
takeover bid, depositing, trading, purchasing from issuer, short sale.…etc. 1092  It is 
therefore difficult to understand why the legislator, instead of using “dealing” (also 
positive action) in securities, used “trading”. If the term dealing had been used, the 
prohibition ambit would have been expanded to cover various kinds of misconduct, 
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including “trading”. However, as long as the term used is “trading”, the prosecution will 
be compelled to adopt the narrow statutory meaning. 
Trading on the basis of inside information is prohibited, whether the person gained from 
it or not as the legislator did not stipulate profiting or avoiding loss from the trading. 
Therefore, in proving the trading offence, the prosecutor should provide evidence that 
selling or purchasing securities was on the basis of inside information, which, when 
made public, affected the relevant securities price. 
Also, the trading offence includes the case where a person influences or procures others 
to trade in such securities, whether directly or indirectly. This case might provoke 
discussion in practice, since the SL of 2002 did not provide any circumstances under 
which a person would be regarded as influencing others to commit the offence (in 
contrast to the CJA of 1993).
1093
 An illustration of this would be the sole shareholder of 
a shareholding company
1094
 who might use his influence over the company to get it to 
deal in securities on the basis of inside information.
1095
 Although any profit made, or 
loss avoided, would be attributed to the company, being the sole shareholder means that 
any benefit will end up in his account.
1096
 Probably, this is not the only example of 
influence over a company. Since the majority of shareholding companies in Jordan are 
family owned businesses,
1097
 major shareholder influence on companies is to be 
expected.
1098
 In fact those family members discharging managerial positions often seem 
to consider the company’s capital to be their own, with little regard for other 
shareholders.
1099
 
Family-based ownership is one of the JSC’s major enforcement challenges, not only 
because of their possible influence, aforementioned, but because they are the dominant 
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economic forces in the market. Whether alone, or by lobbying elite politicians, they 
have significant influence on the JSC.
1100
  
The “influencing prohibition” should not therefore be limited to “trading in securities”; 
rather it should be expanded to cover any improper behaviour that undermines market 
integrity. Replacing the trading requirement with dealing, would help serving this 
purpose. Again in this regard, issues of regulation clarity arise here. Using several 
terms, like trading and dealing, material and inside information, has reduced the clarity 
of the SL of 2002. Also, it significantly affects the enforcement process, especially 
when the regulator itself has problems of inexperience.
1101
 
b. Using inside or confidential information 
This offence is based on using inside or confidential information to attain material or 
moral gains, whether they were for the perpetrator himself or for others. Like the trading 
offence, the nub of this offence is taking advantage of “inside information”. However, 
the “use” this time should result in attaining gains, which was irrelevant in the trading 
offence. The novelty of this offence is that secured gains could be moral, something that 
was not covered by the UK prohibition ambit. 
Before proceeding, the use of “confidential information” should be noted. It is the third 
type of information under the SL of 2002, in addition to inside and material information. 
Under the using offence, the SL of 2002 introduced the term “confidential information”, 
apparently as an alternative to inside information. The SL of 2002 did not provide a 
definition of confidential information, so it cannot be known what is meant, or why the 
legislator used it.  
It is possible that the legislator regarded inside information and confidential information 
as two sides of the same coin. If so, this understanding is incorrect, because they do not 
have the same meaning. For example, some changes to a company’s management might 
be regarded as confidential but not inside information, especially if such changes, when 
made public, did not affect relevant securities prices or investor decisions. Similarly, 
information in a company’s annual report, prior to publishing, might include 
confidential information but not inside information, because it would be old 
                                                     
1100
 This situation was discussed under the FSA’s disclosure regime, specifically the case of delaying 
disclosure. See Chapter 3. s.1. Also the influence of elite market players is discussed under JSC 
enforcement actions, s.2 of Chapter 5 
1101
 See Chapter 5, s.2 
167 
information. Thus, confidential information would not amount to inside information 
unless it satisfied the price-sensitivity test. For this reason, it is suggested that the 
legislator mistakenly used confidential information as an alternative for inside 
information. The drafting problem, that the SL of 2002 suffered, manifests itself again 
in that it impedes proper enforcement of this offence. Any suspected person can 
challenge the issue of dissimilarity between confidential and inside information. 
On the same question of drafting, it would have been optimal if the legislator had used 
“misuse of inside information” instead of the term “use”, which gives the impression of 
a legitimate act. By providing the “use offence”, the legislator has extended the narrow 
prohibition ambit of the “trading” offence, as regards the types of prohibited behaviours 
covered. However, this potential extension is curtailed by the need to prove that using 
inside information resulted in benefit, or attempting to benefit,
1102
 whether materially or 
morally. Moral gains, as mentioned earlier, are something particular to the Jordanian 
prohibition regime. As with other provisions of the SL of 2002, the reason for 
implementing moral gains is not stated or even explained by the JSC, and requires 
clarification. 
To explain its meaning, a good starting point would be a legal dictionary definition, 
along with examples from other Jordanian laws that use the world “moral”. At first 
sight, one might think of moral as being “a set of personal standards relating to right and 
wrong conduct”,1103 or a “person’s ethics and values”.1104 This is the meaning of moral 
in English language dictionaries, but is it the meaning that the Jordanian legislator 
intended? Most likely it is not. The use of “moral gains” was included in the official 
translation of the original Arabic drafting of the SL of 2002, however the translator did 
not choose an English word that was exactly equivalent to the meaning of the Arabic 
word. The original Arabic word would be better translated by using the more precise: 
“incorporeal” or “intangible” gains.1105 
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It should be noted that this is not the first time that the Jordanian legislator has used 
moral/ intangible gains – it was also used in the Income Tax Law (ITL) of 2009.1106 In 
listing the income sources subject to tax, the ITL of 2009 included the “income from 
selling or leasing intangible assets in the Kingdom, including goodwill.”1107 Although 
the Jordanian legislator did not provide a definition for goodwill, or an explanation of 
its exact meaning, it is something intangible/ moral.
1108
 Goodwill was defined as being 
an intangible thing/asset that has a market value and may consist of the company/ 
business reputation, brand names, consumers, location, value of provided goods, etc.
1109
 
Indeed those all constitute the ‘incorporeal elements of a merchant’s store’, under the 
Jordanian Commercial Law of 1966.
1110
 Therefore, it could be argued that the meaning 
of moral, whenever used by the Jordanian legislator, means intangible things. Therefore, 
for the “use” offence under the SL of 2002, it would be sufficient if the person using 
inside information secured moral gains. Clarifying this would be easier if examples 
were also provided. 
In the previous example of person ‘A’ tipping the managerial change in his company 
‘X’ to a competitor company, it was said that ‘A’ did not deal in securities, nor secure 
financial profit in exchange for the information he passed. However, he got a senior 
managerial position at the competitor company. Even if the new position offered did not 
include a better salary, the behaviour of ‘A’ would fall under the “use”, because he 
secured moral gain (a better job title and position). Indeed, if ‘A’ had not considered the 
job to be a reward for tipping, he would not have accepted it. 
Note that the moral gain can be attained for others. For instance, an auditor of a 
shareholding company passed to his fiancé – who worked for a competitor company – 
inside information about his company’s expected losses which would have severely 
affected its securities price when made public. His fiancé, in turn, passed the inside 
information to her company, which managed to avoid losses by selling their securities in 
that company. For doing this she was promoted. Thus, though moral gains were not 
attained for the auditor himself, he would still be accused of using inside information. 
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From the aforementioned examples and discussion, it can be seen that moral gains 
extend the prohibition ambit beyond material benefits. Although this regulatory stance 
is not officially justified, it could be argued that including moral gains is highly 
pertinent to a person’s investment rationale/decision – which, in Jordan, is not always 
based on financial assessment
1111
 – as well as being very relevant to the personalized 
nature of Jordanian market relations.
1112
 In discussing the Jordanian disclosure regime, 
for example, it was noted that investment decisions may be based as much on kin 
relationships, as on financial assessment or analysis. 
This investment trend, along with the dominance of family-based, listed companies, 
explains why moral gains were included. In personalized markets, where influences and 
personal relations are vital tools, it is to be expected that ‘gains’ from an exchange of 
tipping/ using inside information, can take the form of a better job, or expanded and 
strengthened relations with the powerful in the market. All are arguably moral gains, 
and, although not tangible, they definitely represent benefits, since relations or new 
positions can open doors for new investment opportunities. For these reasons it can be 
said that including moral gains was optimal and in line with the local nature of both the 
securities market and the investment mechanism. Note here that the personal character 
of the Jordanian market is quite different from international markets, such as the UK 
market, where mainly the capital and financial position of issuers is taken into 
consideration. 
The previous analysis of the insider dealing offence revealed problems of clarity in the 
SL of 2002. It was shown that the term trading was used instead of the wider term 
dealing, without any coherent justification for why the two terms were included, or why 
the term trading was chosen over dealing. Also, the SL of 2002 uses three different 
types of information – inside, material and confidential information – which means that 
different information, is required depending on the case. Additionally, the study 
highlighted how the statutory definition of an insider led to misinterpretation of the term 
“person”, and thus narrowed the prohibition ambit. Thus, the statutory definition, 
instead of clarifying the statutory requirements of the offence, created more uncertainty. 
To overcome this problem, the SL of 2002 should be redrafted by skilled persons who 
have sufficient experience and familiarity with this offence. A suggested drafting of 
Article (108) of the SL of 2002 could be: 
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“A person shall be in violation of the provisions of this law upon 
committing any of the following acts: A: Misuse of information: where 
the behaviour is based on relevant information that is not generally 
available to market investors and which if available to market investors 
would be considered in their investment decisions, or would have an 
impact on the relevant securities price, whether material or moral gain 
was secured or not”. 
The proposed drafting combines two tests: the reasonable investor and the price-
sensitivity test, which overcomes the problem of which is better to use – inside or 
material information. Also, using RINGA – which is optimally used for the civil market 
abuse offence, “misuse of information”, under the FSMA of 2000 – would allow time 
for markets to fully absorb and adjust to new information. Finally, although the 
proposed definition still refers to moral and material gains, securing them is not a vital 
requirement in proving the offence. 
4.2.3.2 The improper disclosure offence 
Under Article 108 (C), disclosing inside information to other than the competent 
authorities or courts constitutes the offence of improper disclosure. This offence exists 
upon proving the existence of inside information, with all of the aforementioned 
statutory requirements, whether the person committing the offence knew, ought to have 
known, or did not know, that he was possessing inside information. In other words, 
intention or knowledge is not a statutory requirement – as it appears to be from the 
wording of Article (108) –  and because it is classified as a civil offence. 
Note that the insider dealing offence, and the improper disclosure offences, are 
regulated under the same Article (Article (108)), but they are not of the same nature. 
This is because the improper disclosure offence was excluded from criminal penalties 
(fine and imprisonment) in Article (110) of SL of 2002.
1113
 This bizarre situation, which 
is not regulatory, raises once again the problem of clarity in the SL of 2002. Whereas 
the nature of the UK prohibition regime was made clear – as a result of government 
statements when proposing the regime, and in its presentation in relevant statute – in 
Jordan the nature of the regime was only discernible from the sanctions for the offences. 
Why these sanctions where presented in this way, and why sanctions were not provided 
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for all offences under Article (108), is unclear. However, if criminalizing insider dealing 
was intended to emphasise the necessity of establishing a rigorous prohibition regime 
against misconduct, why was improper disclosure excluded? Improper disclosure is no 
less harmful, and can equally undermine confidence – especially in a market the size of 
the ASE, with its personalized character,
1114
 where it is quite possible to disclose inside 
information inadvertently. 
The improper disclosure offence can be committed simply by disclosing inside 
information, in contrast to the permitted situations under the SL of 2002, and the JSC 
Disclosure Instructions of 2004. It can be committed by any person, whether an insider 
or not. For example, if a major shareholder ‘A’, recommended to a friend ‘B’, to buy 
shares in company ‘X’, and this friend in his turn passed this recommendation to person 
‘C’, all of them could be accused of improper disclosure, whether the tipped persons 
knew it was inside information or not. This raises the question of why improper 
disclosure was not included under the “use” offence, since it is widely construed to 
cover any improper behaviour that is based on inside information. If this had been 
considered by legislators, improper disclosure would have been a criminal offence. 
Arguably this would still be possible, if the JSC were to use its statutory autonomy to 
extend the “use” offence to include improper discloser, without the need to amend the 
SL of 2002. 
Most probably the JSC did not think of this because the improper disclosure offence is 
only considered to be a violation of disclosure obligations.
 1115
 In that, the focus is only 
on corporate insiders, which narrows the ambit of prohibition. Evidence of this 
misunderstanding of the improper disclosure offence can be found in the statement by 
Jalil Tarif, Executive Manager of the ASE: 
“Insiders, including members of the board of directors, as well as 
executive managers and employees, shall not use any inside or 
confidential information to attain material or moral gains … and may 
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not divulge any such information to any person other than their 
respective authority or the courts.”1116 
Note Tarif’s rationale for the improper disclosure offence, and what persons are 
targeted.
1117
 His statement shows how the definition of an insider in the SL of 2002 was 
used to constrain the meaning of “person”, whereas it could have extended to include 
any person committing misconduct. Interestingly, although primary insiders are 
targeted, as Halaseh stated, the JSC has “no functioning mechanisms to stop board 
members from benefiting from trading based on inside information.”1118 
The pervious discussion is further evidence of the insufficient skill levels of JSC and 
ASE staff, for dealing with this complicated area of market misconduct (insider dealing 
and improper disclosure). The professionalism problem among JSC staff is further 
discussed in Chapter 5, under JSC enforcement actions. 
Improper disclosure cannot be committed recklessly or negligently because the 
“prohibited act” is defined positively as “any action, scheme,….conduct or device 
forbidden…”1119 For example, if the CEO of a company left his office, forgetting that he 
had left important papers on his desk about an intended bid, and his secretary used the 
papers to deduce inside information about the bid, could the CEO be accused under the 
improper disclosure offence? If he can prove that his behaviour was reckless (negative 
action), then he cannot be accused of insider dealing or improper disclosure. 
 
In sum and from all these offences, it appears that the legislator, in providing the 
glossary for the SL of 2002, did not think of its possible effect on the ambit of 
substantive articles, such as the definition of prohibited acts that led to excluding any 
passive act from prohibition, even though the statutory drafting of the offences was 
broad enough to include action and inaction. Also, those statutory definitions were 
relied on in interpreting the offences – as with the definition of insider, which was used 
to construe the term person in a way that affected the ambit of prohibition. The SL of 
2002 should therefore be redrafted as a whole, with particular attention to the effect of 
glossary definition on the statutory ambit of substantive articles. 
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4.2.4 Market manipulation1120 
The offence of market manipulation is set out in Article (109). Akin to the insider 
dealing offence, it is considered a criminal offence due to the criminal sanctions 
provided for the offence in Article (110). Therefore, the prosecutor has to prove 
knowledge or intention of the accused person. According to Article (109), behaviour 
amounts to market manipulation when persons (natural or legal): 
“A- disseminate and promote rumours to provide false or misleading 
information, data or statements which may affect the price of any 
security or the reputation of any issuer; B- Solely or in collusion with 
others, affect any transaction in securities with the intention of creating 
a false impression of price or volume of trades of a security or any 
related security.” 
Though it is argued
1121
 that market manipulation is only regulated under this Article, a 
review of Article (107) indicates otherwise. This Article provides further prohibition: 
“A- The following shall be regarded as a violation of the provisions of 
this law: … C- Offering or selling securities on the basis of false or 
misleading data regarding: 1. The rights and privileges conferred by the 
security being offered or sold; 
2. The nature of the issuer’s business, the success thereof, the issuer’s 
financial conditions or future prospects. 
… E- Any deception or misrepresentation relating to securities…” 
 Note that Article (107) merely provides further elaboration of what has been prohibited 
under Article (109). However, it is noteworthy that offences under Article 107 are not 
criminal offences, because they are not covered by the criminal sanctions in Article 
(110). Thus, civil market abuse is also recognised under Article (107) of the SL of 2002. 
Generally, the ambit of prohibition covers any person (legal or natural, licensed or not) 
where his conduct affects securities transactions, or trades, otherwise than for legitimate 
reasons. The market manipulating offence can be subdivided into two distinct 
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“behaviours”: dissemination and manipulating transactions, which are discussed 
hereunder. 
4.2.4.1 The dissemination offence1122 
The nub of this offence is to affect the price of securities (move the price materially 
higher or lower) traded on the ASE by disseminating, promoting rumours, or providing 
misleading information (False information). The dissemination might be committed by 
any means other than transactions (which are covered under manipulating transactions). 
Note that the prohibition here resembles that provided under the UK market abuse 
offences “false or misleading impression” and “dissemination” offences. However, 
under the SL of 2002 they are criminal offences. Criminalizing the dissemination 
offence requires the prosecutor to prove that the violator knew, or could have 
reasonably expected, that the disseminated information was false or misleading. Proving 
such intention, or extracting it, might be challenging, unless Article (107) was applied 
instead (that is when the false information affects the issuer’s business, financial 
conditions or future prospects).
1123
 
The offence is committed when a person, for example, disseminates information about 
an issuer’s financial reputation, while knowing it to be false or misleading; or generates 
rumours intended to create a false or misleading impression – and the consequence in 
either case might be that the securities price of the issuer was affected. 
One might question whether disseminating false or misleading information through an 
accepted channel (under the disclosure obligation to the JSC) is covered under the 
dissemination offence? The prohibition scope in Article (108)(A) suggests that it is, as 
long as dissemination affects the securities price in question. Nevertheless, this case was 
separately regulated under Article (107) (B), by stating that “submitting false or 
misleading data in any document filed with the Commission [JSC]…” is regarded as a 
violation of the SL of 2002. Accordingly, this type of dissemination is not covered by 
the criminal prohibition in Article (109). Arguably it should be, since disseminating 
false or misleading information through JSC disclosure channels might be more 
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harmful, since issuers rely on these channels to assess their financial positions and 
risks.
1124
 Therefore, any false information could pose a direct threat to market integrity. 
Article (107) provides another type of dissemination, considered to be a civil offence, 
where a person promulgates or generates false information when offering or selling 
securities.
1125
 This offence is identical to the criminal dissemination offence under 
Article 109, although it is unclear why it was presented as a civil offence. 
Regulating the same improper behaviour under both criminal and civil regimes, could 
arguably be confusing for JSC enforcement staff – especially with their problems of 
inexperience – so uncertainty in the enforcement process is to be expected. The JSC 
only is pursuing disseminating offences, using its disciplinary/ administrative powers, 
when they represent a failure of disclosure obligation.
1126
 
4.2.4.2 Manipulating transactions 
Prohibition under manipulating transactions covers situations where a person, solely or 
in collusion, targets the transactions in securities with an intention of creating a false 
impression of the price or volume of trades of the securities in question, or any related 
security. This prohibition, though it is concerned with transactions only, also overlaps 
with the dissemination offence. It could be considered an extension to the dissemination 
offence, as both create a false or misleading impression. As is the case for the 
disseminating offence, no guidance or examples are provided to market players to help 
them understand what practices amount to market manipulation. 
As with the situation under the UK market abuse regime, the prohibition of 
manipulating transactions is broad enough to capture artificial transactions, since they 
create a false or misleading impression. However, the offence in the form of artificial 
transactions might be also considered civil if Article (107)(E) was to be applied. This 
Article considers any deception relating to securities to be a violation of the SL of 2002, 
if it is likely to have the effect of misleading others.
1127
 Also, it should be mentioned 
that using manipulative devices is prohibited through Article (107)(E), where any 
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deception or misrepresentation
1128
 relating to securities is regarded as a violation of the 
SL of 2002. 
As mentioned for the disseminating offence, the legislator’s attempts to regulate similar 
offences under different regimes (civil and criminal), as a result of weak drafting, has 
been one of the most obvious flaws in the prohibition regime, and explains the lack of 
prosecuted cases. 
4.2.5 Concluding thoughts 
Although the Jordanian insider dealing and market manipulation regime is encapsulated 
in only three articles, it has achieved some remarkable achievements. The breadth of the 
regime ambit is noticeable in some areas, such as in its use of the term “person”, instead 
of “insider”, which gives powers to law enforcers to prosecute perpetrators, regardless 
of their relationship with issuers. Also, adding “moral gains” to classic material profits 
can be viewed as a novel regulatory stance, as it goes beyond the need to secure 
financial material gains.  
 However, critical deficiencies in the regime were identified. The vagueness of the 
regime, by which the criminal or civil nature of offences was only discernible from the 
sanctions provided for each offence, led to similar behaviours having different natures. 
This is of great importance, given the differences in statutory requirements that should 
be fulfilled – specifically the intention in criminal offences. Also, such imprecision has 
adverse effects on the effectiveness of the enforcement process. The lack of clarity and 
cohesiveness in the drafting of the SL of 2002 has arguably led to poor enforcement 
actions, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In light of this, it can only be expected 
that the general articles regulating insider dealing and market manipulation would be 
subject to variable interpretation, particularly as the JSC cadre lacks the skills and 
experience necessary to deal with such complicated offences.
1129
 
The lack of adequate financial experience, of both the legislator and the JSC, was 
noticeable, and clearly influenced both the drafting of articles (regulation clarity), and 
the way the JSC and ASE interpreted their provision. This could be because the 
prohibition regime under the SL 2002 resulted from financial reform in Jordan, 
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encouraged and advanced by the WB and IMF.
1130
 The prohibition regime did not go 
through the process of trial and error, nor was it a consequence of financial scandals, 
globalization requirements and the financial position of the country, as it was in the 
UK
1131
. Rather the regime presented in the SL of 2002 had transplanted minimum 
international standards for financial markets, as a result of financial reform programs. 
This form of transplantation – as recognised in comparative studies by law and finance 
scholars – is evidence for the description of Jordan as an unreceptive (unfamiliar), 
directly transplanted, transition country.
1132
 To those scholars, unreceptive means that, 
at a domestic level, the regulators, decision makers, lawyers, judges and any other legal 
persons or institutions – who are supposed to develop and modify the borrowed legal 
rules to fulfil the local needs of the targeted industry and affected parties – had not done 
so. As Berkowtiz and Pistor el al stated of Jordan and countries in a similar position, 
they merely implement legal rules without being aware of the need to adapt them to the 
local and legal environment.
1133
 The human capital problem, that manifested itself in the 
lack of regulation clarity shown earlier, is evidence of this, and was viewed as coherent 
justification for the regulation clarity problem. This problem extends also to 
enforcement, as the next chapter shows. 
Another explanation for the clarity problem could be the way that the JSC, ASE and 
their staff were appointed. Were they nominated because of their qualifications and 
personal skills in the financial markets? The clarity problems suggest that they may 
have been nominated for other reasons, otherwise how can the drafting problem in the 
SL 2002 be explained, bearing in mind that, as Berkowtiz and Pistor el al found, some 
transition economies had transplanted their legal rules, without suffering familiarity and 
adaptation problems.
1134
 This leads us to question whether the political will to reform 
really existed, or whether it was only on paper, in response to the imposed reform 
programs. The discussion over JSC enforcement actions, in the next chapter, clarifies 
these issues.
1135
 
As for the substantive deficiencies identified in the SL 2002, the glossary did not 
encourage real understanding of the offences and their requirements. The offences 
themselves need to be redrafted to clarify their ambit, the behaviours included and the 
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nature of each – particularly the market abuse/manipulation offences, based on similar 
abusive behaviours – but with different interpretation. This will not only help clarify the 
requirements for the offences, but will also support enforcement. The aforementioned 
discussion answered Research Question 2) – Is the recently introduced Jordanian law 
effective?  
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4.3 Summary 
This chapter presented a critical analysis of the insider dealing and market abuse 
regimes of the UK and Jordan. In the UK sections, the analysis started with the criminal 
insider dealing regime under the CJA of 1993. The criminal insider dealing offence was 
explained in terms of requirements, ambit and the resultant enforcement challenges. The 
civil market abuse regime was then analysed, including all abusive behaviours (the 
original and new offences after implementing MAD) and their statutory requirements. 
The challenges of enforcing this regime were discussed – particularly in light of the 
FSMT view of its criminal nature. This controversial aspect of the regime is its main 
deficiency, in terms of regulation clarity criterion. 
The analysis of the civil regime identified the FSA’s vital role in providing guidance 
and examples of its Code, to explain and detail the scope of the FSMA of 2000. As for 
the employed criterion – regulation clarity – the critical analysis demonstrated the 
clarity of the UK prohibition regime, as a result of its clear drafting, and FSA efforts. 
This reflects the experience and familiarity with the prohibition regime, and suggests 
that any enforcement problems the regime may have will not be the result of either 
regulation clarity or human capital deficiencies. 
The analysis then turned to the Jordanian criminal regime, which was examined with 
regard to the prohibition ambit, and the clarity of regulation in presenting offences. The 
criminal nature of the regime was not stated clearly, and could only be discerned from 
the sanctions provided. This was particularly noticeable in the market manipulation 
offences, where similar abuses might be criminal or civil, without any regulatory 
justification for either. In general, the offences are presented and encapsulated in three 
broad articles, without any further explanation or elaboration of statutory requirements. 
This makes it difficult to identify the ambit of prohibition, particularly where the 
glossary definitions seem to limit this ambit, if used for interpretation. This suggests 
problems of human capital, not just in drafting the SL of 2002, but also in JSC and ASE 
understanding of the regime. 
In sum, the critical problem with the Jordanian prohibition regime is its clarity. This is a 
serious deficiency and undermines its enforcement. The drafting problem seems the 
more serious, since the JSC itself lacks the skilled staff necessary to apply the regime. 
An unclear regime, coupled with inexperienced staff, is a recipe for regulatory failure. 
For comparison purposes, and aside from what has been mentioned, the UK regime is 
180 
wider in terms of markets, securities and in its ambit, particularly in regulating insider 
dealing and market abuse under two regimes, which gives the regulator flexibility and 
diversity in choosing how to tackle improper behaviour. Also, the statutory 
requirements for each offence are well presented, which minimizes incidents of 
misinterpretation. The FSA experience in elaborating and explaining the regulatory 
regime is a model for the JSC to learn from, in order to enhance its own mechanisms in 
this area. 
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Chapter 5 The Enforcement of Regulatory Prohibition on 
Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 
The regulatory enforcement process is one of the essential elements for the success of 
any prohibition regime. It is “an ex post tool used to punish breaches of laws and 
regulations as well as deter further wrongdoings.”1136 A robust regulatory enforcement 
process will ensure compliance with and adherence to regulation by taking action 
against perpetrators. It fosters investors’ confidence in the financial markets and at the 
same time is a tool to secure achievement of regulatory objectives.
1137
 For these reasons 
enforcement is important, and any study of the prohibition regime cannot but examine 
regulatory enforcement. 
The area of insider dealing and market abuse poses challenges to regulatory 
enforcement greater than any other market misconduct. In the previous chapter it was 
shown that proving the criminal insider dealing offence was challenging because of the 
high standards of proof required under the criminal regime. Although the civil regime 
was proposed to overcome these obstacles, enforcement remained challenging, not least 
because of the FSMT decision on the criminal nature of market abuse. The nature of 
these highly technical offences is challenging in itself. However, this is not the only 
challenge. Issues like regulatory structure, regulatory independence (financial and 
political), the regulatory approach to enforcement and regulation, human capital 
professionalism, the clarity of regulation itself, the regulatory armoury of powers and 
sanctions, are all critical for any successful enforcement process. In this chapter, the 
effectiveness of the enforcement actions of the UK and Jordanian financial regulators 
will be explored and critically examined in light of the comparison criteria 
aforementioned. 
Section 1 will look at the UK and the reasons for the FSA’s shift from the light-touch 
approach to the enforcement-led approach, why each was adopted, and how, and to 
what extent, these approaches affected its combatting of insider dealing and market 
abuse. The section will examine how the FSA’s enforcement of the prohibition regime 
countered incidents of market abuse and insider dealing. Section 1 aims to answer the 
third Research Question: After decades of prohibiting insider dealing, has the UK legal 
framework succeeded in tackling insider dealing and market abuse effectively? If so, 
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has this been achieve through the criminal or civil regime? In other words, which 
regime provided better level of credible deterrence? 
Section 2 will seek to discover the underlying reasons for the lack of enforcement 
actions against insider dealing and market manipulation in Jordan. The aim is to provide 
coherent answers to the second Research Question:  Is there any enforcement of the 
law? If so, why are no cases brought to court (even though the Jordanian prohibition 
regime was inaugurated in 1997)? Do judges settle these cases using alternative dispute 
resolution? If there is no enforcement, what are the underlying factors that are 
hindering enforcement? 
The chapter concludes with Section 3 and an assessment of the effectiveness of 
enforcement actions under civil and criminal regimes in both the UK and Jordan: 
whether they provide the same level of credible deterrence for insiders and abusers or 
not. This assessment will be based on published information about enforcement actions, 
the arguments among legal scholars, the weaknesses found in both regimes, and a 
consideration of the lack of empirical research and enforcement statistics in this area. 
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5.1 Section 1: The FSA Enforcement Approach to Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing Cases 
The FSMA’s market abuse regime was introduced in 2001 to “fill the gap” in the 
protection of financial markets and to provide sound deterrence against market 
misconduct.
1138
 Since then, the FSA supervisory and enforcement actions in the area of 
market abuse and insider dealing have been under scrutiny from the financial sector, the 
media and the FSMT.
1139
 Although the FSMA of 2000 empowered the FSA with 
extensive and wide-ranging powers to investigate and discipline regulated persons and 
to take actions against perpetrators, criticisms of the FSA “light-touch” approach to 
regulation aggregated, especially during the heady times of the global credit crisis.
1140
 
According to critiques, the FSA’s enforcement actions, particularly against insiders and 
abusers, fell short to the extent that it was felt that insiders were not “frightened”.1141 In 
corroboration of this, the FSA market cleanliness assessment revealed that insider 
dealing was rife.
1142
 
The purpose of this section is not to review in a detailed manner the FSA enforcement 
procedures and how they were developed historically. The section aims to assess the 
FSA enforcement regime to answer the research question about the effectiveness of the 
civil market abuse regime in promoting market confidence and reducing financial crime. 
In other words, did the civil regime provide more credible deterrence than the criminal 
regime under the CJA of 1993? Of course the new financial regulator’s (the FCA’s) 
enforcement approach to regulation will be referred to, but the focus will be on the 
FSA’s enforcement action, considering that the FCA has only recently started its 
mission. 
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5.1.1 The FSA enforcement policy – from a “risk-based” to an “enforcement-led” 
regulator 
The FSA in describing its general functions (operations, rule-making and policy 
making) used to assure stakeholders that it would work in a way that ensured achieving 
its four statutory objectives.
1143
 Specifically, maintaining market confidence and 
reducing financial crime were two objectives that had influenced FSA enforcement 
actions
1144
 against market abuse offences. As mentioned earlier, the FSA was criticised 
because of its adoption of a light-touch approach to regulation prior to the banking 
crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis the FSA started using all the weapons in its armoury 
to combat insiders and abusers (an enforcement-led approach). John Coffee commented 
on the FSA as follows: 
“They have just discovered that they can enforce insider trading laws if 
they want to. It suggests that their prior lack of success had more to do 
with passivity and indifference than problems gathering evidence.”1145 
Thus, tracing the transition of the FSA’s enforcement policy and actions will be divided 
into two stages, prior to and post the banking crisis in 2008. 
5.1.1.1 The FSA approach to regulation and enforcement prior to the Banking 
Crisis 
The FSA light-touch approach to regulation manifested itself following 1997 in Gordon 
Brown’s speeches. He was then Chancellor of the Exchequer and reflected the Labour 
Government’s policy on the financial markets. 1146  Brown reiterated the Labour 
Government’s commitment not merely to “laissez-faire” but even to deregulation.1147 
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This confirms the influence of political policy on restructuring UK financial regulation 
(as discussed
1148
) and on implemented approaches to regulation. 
Interestingly the Labour Government’s light-touch policy was echoing the dominant 
legacy of deregulating the financial markets since the 1970s.
1149
 Deregulation meant 
that the role of the state should be to put an institutional framework in place for 
financial practice, but with minimum regulatory intervention
1150
. This accounts for the 
dominance of SROs and their vital role in the UK financial markets
1151
 until the creation 
of the FSA. Also, it explains why the SROs, for example the Panel on Takeover and 
Mergers, were against the creation of a unified financial regulator entitled to enforce 
state regulation.
1152
 
Deregulation and its influence on the state’s role originated from neo-liberal state 
theory, one of the neo-liberal ideologies and theories.
1153
 For capitalist countries, neo-
liberalism was perceived as the route to prosperity. A person’s well-being could be 
optimally achieved by advancing entrepreneurial freedom, free markets and free 
trade.
1154
 Neo-liberalism, salient in the 1970s, was an advanced phase of capitalism.
1155
 
It emerged in the mid-1970s in the US and the UK, then spread to the rest of the 
world
1156
 in the aftermath of the wave of inflation that hit major capitalist countries.
1157
 
The inflation crisis was considered to be a severe political defeat for the advocates of 
state economic controls
1158
 which, in turn, paved the way for the capitalists to restore 
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their earlier hegemony, as exemplified prior to the Great Depression in the 1930s.
1159
 
For this to happen, the role of the social democratic state (the Keynesian State) had to be 
rolled back in favour of a more “laissez-faire” state that promoted investments through 
deregulation and minimum interference.
1160
 In this context, the law merely functioned 
as a guiding principle.
1161
 As a consequence, FSMA 2000 was principle-based 
regulation
1162
 as further discussed later in this section. 
The doctrines of neo-liberalism tended towards an ascendancy of the financial markets 
over the state, which in economic terms meant efficient allocation of resources and a 
politically improved basis for human organisations.
1163
 The upper capitalists’ class 
power was embodied and expressed through the financial institutions in the industry
1164
 
(banks, pension funds, firms).
1165
 
This situation expanded beyond domestic levels to become the ideology for global 
competitiveness.
1166
 The reduction of capital constraints, which advanced enterprises’ 
geographical mobility, and deregulation were the contributing factors for the emergence 
of international cross-border companies that were capable of negotiating with states 
over their optimal investment terms.
1167
 This was accompanied by the rapid evolution of 
the capital market globally in the 1980s.
1168
 Thus, under global neo-liberalism, financial 
innovation was a vital means to achieve global competiveness.
1169
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Maintaining competitiveness globally meant more deregulation, more self-regulation in 
certain financial sectors
1170
 and minimum regulatory intervention.
1171
 It was a situation 
that could be described as a global competitiveness race or as, Lutz stated, a “race to 
bottom”. 1172  It was driven by international financial integration, particularly in the 
securities markets. In the face of global neo-liberalism and global competitiveness, 
states internally were “hollowed out” by mobile international capital.1173 What should 
be highlighted here that the myth of a sound economy through increasing liberalism was 
also adopted by international organisations such as the WB and the IMF in their reform 
programs.
1174
 This suggests a consensus of justification for financial reforms in Jordan’s 
emerging markets and the UK’s developed markets. 
In the case of UK deregulation, the roots of the light-touch approach can be detected in 
1979 with the erosion of the bank capital controls that were previously holding capital 
within boundaries.
1175
 This was followed by the integration of the financial services 
(banking, securities and insurance)
1176
 and the globalization of financial markets (the 
UK 1986 Big Bang).
1177
 On a political level, neo-liberalism was endorsed by the 
Thatcher government and illustrated in privatisation, market liberalisation and 
deregulation. These were employed to create opportunities for entrepreneurship, global 
competition and to maximise profits.
1178
 
Thatcherism was a significant turning point for the UK, both at a political and a global 
economic level.
1179
 With the Labour Government led by Tony Blair in 1997, neo-
liberalism/ Thatcherism was not only embraced but more deeply rooted and expanded 
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through the adoption of the light-touch approach to regulation.
1180
 In addition to neo-
liberalist influence, the “blind faith in the power of the ‘invisible hands’ to ensure that 
markets are self-correcting”1181 had influenced the adoption of such an approach. In 
other words, the notion was that there was no need for any intervention from 
government in the markets as they were already efficient.
1182
 
It can therefore be argued that political policy based on neo-liberalism was the leading 
influence in setting the scene and creating the scenarios for the financial industry from 
the 1970s till the banking crisis in 2008. The strong alliance between economic forces 
(elite capitalists controlling the financial institutions) and the political will of the 
state,
1183
 mirroring neo-liberalism, not merely shaped the financial regulator in the UK 
but persuaded it into adopting the light-touch approach. This was an approach that 
fostered a relaxed grip by the state on the financial markets, mainly the securities 
markets, to attract foreign capital.
1184
 
Note here that the UK regulatory transparency in regard to explaining and justifying 
what the government and the regulators are doing and why, does not exist in Jordan. 
Thus, while the FSA’s approaches to regulation and enforcement were easy to identify 
and to explain, the details of the JSC’s implemented approaches needed to be extracted, 
as will be shown in the next section. 
The light-touch approach to regulation had to be underpinned by two further 
approaches: a risk-based approach and a principle-based approach. Adopting both 
approaches as Gordon Brown contended would not only result in light-touch regulation 
but also limited-touch regulation.
1185
 The perception was that a risk-based approach 
would mitigate or minimize the regulatory burdens which were frontline challenges for 
enterprises.
1186
 This approach was based on trust in the firms’ (more precisely, their 
senior management’s) ability to assess their own risks. 1187  To have a broader 
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understanding of the light-touch approach and its influence on FSA enforcement 
actions, it is necessary to briefly present the risk-based approach and the principle-based 
approach. 
I. The risk-based approach 
To achieve its statutory objectives optimally, the FSA declared from the outset its 
commitment to a risk-based
1188
 approach to regulation and supervision, and devoted the 
next few years to refining it.
1189
 Interestingly, the risk-based approach was transferred to 
the FSA from the BoE,
1190
 which the latter had developed in the aftermath of the crisis 
over mismanagement of Barings Bank.
1191
 
The FSA favoured the risk-based approach for several reasons. 
1) It would allow the FSA to justify what it did or did not do – a defensive shield in 
times of financial failures
1192
. 
2) It would enable the FSA to allocate its resources coherently to the areas of most 
need, and justify this allocation internally to staff and externally to the finance 
industry, to politicians and to the public
1193
. 
3) Broad and vague statutory provision would not be drawn into operation unless the 
risk-based approach first triggered the process.
1194
 In that, the approach would be 
employed to identify what in particular gave rise to risks that threatened the 
achievement of the FSA’s statutory objectives.1195 
Identifying those risks was primarily by reliance on the firms’ senior management 
reports, reviews of their systems and controls, and risk assessments.
1196
 This accounts 
for the relaxed supervisory approach of the FSA which, arguably, could be described as 
                                                     
1188
 FSA, ‘A new regulator for the new millennium’ Jan 2000 
1189
 Black J, ‘The development of risk based regulation in financial services: Canada, the UK and 
Australia’ (n 1186) 
1190
 Ibid; Black stated that the FSA approach evolved from RATE (Risk Assessment Tools and 
Education), the BoE risk-based approach. She described it as “a systematic method for determining the 
allocation of resources and for structuring supervisory processes.”  
1191
 The BoE Report on the collapse of Barings Bank, 18 Jul 1995 at: 
<http://www.numa.com/ref/barings/bar00.htm> Accessed: 12/12/2012; Gray J and Hamilton J, 
Implementing financial regulation: Theory and practice (John Wiley & Sons 2006) 5 
1192
 Black, ‘The development of risk-based regulation in financial services: Canada, the UK and 
Australia’ (n 1186) 
1193Ibid; Fisher E, ‘The rise of the risk commonwealth and the challenge for administrative law’ (2003) 
Public Law 455 
1194
 Ibid Black 
1195
 Ibid Black; FSA, ‘A new regulator for the new millennium’ (n 1188);  
1196
 Ibid Black; Bazely, ‘The Financial Services Authority, risk-based regulation, principles based rules 
and accountability’ (n 232) 
190 
mere box-ticking, without real investigations or any challenge to received risk 
assessments.
1197
 To be fair, it was also an implementation of Gordon Brown’s vision of 
the risk-based approach: “No inspection… no form filling… no information required 
without justification, not just a light-touch but a limited-touch…”1198 
In other words, the FSA was not in favour of early intervention for two reasons: markets 
are self-correcting,
1199
 and the primary responsibility to manage and assess firms’ risks 
lies with the firms’ own senior managements who are better placed to choose risk 
models.
1200
 However, this reliance was considered, after the banking crisis, to be one of 
the contributing factors that led to the crisis.
1201
 
Another consideration was the FSA’s own limited financial resources. Implementing the 
risk-based approach was necessary to prioritise the allocation of those limited resources 
to hazard areas that most threatened its statutory objectives.
1202
 This meant that not 
every potential case of market abuse or insider dealing would trigger an FSA 
investigation or enforcement.
1203
 In the light of previous arguments it could be 
suggested that regulatory independence was at risk. The FSA was exposed to two 
influential factors negatively impacting its approach to regulation and enforcement: 
political influence and its own limited financial resources. 
For the industry the risk-based approach, as Brown stated, would reduce the regulatory 
burdens.
1204
 Nevertheless, the financial industry from the beginning had raised concerns 
about the FSA’s risk-based approach.1205 For example, the industry complained that the 
FSA on some occasions had a heavy-handed approach that inhibited innovation.
1206
 
Instead of refuting these concerns, Tony Blair in 2005 affirmed them by stating: 
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“The Financial Services Authority… is seen as hugely inhibiting of 
efficient business by perfectly respectable companies that never 
defrauded anyone”1207 
Although the FSA considered these remarks undermining of its duties, it responded by 
moving to more principle-based rules.
1208
 These allowed regulated firms to set up their 
own systems and controls to meet the risks of their business. Consequently, the FSA 
shifted to a yet more light-touch approach, with more focus on the firms’ senior 
management in identifying risks.
1209
 
Based on this argument, it might be reasonably concluded that the FSA was exposed to 
another influence, the force exerted by elite market players (the upper class of 
capitalists). The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted their influence in reforming the 
regulatory structure, and now this same influence shaped the adopted policy when 
dealing with the industry and enforcing regulation. As was said earlier, those forces 
were at the heart of neo-liberalism. In pinpointing this influence, it was clearly stated 
that: 
“The FSA is captured by the financial industry and allows it far too 
much power over the regulatory design… [FSA] which was created to 
act in the public interest instead advances the commercial interests of 
the industry it is meant to regulate…..[FSA staff were swapping 
positions] from the industry to regulator and back again……”1210 
In 2005 the Hampton Review reiterated a recommendation that the risk-based approach 
be applied also to enforcement. The approach was based on evaluating the effect of 
risks resulting from non-compliance with the FSA’s statutory objectives.1211 Based on 
the results, inspections and enforcement action would be conducted in such a way that 
limited financial resources were best used.
1212
 A year later, the FSA risk-based approach 
was refined and developed through the “Advanced, Risk-Responsive Operating 
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Framework” (ARROW), 1213  but remained based on prioritising market risks. 1214 
Consequently, the FSA was to take enforcement actions in “priority” areas where it 
believed that market misconduct was exposing its statutory objectives to the greatest 
risk,
1215
 among which areas market abuse was top of the list.
1216
 
II. Principle-based regulation 
Principle-based regulation
1217
 means setting the broad principles or standards that a 
regulated firm’s business should be in conformity with1218. The FSMA of 2000 and the 
FSA Handbook are examples of principle-based regulation which at the time were 
widely praised.
1219
 Principle-based regulation illustrates the role of a neo-liberalist state 
in setting standards for the financial markets and in promulgating regulations providing 
principles for business conduct. 
In Chapter 2 it was highlighted that the FSA had inherited the old regulatory structure of 
SIB and SROs,
1220
 but apparently not just that, it also inherited their framework. The 
principle-based approach can be traced back to the self-regulatory regime under the 
FSA of 1986.
1221
 At that time, the SROs adopted high-level principles to govern the 
conduct of business by their members. The nub of those principles was to set general 
values rather than detailed rules.
1222
 When the FSA was created in the face of the SROs’ 
failures, the industry raised concerns about business innovation being hindered by a 
powerful regulator armed with various sanctions.
1223
 To mitigate those worries and to 
create a friendlier image, the FSA had to adopt the same principle-based approach as the 
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BoE and the SROs.
1224
 As Alexander explained, this approach was vitally important for 
London to maintain its financial position as an international trading centre.
1225
 Note 
here, therefore, that the global competitive race created by neo-liberalism and endorsed 
by senior politicians
1226
 and elite capital markets left no choice for the FSA but to 
implement the principle-based approach. 
In the area of insider dealing and market abuse, as with the rest of market misconduct, 
principle-based regulation embraced further approaches. For example, with regard to 
systems and controls for inside information which firms should have and maintain,
1227
 
the FSA did not consider the process or systems themselves, but rather their outcomes 
(i.e. success or failure in preventing the leakage of inside information). The outcomes 
approach involved the assumption that firms’ senior managements were best placed to 
decide what systems and controls
1228
 should be implemented to optimally achieve the 
regulatory objectives and to minimize risks threatening those objectives.
1229
 In other 
words, the FSA would not step in unless those systems and controls failed to do their 
job. A review of FSA’s published enforcement actions revealed that the overriding 
factor in many cases was “a failure in a firm’s systems and controls… whether the topic 
of the enforcement case is fraud, money laundering or other financial crime”. 1230 
Enforcers and supervisors would approach the industry in flexible manner where both 
the spirit and the wording of a legal rule would be considered.
1231
 
Since the early years of enforcement, the FSA had been criticised for adopting the risk-
based approach. For instance, Anthony Hilton commented: 
“risk-based regulation inevitably means that someday the risk will be 
misjudged and an accident will happen. Will the MPs at Westminster 
remember their calls for a lighter touch then or will the relevant Select 
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Committee of the future once again unjustly berate the helpless 
regulator for being ‘asleep at the wheel’?1232 
Hilton’s comment was the nub of commentators’ criticisms1233 of the FSA’s leniency 
and unveiled concerns about the effectiveness of a “risk-based” approach, especially in 
tackling market abuse and insider dealing. 
This was manifested, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in the fact that the FSA’s 
first enforcement actions against civil market abuse incidents were not until 2004.
1234
 
Against market manipulation (under Section 397 of FSMA of 2000) the FSA’s first 
criminal case was in 2005.
1235
 Note that at that time the largest imposed fine on an 
individual for committing a market abuse civil offence was fifteen thousand pounds,
1236
 
something indeed of a “light-touch” compared to the currently imposed fines of millions 
of pounds, as will be discussed later. 
By 2007, the FSA’s published enforcement actions amounted to eight final notices 
against firms and fifteen against individuals, which is arguably a relatively small 
number considering the size and the global prominence of UK financial markets. As for 
the FSA’s enforcement actions using criminal law, the FSA did not bring any criminal 
prosecutions at all against insider dealing during 2001-2007,
1237
 preferring to rely on 
civil prosecutions under the market abuse regime.
1238
 More evidence of the consistency 
of the FSA’s “risk-based” approach can be found in the FSA’s measurement of market 
cleanliness.
1239
 This measurement, through focussing on market movements around the 
times of significant trading announcements made by listed companies ahead of 
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takeovers, showed an increase of insider dealing ahead of takeovers. The study was 
based on the proportion of informed price movements (IPM) preceding the significant 
announcements. These were 28.9 per cent in 2006, compared to 21 per cent before the 
enactment of the FSMA of 2000.
1240
 These numbers suggest that there were deficiencies 
in the FSA enforcement approach and raise questions on the effectiveness of civil 
sanctions in punishing and deterring offenders. 
It can be concluded that until the banking crisis of 2008, the FSA was not an 
enforcement-led regulator for several reasons. These include the political and economic 
influences on FSA structuring and its approaches to regulation and enforcement. The 
FSA had limited resources but broad objectives
1241
 that left it no choice but to adopt the 
risk-based approach to regulation and enforcement. The FSA believed that by using its 
objectives as basic good conduct principles this would encourage good market practices. 
There was also a perception that senior managements were better placed than the FSA 
to achieve the outcomes (regulatory objectives) and minimize risks as far as 
possible.
1242
 The FSA was also required to regulate the whole financial industry with its 
wide variety of risks depending on the types of financial service. This regulatory 
responsibility was acknowledged later as a heavy burden.
1243
 In addition, characterising 
market abuse as criminal
1244
 would result in fresh expenditure and legal challenges 
comparable to handling criminal insider dealing cases. 
5.1.1.2 The FSA approach to regulation and enforcement since the Banking Crisis 
Considering the aforementioned criticisms, the FSA’s enforcement actions have 
undergone thorough and substantial revisions.
1245
 Nonetheless, and even in the 
immediate aftermath of the banking crisis, the FSA continued announcing its 
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commitment to risk-based and principle-based approaches to regulation.
1246
 In other 
words, the focus remained on the outcomes and consequent reliance on senior 
management risk assessments as if the FSA had not learned their lesson.
1247
 Thus, it 
could be argued that seeds of neo-liberalism still persisted.
1248
 
What has radically changed though was the FSA approach to enforcement. In 2008 the 
FSA launched its new “enforcement-led” policy.1249 In acknowledging that effective 
regulation requires effective enforcement, the FSA had abandoned the risk-based 
approach to enforcement and the mantra of not being an “enforcement-led” 
regulator
1250. The FSA’s new aggressive policy to provide credible deterrence appeared 
in Hector Sants’ (then FSA CEO’s) statement: 
“There is a view that people are not frightened of the FSA. I can assure 
you that this is a view I am determined to correct. People should be very 
frightened of the FSA.
1251” 
The FSA in the aftermath of the banking crisis, and till it was replaced by the FCA, had 
“come down hard”1252 on market misconduct. Although the FSA had acknowledged that 
market abuse was always difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute,
1253
 its 
enforcement actions whether under the disciplinary, civil or criminal regimes noticeably 
increased.
1254
 This was true especially of its enforcement action under the CJA of 1993, 
as if the FSA recognised that its criminal prosecutions were essential and effective tools 
in its armoury for combatting insider dealing and market abuse.
1255
 In this regard, Jamie 
Symington, then the FSA Head of Wholesale Department, emphasised that: 
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12/11/2011  
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“the objective is to up the stakes for people who might risk committing 
market abuse, so that they are deterred by the fact that they face a real 
prospect of a spell in prison, and the publicity and stigma of a criminal 
convection
1256” 
As a result, the year 2008 witnessed the FSA first insider dealing criminal prosecution 
against Christopher McQuoid and his father-in-law
1257
 and this resulted in a sentence 
for McQuoid of eight months.
1258
 During the following years the FSA continued its 
criminal prosecutions against insiders
1259
 as these prosecutions were regarded as the 
most significant feature of the FSA “enforcement-led” policy.1260  In regard to civil 
market abuse, the FSA also pursued its enforcement actions
1261
 with a noticeable 
increase in the level of the imposed financial penalties.
1262
 Indeed the largest imposed 
fine against an individual to date is £3.638 million, consisted of disgorgement financial 
benefit from market abuse of £638,000 and an additional penalty of £3 million.
1263
 The 
FSA’s largest fine till now against a firm for breaching the principals of business was 
£33.3 million.
1264
 In relation to market abuse offences, the imposed fine on Shell (£17 
million) remains the highest.
1265
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What can be inferred from the aforementioned is that, regardless of all the challenges, 
the FSA was capable of taking deterrent action. As Coffee said
1266
, it appears that the 
FSA discovered its powers and its ability to take effective enforcement actions against 
insiders and abusers. However, the blame should not be put on the FSA itself but on the 
political policy that advanced using the light-touch approach to enforcement, then 
influenced the change to enforcement-led after the banking crisis. Again, problems 
around the regulator’s independence are manifest. 
After endorsing the enforcement-led approach, the FSA adopted a more interventionist 
approach in its supervision, and used more aggressive investigatory techniques and 
strategies.
1267
 One of those techniques was to conduct unannounced telephone 
interviews with potential offenders in insider dealing and market manipulation.
1268
 Also, 
the FSA had started applying to courts for search warrants for entering premises and 
collecting evidence.
1269
 Noticeably, the FSA had this power since 2001
1270
 but did not 
use it until recently. 
Following this theme, the UK’s new financial regulator, the FCA, announced its 
intention to build on the FSA’s recent supervision approach in intervening early to 
protect consumers and investors and to ensure market integrity and investors’ 
confidence. Such an approach will aim at tackling potential risks before any 
catastrophic failures materialize.
1271
 Akin to the FSA’s more intrusive approach1272 in 
recent years, the FCA will not use the old compliance-based approach to supervision. 
Rather it will keep checking the systems and controls of regulated firms and challenging 
those systems. In the same way, the FCA will apply a pro-active “judgement-led” 
approach
1273
 that goes beyond compliance and targets the root of the problem.
1274
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As for enforcement, the FCA will follow the FSA’s credible deterrence strategy and will 
strengthen its penalty regime by considering the proportionality between the benefit 
received from the misconduct and the size of the fine.
1275
 Also, it will use all the 
enforcement powers in its armoury to combat market misconduct in a way that sends 
deterrent signals to the industry.
1276
 Even before launching the FCA, it was stated that it 
will adopt the same latest enforcement approaches of the FSA, if not tougher, in its 
actions against perpetrators whose conduct falls short of market standards or amounts to 
breach of regulation.
1277
 
All of this sounds promising and indicates that the FCA should ensure market integrity 
and investors’ confidence. However, the FCA’s approach will be closely related to the 
risk-based approach (although using a differentiated approach, abandoning one-size-
fits-all).
1278
 The risk-based approach will remain, stemming from the same rationale of 
focussing on the most serious and severe risks to the FCA’s strategic objectives1279, and 
prioritising the FCA resources to ensure best allocation.
1280
 In line with its objectives, 
the FCA could be exposed, like the FSA, to political and economic influences 
considering its new competition objective.
1281
 An indicator of all this could be found in 
a recent announcement by Martin Wheatley, the FCA Chief:  
“You [the industry] won’t hear from us the ‘be afraid’ tone; that is 
not how we want to act.
1282” This statement the press described as, 
“FCA promises lighter regulatory touch.1283” 
Senior management will continue to be identified who, as Baldwin and Black argue, are 
not the best to assess their firms’ risks.1284  Managers are exposed to “political and 
practical consequences of establishing particular levels of risk tolerance.
1285” The FCA 
seems to be mindful of this as it stated that it will adopt a firm systemic framework 
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(FSF), among other things, to assess the effectiveness of the firms’ systems and 
controls.
1286
 
Nonetheless, the foregoing suggests that the same persisting deficiencies in the FSA 
risk-based approach are still in place. 
5.1.2 FSA/FCA civil and criminal enforcement powers in tackling market abuse 
and criminal insider dealing 
5.1.2.1 FSA powers under the civil market abuse regime 
The FSA was entitled to impose penalties in market abuse cases under Section 123 of 
the FSMA of 2000, whether the person who committed market abuse was an authorised 
or unauthorised person. Where authorised persons were involved the FSA could 
additionally impose disciplinary sanctions. 
The FSA was required under Section 124 of the FSMA of 2000 to publish a statement 
of its policy in respect of the imposition of penalties, under Section 66 in regard to 
regulatory penalties against approved persons, and under Section 210 in relation to 
authorised persons. This statement was provided under Chapter 6 of Decision Procedure 
and Penalties Manual (DEPP).
1287
 According to the DEPP, the purpose of imposing a 
financial penalty or issuing a public censure was to promote high standards of market 
conduct by deterring perpetrators from committing further breaches, and helping to 
deter others from committing similar regulatory breaches.
1288
 Further, the FSA policy in 
imposing penalties aimed at eliminating any financial gain or profit acquired from non-
compliance and at remedying the harm caused by non-compliance where 
appropriate.
1289
 
Thus, the FSA used its market abuse enforcement powers in furtherance of meeting its 
statutory objectives, namely maintaining market confidence and reducing financial 
crime.
1290
 Margaret Cole, then the FSA Director of Enforcement, emphasised this by 
stating:  
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“Enforcement outcomes contribute towards the prevention and cure 
of elements of market abuse strategy.
1291”  
The previous discussion suggests that the sanctions had a dual purpose, punitive and 
deterrent. Note that the FSMT shared this perspective on the necessarily punitive nature 
of the FSA’s financial penalties, leading it to confirm that market abuse was of a 
criminal nature.
1292
 
As mentioned before, the FSA had indirectly stated that it would not take action in 
every incident of market abuse
1293
, prioritising its actions towards the most threatening 
incidents to its statutory objectives. This used to apply also where FSA believed on 
reasonable grounds
1294
 that the person concerned took all precautions and exercised all 
due diligence to avoid engaging in market abuse, or if it appeared that the person’s 
behaviour did not amount to market abuse.
1295
 
In deciding whether to impose a financial penalty or to issue public censure, the FSA 
applied a number of non-exhaustive factors
1296
 with a thorough analysis of each case 
circumstance.
1297
 Some of these factors were: whether the breach is deliberate or 
reckless; the frequency of breach; the impact of the breach on the orderliness of 
markets; the possibility of re-committing the breach;
1298
 the person concerned’s 
compliance with any regulatory requirements; and the degree of the person’s 
cooperation with the FSA during the investigations.
1299
 
I. Imposing financial penalties 
The FSA policy on enforcing penalties has changed in the past few years.
1300
 The FSA’s 
rationale was that achieving optimal credible deterrence would be by increasing the 
level of the imposed fines.
1301
 Accordingly, it could be said that the FSA’s 
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“enforcement-led” approach was characterised by the increasingly severe financial 
penalties on abusers, mainly during the past three years
1302
. For instance, a review of 
FSA published final notices since 2004 shows a significant increase in the level of 
imposed penalties from £15,000
1303
 to reach its highest level in 2012 at £3,638 
million.
1304
 
Under the new penalties regime for market abuse which the FCA will adopt,
1305
 the 
amount of fine will be linked to income and based on: (a) up to 20 per cent of a firm’s 
revenue from the product or business area linked to the violation in the relevant period; 
and (b) a minimum starting point of £100,000 for individuals in serious market abuse 
cases.
1306
  
The penalty regime was based on three principles: disgorgement (a firm or a person 
should not benefit from any breach); discipline (the wrongdoer should be penalized); 
and deterrence (in regard to the person committing the breach and others who may 
commit it in the future).
1307
 Indeed, the FSA final notices showed that the total amount 
of the imposed fines included the disgorgement of profit and a financial penalty 
reflecting the seriousness of the breach.
1308
 
The FSA was keen to use its new penalty regime to strengthen its credible deterrence 
shield, to ensure that the abusive behaviour would not recur again, and to convey a 
message to the market that wrongdoers would not be allowed to benefit from market 
misconduct. The FSA’s financial penalties also targeted firms’ senior management1309 
by imposing fines.
1310
 This was an illustration of the FSA’s intrusive approach, and an 
acknowledgement that directly targeting senior management would be more effective in 
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reducing market misconduct than targeting firms, which indeed is the FCA’s 
opinion.
1311
 
But it could still be queried whether the increased level of penalties would provide 
better deterrent levels. This will be answered within Section 3 in this chapter. 
II. Issuing public censure 
In deciding whether to issue a financial penalty or a public censure, the FSA applied 
criteria which included factors such as
1312
: (a) whether or not deterrence may be 
effectively achieved by issuing public censure; (b) whether the breach is serious;
1313
 (c) 
whether the concerned person brought the breach to the attention of the FSA (a factor 
that would incline the FSA towards public censure rather than penalty); (d) whether the 
person showed cooperation with the FSA; and (e) the person’s previous disciplinary 
record (poor or showing compliance). Therefore, it could be inferred that the FSA 
preferred issuing public censure where the person’s breach was not too serious, and the 
person had a disciplinary record that reflected his cooperation with the FSA and 
compliance with regulation.
1314
 
In addition to the previous penalties (fine and public censure) under the market abuse 
regime, the FSA used its disciplinary regime to impose disciplinary sanctions where the 
person concerned was an authorised or an approved person. 
III. FSA disciplinary sanctions 
The FSA was entitled to take disciplinary actions against regulated persons under 
Sections 206A and 66 of the FSMA of 2000. The FSA used to take one or more of the 
following actions against regulated persons: impose a financial penalty; suspend any 
authorisation for a period the FSA considered appropriate; impose restrictions or 
limitations on performance of any approved function for a period of time; or publish a 
statement of misconduct.
1315
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It should be mentioned that the evidential setbacks arising from legal cases of market 
abuse of a criminal nature,
1316
 specifically in Davidson and Tatham Tribunal case
1317
 as 
was discussed in Chapter 4,
1318
 led the FSA to prefer bringing actions for market abuse 
against authorised and approved persons on the basis of breaching its High Level 
Principles for Businesses (PRIN).
1319
 
Some of the FSA enforcement actions against market abuse demonstrated this trend.
1320
 
For example, the FSA found that Mr. Gower,
1321
 an approved person, made disclosure 
of inside information which was misleading, inaccurate, and had a negative impact on a 
certain share’s price which constituted a breach of Principle 3 of the FSA’s Statement of 
Principles for Approved Persons.
1322
 In fact, the FSA used the overlap between the 
market abuse offences and the violations of its principles in its fight against abusers.
1323
 
For instance, Principle 5 stated that the regulated person’s behaviour should be in 
conformity with proper market standards. Thus, any behaviour amounting to market 
abuse also constituted a breach of Principle 5. 
Suspension and restriction were new disciplinary sanctions provided under the FSA of 
2010
1324
 to allow the FSA to target directly the relevant part of business where the 
misconduct occurred.
1325
 Additionally, the FSA had the power of imposing penalties on 
authorised persons in conjunction with withdrawing the relevant firm’s 
authorisation.
1326
 This combination prior to the FSA of 2010 was not allowed. The FSA 
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was also capable of using its disciplinary sanctions in addition to, or instead of, 
imposing a financial penalty or issuing a public censure.
1327
 
The foregoing discussion has shown that the FSA was empowered with various tools 
and sanctions to counter market abuse and civil insider dealing. The same level of 
empowerment is not available for the JSC, though it has the power to take actions 
through its disciplinary regime. The FSA penalty regime and its underlying policy 
entitled it to impose penalties proportionate to the seriousness of the abuse with a 
starting point of £100,000 for individuals, which is the maximum amount that the JSC 
can impose. Another difference, as will be shown, is that the JSC does not have any 
manual or guidance for its enforcement actions. Thus, unlike the FSA’s clear 
enforcement procedures, the JSC’s procedures are to some extent vague and the 
principles for its enforcement actions are undocumented
1328
. These points are brought 
up now to explain why the discussion on the JSC enforcement process and actions will 
not be as detailed as for the FSA. 
5.1.2.2 FSA enforcement actions in criminal insider dealing cases 
Despite the FSA’s perception of the difficulties involved in securing evidence in 
criminal insider dealing cases,
1329
 post the banking crisis it started using the criminal 
route more regularly. The shift could be because civil market abuse cases proved in 
practice that they were not any less challenging.
1330
 Additionally, it was because of the 
FSA rationale that credible deterrence would be best achieved through the criminal 
route
1331
. The FSA in 2012 had won eight insider dealing cases out of a total of twenty 
since 2009
1332
. 
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Note that securing evidence was not the FSA’s only hurdle in criminal cases: its role as 
a criminal prosecutor was also challenged. This role was challenged more than once.
1333
 
For instance in R. v Westminster Magistrate Court,
1334
 the claimant (U) appealed for a 
judicial review of the Magistrate Court’s decision that the FSA did not have to obtain 
the consent of the relevant Secretary of State or the Public Prosecutions in order to 
institute proceedings for the offence of insider dealing under the CJA of 1993. The 
Court
1335
 dismissed the application, affirming that the FSA was not required to obtain 
such consent as the “FSA may institute proceedings under Section 402(1)… without the 
antecedent need to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State
1336” 
The FSA was eventually added
1337
 to the list of specified prosecutors in the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 2005. In fact, the FSA had lobbied
1338
 for 
the granting of these powers which were necessary tools in its battle against insider 
dealing.
1339
 In consequence, as a criminal prosecutor, the FSA was entitled to grant 
immunity to witnesses
1340
 in insider dealing cases who contributed towards establishing 
evidence. The FSA used this power in its third insider dealing case against Malcolm 
Calvert, a former market-maker at Cazenove, who was found guilty of five counts of 
insider dealing.
1341
 The prosecution involved a key witness, Bertie Hatcher, a friend of 
Calvert, who agreed to provide evidence in the trial in return for the granting of 
immunity. Mr Hatcher was tipped inside information and profited from it, but because 
of his cooperation with the FSA, he was sanctioned under FSA regulatory powers rather 
than the criminal prosecution.
1342
 
In addition, the FSA under the SOCPA of 2005 was granted plea-bargaining powers.
1343
 
The FSA used this power in the case against Anjam Ahmad
1344
, a former hedge fund 
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1335
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trader and manager at AKO Capital who was convicted of insider dealing. Mr Ahmad 
agreed to plead guilty after reaching an agreement with the FSA to cooperate with its 
investigations into his co-conspirator. This was the first case in which the FSA used its 
plea-bargaining powers, which resulted in a reduction of Mr Ahmad’s sentence.1345 In 
addition, Mr Ahmad agreed to a final notice.
1346
 
Note that the JSC has not yet played a comparable role as it has not yet made any 
criminal prosecutions for insider dealing. Thus it has not encountered any of the FSA’s 
difficulties arising from the criminal route, and it has not considered enhancing its 
statutory powers in this area. 
It is clear that the FSA was making full use of its tools to achieve credible deterrence, 
with the recognition that criminal prosecutions are the most effective way.
1347
 
Therefore, it can be argued that increasing the level of imposed financial penalties in 
market abuse cases would not provide as effective deterrence as the criminal sanctions. 
This will be discussed further within the assessment in Section 3. 
                                                     
1345
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1346
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5.2 Section 2: The JSC Enforcement Approach in Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation Cases 
To ensure and promote investors’ confidence and market integrity, 1348  the JSC is 
authorised
1349
 to regulate and develop the securities market in a manner that ensures 
high standards of fairness, transparency and efficiency.
1350
 The JSC can underpin that 
by carrying out investigations
1351
 and taking enforcement actions against improper 
behaviour, either by using its disciplinary regime or the criminal insider dealing and 
market abuse/manipulation regimes.
1352
 Nevertheless, the fact that the JSC since its 
creation in 1997 has taken enforcement actions against insiders and manipulators only 
once raises many questions. It cannot be simply that all market players’ transactions are 
in conformity with the law and they are showing a great deal of compliance. If 
developed countries like the UK struggle to ensure market integrity by devoting a great 
deal of effort and reform to the task of tackling insider dealing and market abuse, such 
efforts logically should be all the more necessary in Jordan’s emerging market.  
This section will try to discover why there are not enforcement actions taken against 
insiders and manipulators. Criteria such as regulatory transparency, human capital, 
regulatory independence, and regulation clarity will be applied in considering the JSC’s 
rare enforcement actions. Discussion will start with the JSC’s approach to regulation 
and enforcement, if any, and its investigatory and enforcement powers. 
However, the lack of regulatory transparency,
1353
 either in regard to the SL of 2002
1354
 
or the JSC’s policies and adopted approaches, poses challenges1355 to identifying what 
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 National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), ‘NASD market surveillance assessment and 
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1353
 This was highlighted in 2003, a year after enforcing SL 2002, but no efforts were made to enhance 
regulatory transparency. See for example: MENA Corporate Governance Workshop (n 1114); Saidi N, 
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<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b508b10048a7e753ab1fef6060ad5911/Transparency_and_Disclos
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indeed is the JSC approach to regulation and enforcement. Thus, any analysis provided 
will, as was the case in the previous analysis, rely mainly on the SL of 2002 articles and 
the JSC by-laws to find logical legal justifications. In addition, reference will be made 
to information found in the IMF and WB and other international reports, and articles 
addressing Jordanian political and economic reforms. 
The broad and ill-defined articles of the SL 2002
1356
 and the JSC by-laws that were 
supposed to clarify the situation, arguably, had their negative effect on the enforcement 
process. For proper enforcement, it is vital for both the regulator and the financial 
industry to have clear rules and principles to comply with, and for the rules to be 
enforced,
1357
 which is not the case here, as was shown in the previous chapter. 
Otherwise, the enforcement process will be hazy and patchy, if there is any at all.
1358
  
5.2.1 The JSC approach to enforcement and regulation 
In Chapter 2, it was made clear that the financial reforms in Jordan were part of 
overlapping political and economic reforms stipulated by the WB and the IMF financial 
reform programs in exchange for the granting of loans.
1359
 This international political 
and economic influence, allied with the internal political will of the executive authority, 
resulted in promulgating the provisional SL of 1997, in turn repealed by the provisional 
SL of 2002, and within which the financial institutions were created. Also, the influence 
of the internal political will can be found in the JSC, whose Board members and 
Chairman are appointed by the Council of Ministers.
1360
 Therefore, political will 
(national and international) and economic reform jointly influenced the creation of the 
JSC. Do these political and economic influences affect its approach to regulation and 
enforcement? This will be explored in the coming discussion. 
The intention of Jordan’s financial reforms was to encourage market liberalisation 
through, inter alia, privatisation and bringing the investment environment up to global 
                                                                                                                                                           
national resources?’, IMF WP 07/157, Jul 2007 at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07157.pdf> Accessed: 1/2/2013 
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 Billmeier and Massa (n 1353) 
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1360
 SL 2002 art.10(B)&(C) 
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standards to attract foreign and domestic investment.
1361
 Indeed, Jordan was considered 
one of the good examples in the region in fostering liberalising reforms.
1362
 As was 
discussed in the previous section, liberalisation meant, in regard to financial markets, 
light-touch regulation accompanied with flexible regulatory approach. Thus, 
considering that the JSC resulted from prescribed reforms to a governmental body, it 
would not be surprising if the JSC policy in attracting foreign investments was based on 
relaxed regulation providing a competitive environment and fostering competitive 
investment requirements.
1363
 
In the absence of any published policy by the JSC declaring its approach to regulation 
and enforcement, it could be argued that in fulfilling globalization and liberalisation 
requirements the principle-based approach and risk-based approach would be 
adopted.
1364
 As for the risk-based approach, implementing and developing risk 
competitiveness thereafter was recommended in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
workshops
1365
 and by the IOSCO
1366
 to emerging market regulator members, of which 
the JSC is one.
1367
 
Apparently, the JSC’s risk-based approach will not differ from the FSA’s in regard to 
the main underpinning bases. 
1) If the UK financial regulator has limited financial resources, the JSC, considering 
the country’s economic constraints,1368  arguably has the same, if not a worse 
problem. Thus, it is expected that the JSC will target risks which most threaten its 
regulatory objectives (mainly investors’ confidence in market integrity). 
2) The JSC will also rely on firms’ senior managements to assess their risks and to 
adopt systems and controls accordingly. 
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Although the JSC has financial autonomy,
1369
 a considerable part of its financial 
resources comes from the General Budget
1370
 which could expose it to the country’s 
economic setbacks.
1371
 In fact, it would be surprising if the JSC was financially 
independent while the country as a whole depends on international and domestic aid and 
loans.
1372
 The financial dependency problem was acknowledged by Mohammad Tash, 
the JSC Chairman, soon after he was appointed in 2012. In an interview with the media, 
he stressed that his top priority is to regain independence for the securities market 
institutions.
1373
 Thus the JSC’s financial constraints would be one factor behind 
enforcement reluctance, particularly since the enforcement process is costly, either 
under the civil or criminal regime.
1374
 
Apart from this, the critical problem in the risk-based approach adopted by the JSC is 
the reliance on companies’ senior management in assessing their risks and in 
implementing effective systems and controls. If this approach has contributed to the 
FSA’s regulatory failures, even though UK market players were familiar with regulation 
of financial services and thus capable of assessing their business risks, what would be 
the case with the market players in Jordan? 
In fact, the lack of professionalism among Jordanian companies’ board members has 
been acknowledged, and there are always calls for experienced board members to carry 
out managerial responsibilities,
1375
 or at least to train others on risk-assessment methods 
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and strategies.
1376
 Although this might not be the situation in the banking sector, which 
has been well established since the 1930s and is under scrutiny and surveillance from 
the Central Bank,
1377
 the problem arguably manifests itself in regard to other securities 
market players. It can be said, therefore, that the JSC is placing its trust in firms which 
lack sufficient experience to identify market risks. 
As for the principle-based approach, the adoption of this approach could be easily 
inferred from the broad structuring of the SL 2002 as mentioned earlier. No doubt, the 
advantage of adopting this approach is to provide flexibility to the regulator in keeping 
abreast of innovation and development in the financial markets. However, the regulator 
should further explain, and provide detailed by-laws to add flesh to the SL of 2002 
skeleton, which unfortunately has not been the case.
1378
 Like the risk-based approach, 
the principle-based approach relies on the firms’ senior management, which takes us 
back to square one, the human capital problem. If corporate senior managements were 
inexperienced in assessing their business risk in the normal course of events, how would 
they be able to deploy efficient systems and controls for inside information? How would 
they assess whether their information amounts to inside information or not? Further 
discussion on senior managers’ inexperience and their economic influence will be 
provided later in this section. 
The inexperience problem is not confined to senior managers;
1379
 the JSC staff 
themselves need training to carry out their supervision and enforcement 
responsibilities.
1380
 Mohammad Tash, the JSC Chairman, admitted that the decline in 
the JSC’s qualified and professional cadre is one of the JSC’s most critical 
challenges.
1381
 This fact was highlighted within the disclosure obligation
1382
 and 
substantive analysis of the prohibition regime that described the JSC’s and the ASE’s 
inexperience in understanding the regime and in issuing suitable by-laws.
1383
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Thus the lack of experienced persons, highly skilled or professional, from two sides, the 
JSC and the industry, poses a severe problem in the SL of 2002 application and 
enforcement. This is particularly the case in sophisticated insider dealing cases where 
expertise and professionalism are greatly needed. The lack of familiarity with the 
regime, as legal and financial academics have said, is one of the reasons for weak 
enforcement.
1384
 
In light of this discussion, it appears from the outset that the enforcement process would 
be a challenge for the JSC. It suffers from deficiencies in its independence (financially 
and politically
1385
), inadequate skilled staff, and weaknesses in the SL of 2002 
prohibition regime.
1386
 
5.2.2 The JSC investigation and enforcement regime 
The SL of 2002 grants the JSC powers to conduct investigations
1387
 and take actions
1388
 
against perpetrators either by using its administrative powers (disciplinary regime) or by 
referring the matter to the competent court.
1389
 
5.2.2.1 The JSC investigations 
The JSC investigations are closely linked to its market surveillance. It relies on 
monitoring market operations to identify suspicious transactions and then to conduct an 
investigation.
1390
 However, tackling insider dealing and market manipulation should not 
be restricted to these methods. There should on-site visits from the JSC to assess the 
efficacy of firms’ controlling measures, systems of inside information, and the integrity 
of persons having access to inside information.
1391
 Conducting such inspections would 
help solve the problem by identify it at source, instead of waiting till the problem 
materializes. Thus, ensuring that firms have suitable controls for inside information to 
minimize or stop any possible leakage would be better than identifying and combatting 
offences already committed. 
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In addition, the JSC should consider employing and enforcing effective disclosure 
mechanisms that ensure timely dissemination of inside information to the market. The 
JSC disclosure regime does not currently provide this, which undermines the objective 
of prompt and timely disclosure of inside information. While this situation persists, how 
can the JSC decide whether a suspect transaction was made prior to or post the 
regulatory disclosure? This critical problem of regulatory transparency can be added to 
the list of factors behind the JSC’s hesitant enforcement process. 
The Capital Market Institutions Monitoring Department (CMIMD) and the Surveillance 
Department, one of the JSC departments,
1392
 monitor trading sessions on the ASE to 
identify any suspicious transactions, especially during the time prior to and post the 
announcement of information that affects securities’ prices or the trading volume.1393 
Note that this focus merely on trading sessions could be because the SL of 2002 
considers any slightly abnormal move of securities’ prices an indicator of an insider 
dealing offence.
1394
 Upon identifying a suspicious deal, the CMIMD will report this to 
the investigation authority. 
According to the SL of 2002 the competent authority could be one of the JSC’s own 
departments
1395
 under its administrative hierarchy
1396 , or the JSC might “enlist the 
service of experts and specialists in conducting investigations
1397”. 
The latitude given to the JSC
1398
 in entitling any of its departments to conduct 
investigations raises concerns about providing a consistent level of transparency, 
adequacy and rigour in the investigation’s procedures and outcomes. And above all, 
there arises the problem of consistent interpretation of the broad basic articles of the SL 
of 2002, especially since the JSC has not provided any instructions, explanatory notes or 
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guidance
1399
 to help in setting forth the statutory requirements for each type of 
misconduct. 
This lack of clarification is a critical problem, especially when JSC staff is 
inexperienced as already mentioned. It would therefore be a great help to issue a 
guidance or enforcement manual
1400
 akin to the FSA’s manual1401 that provides detail 
and definition of minimum standards, includes each type of misconduct, the required 
elements, the procedures that should be followed during the investigation,
1402
 the 
investigated person’s right of defence, etc. By having such a manual, even if the 
department entrusted with the investigation were changed, or new staff members were 
recruited, this would not affect the consistency of the process or the outcomes.
1403
 
In fact, the JSC Investigating Instructions of 2008 did not even provide any elaboration 
of or addition to the general investigation rules under the SL of 2002. Those instructions 
are merely repetition of the SL of 2002 provisions on giving the JSC latitude in 
appointing a “competent department” to carry out the investigation of detected 
violations or complaints to the JSC.
1404
 
With regard to the investigation procedures, the investigation usually starts by serving a 
notice to the suspected insider/ abuser that includes a description of the potential 
violation, an invitation to a hearing of statements and for submission of any 
evidence.
1405
 However the Investigating Instructions 2008 did not mention whether the 
concerned person’s lawyer would be allowed to attend the investigation or not. 
Arguably this could be an issue of great importance, considering the lack of proper 
understanding, even among industry players, of what behaviours amount to insider 
dealing or market manipulation.
1406
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For investigation purposes, the competent authority would request any documents or 
papers relevant to the matter under investigation,
1407
 which could be bank statements, 
correspondence, memoranda, computer files, or any other means of storing data whether 
written or electronic.
1408
 For this, the JSC was granted powers to request documents 
from issuers, licensed and regulated persons,
1409
 where the failure to comply with such a 
request is regarded as a violation of the SL of 2002.
1410
 
After hearing the concerned person’s statements and defences, hearing from witnesses 
and examining evidence, the investigating “competent department” will submit a report 
to the JSC Chairman on the investigation’s outcomes. The report will include: “A 
description of the subject violation, the person or persons to whom the violation is 
ascribed, a summary of the procedures carried out, and the investigation’s findings and 
recommendations
1411”. Note that “recommendations” (i.e. the sanctions) suggest that the 
investigator’s role would to a certain extent overlap with the role of a decision maker or 
enforcer who would be entitled to choose the relevant sanctions. Such a situation 
conflicts with the principles of fairness and fair trial that require total separation 
between the investigation process and the enforcement.
1412
 Further support for this 
concern can be found in the Investigating Instructions of 2008 stating that the JSC 
Board, upon concluding the investigation, might “approve the report1413” that includes 
the recommended sanction, or might reject it. This means that if the investigation report 
is approved by the JSC, the recommended sanction by the investigator will be enforced. 
Drawing on this discussion, it is worth suggesting that the JSC needs to redraft the 
Investigating Instructions of 2008 to ensure a total separation between the investigation 
process and the decision making. The JSC also needs to ensure consistency in the 
investigation process a) by providing detailed procedures, and b) by nominating a 
specific entity to conduct investigations, so that its staff can enhance and develop their 
experience in dealing with market misconduct. In line with this, the JSC should consider 
issuing guidance
1414
 for investigators to provide explanation and examples of prohibited 
behaviours, mainly insider dealing and market manipulation, and the types of evidence 
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that should be considered for each violation. Through this, the JSC would develop and 
enhance the experience of its staff. 
Finally, and of great importance, is the recommendation to publish details of these 
investigations after being concluded. First of all, such publication would educate and 
enlighten both the industry and public awareness about what conduct was considered to 
be a violation, and how the JSC dealt and would deal with it. Also, by publishing their 
investigations, the JSC’s own consistency and conformity with the law would be better 
ensured because the JSC’s actions would be under closer scrutiny from the industry and 
legal advisors. Therefore, the public accountability of the JSC would be greater, and this 
would enhance confidence in the market. Having those investigations published would 
demonstrate the level of JSC transparency in dealing with market misconduct, and 
confirm that it applies the same measures and standards regardless of the identity of the 
people involved. 
Whether there is currently an issue of inappropriate influence from market players on 
the JSC’s enforcement actions will be discussed later in this section. Unfortunately, 
however, the JSC’s investigations are “wrapped up with secrecy1415”, raising concerns 
about transparency issues. The need to provide more transparency has been brought to 
the attention of the JSC since 2003, but it seems that market forces have not allowed 
implementing it.
1416
 
5.2.2.2 The JSC enforcement actions 
The JSC can take enforcement actions under its disciplinary regime and under the 
criminal regime of insider dealing and market manipulation
1417
 by bringing an action to 
the competent court, “the Amman Court of First Instance.1418” However, the JSC has 
not yet made use of this option, up to the time of this research (December 2013). 
The JSC under its disciplinary regime can apply one or more of the following sanctions 
for improper behaviour, including market misconduct: suspend or cease the activities of 
a licensed or registered person; suspend the public offering; suspend or cease activities 
related to securities or a specific security;
1419
 issue a ceasing or desisting order for the 
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perpetrator to forbid him from committing or attempting to commit a violation; issue an 
order requiring elimination of the violation;
1420
 or impose a financial penalty.
1421
 
The sanctions of the JSC administrative/disciplinary regime above would seem to be 
more appropriate, relevant and effective where licensed and regulated persons are 
involved (brokers, dealers or listed issuers). The effectiveness of the sanctions in 
deterring other insiders and manipulators (financial professionals, lawyers, any tipped 
person) would be less. Even the maximum fine of JD 50,000 (around £49,500) might 
easily fail to be proportionate to the seriousness of the breach or the illicit gains. 
Interestingly, despite all this, the maximum amount was imposed only once: in 2008, on 
an individual for violating Article 108 of the SL of 2002 (the Article prohibits insider 
dealing and improper disclosure).
1422
 This sole enforced case was probably against an 
insider for committing insider dealing. It is difficult to confirm this because the JSC’s 
publications of enforcement actions are very brief. For example, in the previous case, 
only what being mentioned was the name of the individual, the article he had violated 
and the imposed sanction. The difficulty in determining what type of offence he had 
committed is because more than one offence is regulated in the Article (insider dealing 
and improper disclosure). 
Again therefore, issues of an absence of transparency manifest themselves in connection 
with JSC enforcement, as with JSC investigations. It is something, as was argued 
earlier, that hinders the main purpose of enforcement, namely deterrence.
1423
 
Enforcement actions are published within the JSC Annual Report in a manner that is 
“likely to focus more on trends rather than specific instances.”1424 Thus, for the reasons 
already mentioned in connection with JSC investigations, the publication of 
enforcement outcomes is vital. Publishing brief and low-detail accounts of enforcement 
actions once a year is insufficient and counter-productive. 
This is not the only difference between JSC and FSA/FCA enforcement process. The 
FSA’s final notices are provided throughout the year giving details of the misbehaviour, 
the legal rule that was violated, and the enforcement action. Two birds are thereby hit 
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by one stone: publication ensures regulatory transparency and accountability in dealing 
with the industry, and publication also enhances the industry’s awareness of abusive 
behaviours and deters future offenders. To achieve these vital benefits, the JSC should 
publish its actions against offenders and insiders. 
Another difference can be found in the variety of sanctions and the amount of the fines 
levied. The FSA, under its penalty regime, is able to escalate the amount of the fine 
depending on the seriousness of the behaviour, with a starting point of £100,000 in the 
case of individuals. On the other hand, the maximum fine that the JSC can impose under 
its disciplinary regime is half of the FSA’s minimum amount. In the light of this, one 
might wonder to what extent the JSC’s enforced sanctions are deterring effectively, if at 
all. 
In connection with this, a general review of the JSC published enforcement actions 
under its disciplinary regime (against any regulatory violation) revealed that the same 
offenders had committed the same violation more than once, and that instances of the 
same sanctioned breach were increasing among industry players.
1425
 It can be suggested 
that JSC sanctions are therefore failing as dissuasive/deterring sanctions.
1426
  
In addition to tackling insider dealing and market manipulation using the disciplinary 
regime, the JSC can bring enforcement actions to the competent court
1427
 under the 
criminal regime which was precisely created for both offences.
1428
 Referring cases of 
alleged insider dealing and market manipulation to courts using the criminal regime 
arguably provides better levels of deterrence. The imposed fines would be up to JD 
100,000 in addition to “a fine of not less than twice the amount, and not more than five 
times the amount, of profit made or loss avoided by the person committing the 
violation
1429” and imprisonment for up to three years.1430 The argument over the optimal 
deterrence by using the criminal regime will be discussed in the next section. 
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However, the JSC since its creation in 1997
1431
 has never used the criminal regime
1432
 
and there is no indication that it will refer cases to courts in the near future, probably for 
reasons that will be discussed hereafter. 
In addition to all the aforementioned challenges facing the enforcement process, the 
criminal route in itself poses additional challenges, even for experienced regulators like 
the FSA. Proving the existence of criminal intention was always difficult and has 
hindered many prosecutions made under the CJA of 1993. If this was the case in the 
UK, how would it be for the JSC? Most probably, any attempt to enforce the criminal 
insider dealing and market manipulation process would fail. The JSC, due to its human 
capital problem, faces challenges not just in understanding the prohibition ambit, mainly 
in regard to the person committing the offence, but it also faces challenges in the 
enforcement procedures and the skills of the staff carrying out the process itself.
1433
. If 
the JSC has enforced only one action against an insider since 1997 through its 
disciplinary regime, which is less challenging than the criminal route, then it is no 
wonder that it chooses not to use the criminal process. 
5.2.3 What went wrong? - Concluding thoughts 
The discussion has shown that over the past 16 years, the JSC has taken only one action 
against an insider through its disciplinary regime, and until now has avoided the 
criminal route for any case. 
It is a situation that raises many questions on the proper application and enforcement of 
the SL of 2002 prohibition regime. A situation of regulation that bans insider dealing 
and market manipulation without knowing how to be applied, or without the will to 
apply it, is arguably a situation tantamount to deregulation.
1434
 
In regard to know-how, the earlier discussion showed that the JSC has serious problems 
in its staff
1435. The human capital problem manifested itself as well in corporates’ senior 
management who seemed to be incapable and unqualified, not just to assess their 
companies’ risks, but also to fulfil compliance requirements.1436 As Khaled Al Wazani, 
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then the Head of the Economic Department of the Hashemite Royal Court said, the 
problem gets worse if these senior managers were appointed by the government. This is 
because they are not just lacking in professionalism but also because “it is difficult if not 
impossible to prosecute a government-appointed board member for corporate 
misdeeds.
1437” The statement could be applied to members of the JSC’s own Board, 
who are appointed by the government with minimum experience of and skills in the 
financial markets. 
During 2011 the JSC human capital problem was in the media: headlines criticised 
JSC’s superficial market surveillance.1438 Criticism went on into January 2012 when 
investors raised concerns again about the JSC’s relaxed approach generally in market 
surveillance and its failure to identify and punish offenders.
1439
 Thus, it is hard to 
anticipate having a sound enforcement mechanism in the near future. 
As for the JSC being unwilling to enforce the law, in other words to take enforcement 
actions against perpetrators, this could have many reasons. One of them, arguably, is 
political influence and pressure. Political influence spreads through most aspects of 
Jordanian public life, whether in the form of elite politicians, senior public servants, or 
their families and friends. Individuals may be entitled through public positions to 
influence the general economic policy; they may be nominated by government to be 
board members; they may be managing their investments in the financial markets, either 
directly or indirectly. These elites, apart from being ignorant about financial regulation, 
exploit their positions in the companies to run them according to their own personal 
interests.
1440
 They enjoy, as Khaled Al Wazani said, “immunity from being caught by 
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the law.
1441” They may also take advantage of their political and economic power to 
manipulate public policy for their own benefit. Muasher, former Foreign Minister, 
pointed this out when he said: 
“Political elites have become entrenched, powerful…, recalcitrant, self-
appointed guardians of the state, who believe they alone should decide 
how the country ought to evolve.
1442” 
This statement is very important not just for evidencing the “ugly truth” of politicians’ 
influence, but also because it came from a politician who was involved as an architect of 
reform.
1443
 Muasher, who was the Head of the National Reform Agenda
1444
 in 2005, 
emphasised that politicians’ influence was the main reason behind the failure of any 
reform, and since then all economic and political reforms have been merely vain 
attempts.
1445
 Indeed, the massive influence of elite politicians reached a point where 
they considered King Abdulla II’s directives as if they were open to their personal 
interpretations. This often resulted in either a watered-down version of reform or no 
reform at all.
1446
 The King himself, in an interview published in the Atlantic, admitted 
struggling with those politicians resisting and hindering many reforms.
1447
 This 
circumstance could explain why the prohibition regime under SL of 2002 was not 
developed and enforced, even though its promulgation was directed by the King.
1448
 
If this is saying anything, it is saying that the problem goes far beyond the deficiencies 
in the JSC’s enforcement process. It is most likely that the problem is one of endemic 
corruption, and at a level rooted deep in the system of the State itself.
1449
 Also, it seems 
that the influence of corrupt elite is more powerful than any program of reform. They go 
with the flow, enact regulations that implement the international reform agendas of the 
IMF and WB, for example, but make sure that such reforms remain on paper, without 
any effective application and enforcement, as is the case with the JSC enforcement 
process. 
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However, these forces are not the only obstacle to the enforcement process. Senior 
market players
1450
 also have strong links with the politicians. This allows them to 
influence the policy decisions in the business sphere and relevant regulation.
1451
 Given 
this situation, the leakage of inside information is likely to be endemic as long as family 
relationships or friendships (whether with politicians or other influential market players) 
dominate
1452
 the markets. Business managers and owners often “have arm-length 
relations
1453 ” that are capable of covering up their abuses and mistakes. This is 
something that Mohammad Tash, the JSC Chairman, considered to be an acute problem 
posing real challenges to the JSC enforcement actions and which it would take a 
considerable time to change.
1454
 It is a situation of overly lax regulatory grip which 
explains why the market is fostering the interests of the powerful
1455
 without being 
accountable. 
To summarise, there are many contributing factors shaping the JSC’s ineffectual 
enforcement process: 
1) problems of independence: undue political and economic influences, mainly at a 
local level; 
2) human capital: the lack of experienced and skilled persons, either on the JSC staff 
or among senior managers of firms; 
3) transparency issues on all levels, especially in JSC enforcement actions; 
4) the lack of clarity of the SL of 2002, with no further elaboration from the JSC, and 
the lack of clarity in publishing details of investigations and enforcement. 
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5.3 Section 3: Assessing the Effectiveness of Enforcement Actions against 
Insiders and Abusers - credible deterrence through the criminal or civil 
route? 
Considering the lack of any financial statistics and empirical research in this area, a 
definite answer would be impossible. But the FSA measures for market cleanliness 
could shed some light. The measure for takeover analysis shows a decline in suspicious 
movements prior to a takeover announcement. This measure fell from 30.6% in 2009, 
when the FSA started using its criminal enforcement powers more vigorously, to 21.2% 
in 2010, and then to 19.8% in 2011, which is the lowest level since 2003.
1456
 This 
suggests that the criminal regime provided a sound and more credible deterrent than the 
civil market abuse regime. Support for this argument can be found in the legal and 
economic academic arguments presented hereunder. 
In the area of regulatory enforcement there has been a long dispute between proponents 
of deterrence and compliance models.
1457
 Supporters of deterrence argued that 
corporations’ compliance would not be achieved except through aggressive sanctions, 
while those favouring compliance believed that persuasion would best secure 
compliance.
1458
 In 1992, Ayres and Braithwaite presented the “responsive regulation” 
theory which proposed an interesting balance between compliance and deterrence 
theories.
1459
 The crux of their responsive or “tit-for-tat” approach to regulatory 
enforcement was to secure compliance through persuasion first, but if and when the 
regulated firms failed to comply, regulators should use more punitive deterrent 
measures.
1460
 In that process, regulators’ actions to secure compliance would escalate 
upwards through a pyramid of sanctions, starting from the pyramid base (education and 
persuasion) and then, by degrees, to the top where criminal prosecution or loss of 
license
1461
 could occur. This escalation, of course, requires the regulator to hold a 
variety of sanctions in his armoury.
1462
  
Although the responsive approach seemed to provide an effective enforcement 
mechanism, the question still arises whether it would be effective against financial 
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insiders and abusers. Ayres and Braithwaite had not examined their responsive approach 
in the financial areas and their enforcement pyramid was a two player game (the 
regulator and regulated) with a rationale that dialogue and persuasion would be more 
fruitful than reaching the pyramid top.
1463
 
The two player game is hard to conceive of as applied to the financial industry, where 
financial transactions are numerous and market players are difficult to identify 
personally.
1464
 Arguably for this reason, Ayres and Braithwaite concluded that the 
enforcement pyramid is “inapplicable to banking or affirmative action regulation.1465” 
Also insiders and abusers arguably do not care about compliance; rather they care about 
securing their illicit profits
1466
. As the prominent economist Becker said, they will not 
be deterred by persuasion or even civil penalties unless the coast of punishment exceeds 
the expected gain.
1467
 In line with this, Braithwaite argued that mere persuasion fails 
with business actors who are motivated by profits. He added that they will also exploit 
the policy of persuasion because of Becker’s economic calculation, and because they do 
not care about breaking the law.
1468
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the “benign big gun” regulator who speaks softly with 
the industry while carrying a big stick will not deter insiders and abusers unless he 
shows he can use the stick. This takes us on now to examine whether the financial civil 
sanctions under the market abuse regime would offer an effective deterrent or not. 
Monetary sanctions are probably the most widely used tools in society for punishment, 
deterrence and compensation, starting from “fines for breaking the speed limit, to 
compensation for injury or assault.”1469  The effectiveness of monetary sanctions in 
deterring crime is confirmed by economic analysis of the criminal law.
1470
 Becker’s 
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work on the economics of crime concluded that a fine is the most efficient penalty.
1471
 
He explained that deterrence could be achieved optimally without costs by imposing 
fines. On the other hand, penalties like imprisonment simply add the costs of imposing 
such a punishment to the costs of the harm already caused by the offender.
1472
 
Economists confirm that the costs of regulatory inspections, collecting evidence, 
criminal trials and imprisonment itself are massive. Fines, however, are costless: they 
transfer the illegal profit from the offender back to society.
1473
 Accordingly, 
imprisonment should not be used unless the offender is unable to pay the fine,
1474
 or if 
the maximum possible limit of fine is inadequate
1475
 to the offence. 
Becker argued that public policy in combatting illegal behaviour depends on two 
variables. The first of these are the aforementioned expenditures that the state and 
society will encounter.
1476
 Applying this variable to the case of insider dealing and 
market abuse, Becker’s argument seems coherent, considering the difficulties of proof 
and the risks of not securing a conviction after a long process of investigating, 
collecting evidence, deploying highly skilled human capital, and trials. Even if the 
prosecution succeeds, the imprisonment itself, as argued, is costly. This argument will 
be further assessed hereunder. 
The second of Becker’s variables is the size of the imposed fine, which is considered of 
great importance because of its close link with the deterrence strategy. The nub of this 
economic argument, according to Becker, is that an offender who contemplates 
committing a crime will not be deterred unless his expectations of the punishment costs 
exceed his expected gains.
1477
 Applying this perspective to a case of insider dealing, a 
potential insider will be calculating the illegal financial benefits he might secure from 
insider dealing, bearing in mind the possibility of being caught, compared with the legal 
gains he can make if he uses his time, skills, resources and other activities legally. Thus, 
he will not be deterred unless the imposed fine exceeds his profit expectations. At this 
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point, Becker concludes that, “some persons become criminals, therefore, not because 
their motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs 
differ.
1478” 
Becker’s economic variables, arguably, could provide a coherent justification for the 
FSA’s tendency towards using fines prior to and post the banking crisis. The question 
is, therefore, did fines under the civil market abuse regime effectively deter abusers and 
insiders? Assessing Becker’s economic argument will be the starting point in trying to 
provide an answer. 
As for the argument that imposing fines is costless, it could be argued that any 
enforcement process in a case of market abuse and insider dealing costs a great deal of 
money, whether pursued under the civil law or the criminal law. The costs mount up, 
not just the costs of recruiting professional, highly skilled persons and specialists in 
those sophisticated cases, but the costs of the software and technical systems that the 
regulator will use for analysis of financial markets.
1479
 Another consideration in relation 
to the argument about ‘costless’ fines is what if the perpetrator is unable to pay?1480 
Isn’t that yet another cost to society in addition to the illicit gains ripped off by the 
offender and the enforcement process costs? It could be argued that imposing fines is far 
from costless for regulators and an injured society.
1481
 
As for the amount of fine levied, Becker’s economic calculation would be sometimes 
difficult to apply, given a requirement for proportion between the amount of the fine 
and the offender’s wealth.1482 Sometimes it would be difficult to calculate the amount of 
fine because the offender managed to hide part of his illegal wealth. Therefore, the 
imposed fine would be less than the offender’s illegal gains, which reduces the fine’s 
deterrent effect. On the other hand, what if the imposed fine exceeded the wealth ceiling 
of the offender? It would be a serious problem in regard to deterrence, unless as Coffee 
said, deterrence was achieved by incarceration.
1483
 Coffee clarified this: 
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“Wealth boundary seems an absolute limit on the reach of deterrent 
threats… If the “expected punishment cost” necessary to deter a crime 
crosses this threshold, adequate deterrence cannot be achieved
1484” 
The discussion on the deterrent effect of fines from an economic perspective deserves 
an attempt to address the issue from the insider’s angle. The insider, as mentioned, will 
make his economic calculation and reach his decision on committing the offence or not. 
He might consider any imposed fine, if he is caught, as some sort of business cost or 
levied tax that should be paid as part of the normal course of events. In the same vein, 
the Times stated: 
“The threat of fines from the FSA is seen as a footling expense, just 
another cost of doing business, no different from paying the quarterly 
phone bill… There is not much shame in being on the receiving end of a 
fine… In some areas, this has proved inadequate in providing better 
behaviour
1485” 
Based on this discussion of the fine as a deterrent tool, it can be concluded first that 
fines are not costless, and second, that the economic calculation of the amount of fine 
would not be efficient in practice. This would be the case particularly in cases where the 
regulator escalates the fines but discovers that “no financial deterrent can make 
compliance economically rational.” 1486  Therefore, it can be argued that criminal 
sanctions, especially imprisonment, would provide better deterrence. 
Corrupt insiders are arguably no better than thieves. They intend simply to steal from 
investors and consumers to secure illegal profits when they should be, as corporate 
insiders, trustees for their money. Insiders, through their dealings, damage market 
integrity and erode investors’ confidence, specifically when investors see their savings 
being transferred illegally to insiders.
1487
 Why, it should be asked, is a thief sent to jail 
whereas an insider is not? Both behaviours are similar: stealing money owned by others. 
Insiders are even more harmful than common thieves: their illegal dealings do not 
merely affect investors but can have an adverse effect on the national economy. 
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Sending insiders and abusers to jail would be the optimal deterrent. Imprisonment 
would not be a material thing (money) that the insider could tolerate losing; rather it 
would be the loss of his personal freedom if he was jailed.
1488
 The sanction would reach 
him physically. It would also include the humiliation of reputational damage resulting 
from public exposure.
1489
 As Young stated: 
“It is the prison that is seen as the proper punishment; penal values shift 
from the focus on resources to… body… and attack that aspect which is 
most highly valued… autonomy… freedom.1490” 
This sanction should apply also to corporate individuals. After all, a firms’ work is 
carried out through decision making strategies and operational controls that senior 
managers put in place.
1491
 Otherwise, the shareholders would suffer from the imposed 
fine. As Martin Wheatley, the FCA Chief, stated: “To be honest, for the banks that 
make billions of pounds in profits, whatever the level of fine, it will get passed on to the 
shareholder.
1492”  
Further support for this argument, although from different area, can be found in The 
English Traffic Law Review Report. This highlighted the hazards of allowing 
corporations to pay traffic infringements on behalf of their employees. It reported that 
the meaning of the fine was abolished: instead of being a punitive it became merely 
business expenses.
1493
 Thus, to achieve credible deterrence, corporate employees should 
not merely be fined but included in the imprisonment ambit.
1494
 
It could be argued, therefore, that spending time in jail and the stigmatization of being 
criminally convicted would be the most effective deterrent. If the argument for 
stigmatization is applauded in cases involving white-collar criminals,
1495
 why not 
invoke it for insiders and abusers? Their misconduct is arguably no less harmful. This 
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was indeed highlighted during the passage of the Companies Bill of 1979 which 
introduced the criminal insider dealing offence in the UK for the first time. It was stated 
that insider dealing is not just grossly unfair to investors and shareholders, but it deeply 
threatens public confidence in corporate directors and the securities industry.
1496
 During 
the Bill’s passage, the Parliamentary debate explored the reasons for criminalizing 
insider dealing: inter alia, the necessity of achieving credible deterrence. Insider dealing 
was described as “an abuse which needs to be deterred by the force of crime.1497” 
Although criminalizing insider dealing was controversial at that time, the government 
was in favour of criminalization
1498
. This stance is supportive evidence for the criminal 
regime’s efficacy in tackling insiders and abusers more effectively than the civil regime. 
The threat of reputational damage
1499
 and stigmatization, let alone the prospect of 
imprisonment itself, would change the calculations of any insider intending to commit a 
crime. Such criminal sanctions would deter not just the individual, but would also send 
an effective deterrent message to the whole industry. As Werden and Simon argued, the 
prison sentence is, apart from its effect on the offender himself, more newsworthy than 
fines.
1500
 It attracts huge media coverage, by which the deterrent message is best 
conveyed to other market players. In addition, such coverage would arguably enhance 
investors’ confidence when they know that offenders will be reliably sanctioned.1501 In 
fact the FSA has used the policy of “naming and shaming” not just in publishing its 
final notices for market misconduct but also through the media, especially when it came 
to its dawn raids on insiders. 
As for the high costs of imprisonment sentences compared to fines, the additional 
imposed fines and disgorgement could cover these costs at least partially. In addition, 
the prison sentence should not be for too long a period of time. As Coffee stated, the 
period is irrelevant, considering that the stigmatization in itself is sufficient 
deterrent.
1502
 Consequently, the costs of imprisonment can be minimized by imposing 
short sentences. 
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In sum, the recommendation can be made that credible deterrence would be best served 
through the criminal regime. In the financial markets where greedy insiders and abusers 
are driven by the power of money and the size of their bank accounts, monetary 
sanctions should exist but be accompanied by criminal sanctions. Any potential insider 
should be mindful of the threat of imprisonment which the regulator has every intention 
of using. In other words, his calculations of the crime should include risking his 
freedom and reputation. The FSA found from its experience in dealing with market 
misconduct that the civil market abuse regime was not effective in providing sound 
deterrence. Margaret Cole, then the FSA Director of Enforcement, emphasised this: 
“Hector, Callum and I recently appeared before the Treasury Select 
Committee to give evidence about market abuse. We were asked whether 
we felt that the City of London takes market abuse seriously enough. 
Sadly our response was “No”… We felt that the threat of civil fines 
hasn’t worked as well as we would have liked. We’re very convinced 
that the threat of a custodial sentence is a much more significant 
deterrent.
1503” 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter examined the challenges facing the enforcement processes and actions of 
the FSA and the JSC. The discussion of the two regulators’ enforcement experiences 
addressed the most critical areas that influence the effectiveness of the enforcement 
process. It was found that both regulators, to varying levels, have problems regarding 
their independence (political, economic and financial) which in turn affect their 
implemented approaches to regulation and enforcement. The political context was found 
to have most impact. As it was stated: “A regulatory agency that is legally able but 
politically unwilling to fire its big guns might get enormous mileage in management of 
the appearance of invincibility.”1504 
This issue of the political will influence was very challenging for the FSA. The FSA’s 
changed approach and policy towards enforcement in the aftermath of the banking crisis 
proved that, regardless of all the challenges discussed in the chapter, the FSA was 
capable of enforcing regulation effectively when it decided to. Significantly, this 
occurred when the FSA was given the green light to tighten its grip on market 
misconduct. 
The nature of regulation itself raised challenges for both regulators. In the UK, 
consideration of market abuse of criminal nature exposed difficulties in proving the 
offences as with the case of criminal insider dealing offence. Similar challenges are 
found in the Jordanian regime. 
In addition to these challenges common to both countries, the JSC have more 
difficulties. The Jordanian prohibition regime as a whole suffers from a lack of clarity 
which makes it difficult first to understand and then to enforce. 
In regard to the importance of having skilled human capital, it was found that not only 
do the JSC cadres need training but also the senior managers of firms. While this is the 
situation, it will be difficult to have proper compliance and enforcement of regulation. 
Human capital inefficacy was not a problem in the UK. The FCA, and formerly the 
FSA, both acknowledged the need to employ highly skilled specialists and experts for 
market surveillance and for the enforcement process. Both agreed on the need to attract 
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and retain “professionals and dedicated staff, equipped with skills and knowledge to 
tackle the difficult and sophisticated issues like insider dealing and market abuse
1505”. 
The JSC also lacks transparency in clarifying its implemented approaches and in 
publishing its enforcement actions. 
All of these considerations go towards explaining one of the research issues: why the 
JSC did not take enforcement actions against insiders and manipulators. 
As for the second research issue, namely the effectiveness of the FSA’s enforcement 
actions, and whether using the criminal route enhances the level of deterrence, Section 3 
contended that credible deterrence will best be achieved through the criminal regime. 
This indeed is what the FSA used to do and the FCA is intending to do. Therefore, the 
question over the effectiveness of the UK regulator’s enforcement actions is answered, 
suggesting that a criminal regime provides a better level of deterrence. 
This section therefore sums up the answers to two research issues: the lack of 
enforcement actions against insiders in Jordan, and the effectiveness of the UK civil and 
criminal prohibition regimes. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Outline of Thesis Conclusions 
The aims of this thesis were to present a critical analysis of Jordan’s insider dealing and 
market abuse prohibition regime, then to assess the effectiveness of that regime. To 
achieve these aims, the study adopted a comparative-analytical methodology to compare 
the UK and Jordanian prohibition regimes. Using this methodology, it was possible to 
view the Jordanian prohibition regime in a wider context, and subject it to deeper 
scrutiny. For this, the UK and Jordanian prohibition regimes were compared in terms of 
“law on the books” (statutory prohibition) and “law in action” (enforcement). This 
included an assessment of the argument, by law and finance scholars, that the key 
determinant of an effective and sound legal regime is the legal environment within 
which it sits.
1506
 
In conducting the critical analysis of “law on the books” (statutes) and “law in action” 
(enforcement in practice), four Comparison Criteria were employed throughout: 
(i) the financial regulator’s independence 
(ii) the clarity of regulation 
(iii) adequacy of human capital 
(iv) regulatory transparency (with regard to proposing and promulgating statutory 
prohibition, and promptly disclosing inside information to market investors on an 
equal footing) 
The subject choice for this thesis was influenced by the need to logically examine 
prohibition regimes in the UK and Jordan in order to answer the Research Questions 
(section 1.5). 
Chapter 2 explained how and why the UK and Jordanian financial regulators and 
prohibition regimes developed, and how they currently exist. It described the historical 
events in their legal context, as well as factors which affected the creation of the 
financial regulators in each country. It was found that each country had different reasons 
for creating and developing its financial regulatory model: the Twin Peaks structure in 
the UK, and the Institutional Structure in Jordan. 
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In the UK, the reasons were: financial scandals (insider dealing); the way financial 
services were conducted (the move towards integration); the dominance of self-
regulation in the 1980s; and the prominent global position of the UK financial market, 
and the need to maintain this by implementing globalization requirements. 
By contrast, in Jordan, the main reason was the need to conduct financial reforms 
prescribed by the WB and the IMF financial reform programs, in order to be granted 
aids and loans. The study showed how these international reform programs carried with 
them the same globalization requirements – for market integrity and investor confidence 
– that were found in the UK. As the chapter recognised, this represents a form of legal 
transplantation, which, as law and finance scholars contend,
1507
 can have adverse 
effects. 
Apart from national differences in factors that influence the choice of financial regulator 
structure, the political will in both the UK and Jordan has adversely affected regulator 
independence in both countries. This was highlighted using Comparison Criterion (i) – 
the financial regulator’s independence – which also showed (in Chapter 5) how the 
enforcement approaches and actions of both regulators were affected. 
The Chapter then discussed the theoretical genesis of the UK and Jordanian prohibition 
regimes to counter insider dealing. It found that prohibiting insider dealing in both 
countries had initially stemmed from fiduciary theory, then developed to be based on 
the parity of information. However, in contrast to Jordan, developments in the UK were 
more clearly linked to financial reforms of statutory prohibition. Key indicators of 
regulatory transparency in the UK, which were missing in Jordan, included: government 
proposals for regulations and their reform; Parliamentary debates during the passage of 
legislation; and consultations and discussions between government and the financial 
industry. The absence of such transparency in Jordan posed challenges throughout this 
study. By identifying the evolution of Jordan’s financial regulator and the development 
of its prohibition regime, the study answered Research Question 1) – Why was insider 
dealing prohibited in Jordan? – International financial reform programs were the most 
influential factors in creating the regime. 
Chapter 3 examined the disclosure regimes enforced by the UK and Jordanian financial 
regulators. The disclosure regime was considered the front line in tackling insider 
dealing. Therefore, the main aim was to identify the extent to which disclosure regimes 
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control and prevent possible leakages – to ensure prompt disclosure of new information 
to the market, equally and in a timely manner. In other words, to identify the level of 
transparency provided under each regime. It was found that, although both countries 
have enforced disclosure obligation on issuers many deficiencies and loopholes were 
identified in the Jordanian regime. In addition, there was a lack of regulatory 
mechanism to ensure timely disclosure, and this rendered the disclosure policy hollow. 
Under the current Jordanian disclosure regime, the imposed obligation on issuers does 
not either: cover all persons having access to inside information effectively; control how 
this information is handled within the issuer; or control its subsequent release through 
regulatory channels. Thus, parity of information is compromised, as leakage is likely, 
and, more critically, the time at which an offence was committed is difficult to 
determine. If, under the disclosure obligation, the exact time that inside information was 
disclosed to the market cannot be determined, how can the regulator decide whether 
behaviour was based on inside information prior to, or post disclosure? The chapter 
posed this key question, and linked it directly to ill enforcement actions and to issues of 
human capital, arguing that low levels of experience and skill among staff in the 
Jordanian regulator (the JSC) were a critical weakness in implementing an effective 
disclosure regime.  
The question of professionalism was also raised during the substantive analysis of the 
Jordanian prohibition regime (legal rules) in Chapter 4, which showed how legal 
institutions were unfamiliar with the prohibition regime that had initially been created to 
fulfil the requirements of international reform programs. Such problems did not exist in 
the UK, because the establishment of the prohibition regime benefitted from the UK’s 
long experience in regulating financial markets, and the need to maintain investor 
confidence in their integrity. The UK disclosure regime therefore provided better 
control over the release of new inside information to the market, and better levels of 
transparency. In this respect, the UK disclosure regime can inform, inspire and shed 
light on proposals to reform the Jordanian regime. 
Chapter 4 analysed substantively the UK and Jordanian statutory prohibition of insider 
dealing and market abuse / manipulation. The main purpose was to assess the clarity 
and effectiveness of the enacted legal rules – “law on the books”. When analysing the 
UK and Jordanian regimes, it was found that the nature of the UK prohibition regime 
was clear – criminal and civil – though the civil nature of market abuse had been 
challenged. By contrast, in Jordan the sanctions for offences, under the SL of 2002, 
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were the only way the nature of those offences had been defined. Because of this, it was 
found that similar abusive behaviours were considered both criminal and civil, which, it 
was argued, raised barriers to proving offences and enforcing the regime. In terms of 
clarity as well, the analysis showed that the statutory requirements for offences under 
the CJA of 1993 and the FSMA 2000 were clearly defined, unlike those under the SL of 
2002. Unclear drafting of the SL of 2002 affected the understanding of its meaning, and 
of the ambit of statutory prohibition. It is most likely contributed in the lack of 
enforcement. 
Chapter 4 also highlighted the inefficacy of the legislator, and its unfamiliarity with this 
area of market misconduct. Inefficacy was identified in the JSC’s misinterpretation of 
its prohibition ambit, through its use of incorrect statutory definitions – of ‘insider’, 
‘inside information’, etc. – and in its failure to issue any instructions to explain and 
detail the scope of statutory prohibition, despite being required to do so by the SL of 
2002. Inexperienced staff and lack of professionalism were attributed to the fact that the 
creation of Jordan’s prohibition regime had been influenced by the IMF and WB 
financial reform programs, not by local financial needs.  
By contrast, evidence from the FSA illustrated the financial regulator’s vital role in 
elaborating and explaining the general prohibition ambit of the FSMA of 2000. The 
FSA not only issued a Code of Market Conduct, but also – through its newsletters, 
market watch and other documents – provided guidance to market players on the 
prohibited behaviours that would constitute market misconduct. 
The aforementioned critical role of the financial regulator should therefore be 
recognised and reappraised in Jordan, particularly because, as in the UK, Jordanian 
statutory prohibition is principle-based. In this respect, regulation merely provides the 
broad scope of prohibition, and leaves further explanation and elaboration to the 
financial regulator. This gives the regulator the flexibility to develop its actions in line 
with the development of financial markets. The chapter argues that the concept of 
principle-based regulation was not appreciated by the JSC. 
In Chapter 4 the comparisons between the two prohibition regimes highlight the 
following major differences: 
1) Insider dealing is comprehensively regulated in the UK (CJA of 1993 and Part 
VIII of the FSMA of 2000), while in Jordan few articles (108,109,110 of the SL 
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of 2002) relate to this type of behaviour. Those few articles are arguably not 
enough to tackle insider dealing, considering its major negative impact on investor 
confidence and market efficiency. 
2) The definition of ‘Insider’, under UK regulation, is precise and specific, and 
includes primary and secondary insiders, whereas the SL of 2002 definition of 
‘Insider’ retained the classical view, that fiduciary duty could be the basis for 
prohibition. In fact, though the SL of 2002 used the term “person”, not insider, the 
analysis in this chapter showed that insider definition was the benchmark for the 
JSC. 
3) The concept of ‘tippees’, and liability requirements, are well established under 
UK regulation, while the SL of 2002 is ambiguous about this issue. 
4) Insider dealing in the UK constitutes a form of market abuse behaviour, in 
addition to being a criminal offence, and thereby extends the scope of prohibition 
and the ability to impose criminal and civil sanctions. In Jordan, by contrast, 
insider dealing is a criminal offence and expected to be challenging, in terms of 
securing evidence more than the case in the UK. 
5) The meaning of inside information is explicit in UK regulation, i.e. non-public 
price-sensitive information. However, the SL of 2002 use of more than one term 
for ‘information’ (material, confidential and inside information) in different 
articles, together with weak drafting, all made it difficult to decide what was 
intended by the regulator. In this way, the chapter answered Research Question 2) 
– Is the recently introduced Jordanian law effective? – on the effectiveness and 
clarity of Jordanian statutory prohibition. 
Chapter 5 attempted to identify the underlying factors that influenced the approaches of 
the UK and Jordanian financial regulators, to enforcing statutory prohibition, and their 
enforcement actions. In order to consider these factors, the chapter assessed the 
effectiveness of the UK and Jordanian prohibition regimes in tackling insider dealing 
and market abuse.  
By analysing UK prohibition regimes (criminal, civil and the FSA’s disciplinary 
regime), the study found that the most important factors impacting the effectiveness of 
prohibition regimes were: problems associated with regulator independence; the very 
wide-ranging remit of the FSA in regulating the business of a massive industry; the 
controversial nature of the market abuse regime; and blind faith in the ECMH. 
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Nevertheless, political and economic factors were arguably the most influential. Neo-
liberalism and global competitiveness – which the political climate fostered – leading to 
lax regulation and enforcement prior to the banking crisis, were the FSA’s key 
problems. In evidencing this, the chapter argued that although the previous factors 
remained in the aftermath of the banking crisis, the FSA did manage to enforce the 
prohibition regime very effectively (when the ‘political will’ encouraged this).  
This conclusion answered Research Question 3), on the effectiveness of the UK 
prohibition regime and whether enforcement provided credible deterrence – After 
decades of prohibiting insider dealing, has the UK legal framework succeeded in 
tackling insider dealing and market abuse effectively? 
The same problem of independence was seen to affect JSC enforcement policy and 
actions. However, the chapter argued that problem of independence was more acute in 
Jordan. Political resistance to moving reforms from paper to action was highlighted. The 
role of politicians in freezing the enforcement of prohibition was a result of their 
conflicting roles as decision makers on the JSC Board, or as managers of elite issuers. 
Another aspect of independence that was seen to be common to both UK and Jordanian 
regulators, was their limited financial resources, which impacted on their enforcement 
actions. 
The chapter showed how independence was not the only factor affecting JSC 
enforcement. Lack of regulation clarity, the problems of inexperienced and 
unprofessional staff, and regulatory transparency, had all contributed, and resulted in 
lack of enforcement actions against insiders and abusers.  
The chapter finally within the assessment of the effectiveness of enforcement under the 
civil and criminal regimes advanced using the criminal regime if to achieve better 
credible deterrence and reduce the rate of insider dealing. This aimed at answering the 
research question 4): whether the UK prohibition regime is effective in tackling insider 
dealing. 
In light of all of this, and based on the findings identified above, this study is able to 
conclude with insights into two key issues: 
1) To explain why the prohibition regime to counter insider dealing was established 
in Jordan, yet not enforced. This goes to the heart of the Research Questions, and 
was the main reason for undertaking this study. 
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2) To test the findings of comparative studies undertaken by law and finance 
scholars – specifically the argument that countries with common law systems, like 
the UK, provide more effective legal rules than those countries with civil law 
systems, like Jordan. 
In assessing this latter argument, and whether it applies to insider dealing and market 
abuse prohibition regimes in the UK and Jordan, it was necessary to examine both legal 
rules in statute, “law on the books”, and “law in action”. It was found that the UK 
provided a more effective prohibition regime than Jordan, not only because of 
differences in the origins of their legal systems, but more significantly because of 
differences in the legal environment in which each regime is set. It was found that, as 
regards financial market regulation, argument about legal origins recede into 
insignificance. This is because, as described, globalization mandated the adoption of 
minimum unified international standards for financial markets. In this, IOSCO, of which 
the UK and Jordan are members
1508
, required the implementation of minimum standards 
for financial markets, and this ensured market integrity and investor confidence
1509
. 
In general, therefore, the statutory prohibition regimes established in each country were 
found to be largely similar, regardless of their different legal origins. In light of this, the 
focus of the study shifted to considering the legal environment in each country – in 
particular: 
1) the political will and economic forces around the market, which, among other 
things, played a vital role in the establishment of financial regulation and its 
enforcement; 
2) the experience of legislators and financial regulators in regulating and dealing 
with insider dealing and market abuse – in particular their familiarity with the 
needs of national markets and how to address them; this is also closely linked to 
the effectiveness of legal institutions in providing sound prohibition regimes, and 
enforcing them effectively; 
3) the structure of financial markets, transactions and investors, and how they 
conduct business and take investment decisions. 
These points helped explain why the UK has a sound, effective, prohibition regime, 
while Jordan has not. As scholars of law and finance point out, the emphasis in any 
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comparative-analysis should be on “law in action”, rather than “law on the books”.1510 
Only when the law is in action, can its effectiveness be tested, and a judgement made as 
to whether enforcement has achieved the goals and objectives set for it. The study 
recognised that it was never going to be possible to transplant the UK experience of 
prohibiting insider dealing, to Jordan; rather, the UK experience was examined for 
inspiration in the framing of recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the 
Jordanian regime – albeit recommendations tailored to the Jordanian legal environment. 
6.2 Recommendations 
The recommendations presented here are classified in accordance with the adopted 
Comparison Criteria (see section 1.7). The recommendations are mainly intended to 
address weaknesses in the Jordanian prohibition regime, but will address the UK regime 
where appropriate. 
6.2.1 Regulator independence 
The recommendation that the financial regulator be independent of political policy is 
difficult to achieve. The vital role of the financial markets, and their contribution to the 
national economy, mean that politics is closely linked to legal reform. For example, 
political influence was evident in the reforms to financial regulation in the UK, and in 
Jordan to a greater extent. Recommending total independence is not therefore realistic, 
however political influence can be minimized. This can be achieved when national 
political policy considers all investor interests, not just the interests of market elites. 
The study found that politicians in the UK did consider the opinions and economic 
interests of elite market players, and that sometimes their interests affected both the 
proposed reforms and the approach adopted by the regulator. Giving consideration to all 
market investor interests is essential, particularly where the aim of the UK financial 
regulator is to ensure market integrity and maintain investor confidence in the financial 
system. Otherwise, if normal investors believe political policy is favouring only the 
interests of elites, they will lose trust in the market, withdraw their savings, and thereby 
the national economic prosperity will be affected. Investor confidence in market 
integrity should flow from the protection of consumers in general, and not be hijacked 
by “allowing the financial industry too much power over regulatory design.1511” 
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Arguably, regulator independence could be ensured by greater transparency, not only 
with the financial industry, but also with investors and consumers.
1512
 The FCA seems 
to be mindful of the importance of transparency, and is looking to be more open and 
engaged with consumers, than was the FSA.
1513
 The FCA acknowledges that being 
more cooperative and transparent with external stakeholders, consumers and the public, 
as well as with the financial industry, will promote investor confidence and maintain 
market integrity.
1514
 For this reason, the FCA uses the media, focus groups, and other 
methods, to ensure face to face interaction with consumers and the general public
1515
. 
It could be argued, therefore, that there should be no contradiction between attracting 
foreign and regional investments, and having a sound financial system. Corrupt and 
uncontrolled financial systems have adverse effects, because, even if governments 
succeed in attracting those investments, they will tend to be short-term. Uncontrolled 
financial systems are something that the JSC should try to minimize, as should decision 
makers when drawing up general investment policy. 
The need to monitor executive authority when introducing provisional laws, is also 
highly recommended. The study showed how, under the Jordanian Constitution of 1952, 
the SL of 2002 was a ‘provisional law’, yet the constitutional requirements (exceptional 
circumstances) for such a law were not fulfilled. The political factors caused the 
executive authority to bow to pressure from international reform programs, and rush in 
the SL of 2002. Political influence did not stop there: it continued to affect the whole 
regime, both in its loose drafting, and in its enforcement. 
The problem of financial regulator independence in Jordan is endemic, and requires 
reforms to the entire national legal system. These reforms should start by reducing the 
exceptional role of executive authority, and minimizing opportunities for political 
patronage – when filling important roles in the market – by ensuring that candidates 
have sufficient experience of market mechanisms, and of regulating them. 
To minimize political influence on the JSC, total separation should also be established 
between JSC financial resources and the General Budget. The JSC can then augment its 
financial resources by increasing fines levied, or by increasing registration and listing 
fees, for example. 
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6.2.2 Regulatory transparency 
The lack of transparency was recognised in all aspects of this study. Regarding 
transparency in the process of proposing laws, it is recommended that the legislator and 
the government be more open and transparent with the nation, as well as with those 
directly affected by new laws. This will enhance confidence in the legal system and 
demonstrate that the government is working in the public interest. It will also underpin 
accountability for legal institutions, and minimize corruption, as decision makers will be 
aware that their decisions will be reviewed and monitored.  
Transparency will also improve public awareness: when market players and investors 
know about insider dealing, and why it is prohibited, awareness of its adverse effects on 
market integrity will be enhanced, and investor confidence – in the regulator and in 
financial market regulation – increased. Investors will know that prohibition is intended 
to protect their interests. The benefits of this sort of openness can also be of great 
importance to legal intermediaries (like lawyers) and judges. For all of these reasons, it 
is recommended that the JSC be open with the financial industry and investors in 
general, and conduct consultations with them, to justify and clarify its activities and 
actions. 
In the spirit of transparency, the JSC should publish its enforcement actions promptly 
and in detail. Its current practice of publishing summaries in appendices to its Annual 
Reports undermines enforcement and, critically, reduces the likelihood of deterrence. 
Providing details of enforcement cases to the public and industry will have multiple 
benefits: it will educate the industry, enhance public awareness, and also send out clear 
signals to deter future offenders. The JSC will be taken more seriously by the financial 
industry, and potential perpetrators (mainly insiders) will think twice before being 
stigmatized – not least because such news and awareness spreads quickly, given the 
personalized nature of the financial markets. Even if the JSC is reluctant to send 
‘borderline’ or difficult cases to court, because, as with its own staff, judges lack the 
knowledge and experience to deal with them,
1516
 publishing its enforcement actions will 
still have a strong deterrent effect. 
As for the level of transparency provided under the JSC disclosure regime, the study 
found that the JSC overlooked some key areas, the most important of which is the 
                                                     
1516
 This was mentioned in: MENA Corporate Governance Workshop (n 1114); NASD Market 
Surveillance Assessment (n 1348); Harabi (n 1096) 
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enforcement of timely disclosure, so that the exact time inside information is 
disseminated can be established. 
In addition to the general, if critical, issue of regulatory transparency, the following 
reforms are recommended for enhancing the Jordanian disclosure regime: 
1) Identify clearly what information is subject to disclosure, especially regarding the 
offence of insider dealing. The information currently subject to disclosure is 
‘material information’, while ‘inside information’ is the essential requirement for 
the offence. The disclosure regime should be amended forthwith, not only to 
ensure that the right type of information is disseminated to the market, but also to 
ensure the effectiveness of the prohibition regime. The current situation provides a 
loophole in the prohibition regime, and could be challenged, either in disclosure 
breaches or when committing an offence. 
2) Enforce timely disclosure through regulatory channels, without giving latitude to 
issuers to choose where, and to whom, they disclose – particularly in cases were 
disclosure is required from different entities, such as the Central Bank and the 
Corporates Controller. In this regard, the JSC and those entities should consider 
establishing memoranda of understanding between them, relating to the disclosure 
of inside information. 
3) Expand the definition of ‘insider’, so that disclosure obligation covers all those 
having access to inside information by virtue of their business or profession, 
regardless of their ability to make managerial decisions. 
4) Include ‘connected persons’ in the same definition of ‘insider’. 
5) Regulate ‘selective and delayed disclosure’, as the interests of issuers may be 
affected if prompt disclosure is always required. 
6) Require issuers to hold and maintain updated lists of their insiders. 
7) Provide guidelines that illustrate disclosure requirements from a practical 
perspective. 
8) Ensure that PDMRs – and other employees having access to inside information, or 
handling it internally – are aware of their regulatory duties and responsibilities, 
and of the sanctions that may be imposed if any misuse of that information occurs, 
whether for their own benefit or the benefit of others. 
9) Require issuers to implement procedures and systems to identify and control 
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inside information. 
10) Review current methods for dealing with rumours, as the mechanism adopted by 
the JSC increases the possibility of leaking inside information. 
11) Publish details of enforcement actions in cases of disclosure breaches, not only for 
reasons of transparency, but also to enhance industry awareness of the offence. 
6.2.3 Regulation clarity 
The SL of 2002 should explicitly define the nature of the prohibition regime, from the 
outset. The study found that, under the offence of market manipulation, the same 
misbehaviours may be regarded as either civil or criminal, depending on the applicable 
article – which hinders enforcement. The legislator should consider redrafting the entire 
prohibition regime, to clarify the statutory requirements for each offence, and to ensure 
conformity between the glossary provided, and the regulated offences. For example, the 
definition of an ‘insider’ should be expanded to include all types of insider (primary and 
secondary), because the current limited definition was used to interpret the meaning of 
‘person’ incorrectly. 
The legislator should avoid using different variants of the term ‘information’ (inside, 
material and confidential) and consider, for example, adopting the term ‘information not 
generally available’, for consistency and to allow markets enough time to react to fresh 
information, while at the same leaving time for the information to be assessed by 
investors. 
Instead of regulating the insider dealing offence by requiring “dealing in or using inside 
information”, it is suggested that offence be based on ‘misuse of information’, akin to 
the FSMA of 2000, with its ability to encompass any improper act, whether relating to 
action or inaction, as long as it was on the basis of information not generally available. 
In this way, the improper disclosure offence can fit easily under the ‘misuse’ offence, 
without the need for separate prohibition. Improper disclosure will thereby be the same 
order of offence as insider dealing (criminal). 
As the study discussed, further consideration should also be given to improper 
disclosure, since a number of other factors can influence the likelihood of tipping or 
leakage of inside information. These factors include: market size, companies’ structures 
(mostly family-based), and unorthodox investment motives (based on kin relationships, 
for example, rather than financial considerations). Adding to these factors, the media 
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can also contribute to the dissemination of inside information and the spreading of 
rumour. Unfortunately, the role of the media in improper disclosure was overlooked, 
and may need to be regulated. 
In the case of market abuse/manipulation (depending on the nature of the behaviour), 
the regulator should consider issuing further explanation and guidance on the offences – 
for the benefit of market players and those responsible for monitoring and enforcing the 
law.
1517
 The JSC can benefit from FSA experience of this, and might also consider 
publishing details of its disciplinary actions, so that the industry, judges and lawyers can 
better understand what constitutes violation and how the JSC deals with such cases
1518
. 
To summarise, the lack of precision and well-structured provision in Jordan allows 
different interpretations to be applied whenever a case of insider dealing or market 
manipulation is brought to court. Such imprecision can allow wrongdoers to manipulate 
the regulation, and avoid prosecution and conviction. 
6.2.4 Human capital 
The earlier recommendations cannot be successfully implemented unless those involved 
in the regulatory process and in its enforcement, are sufficiently professional in 
regulating the financial markets, and have the skills and experience appropriate to this 
area of market misconduct. Overcoming the challenges impeding JSC enforcement will 
require real reform in its cadre and in its approach to the industry. JSC staff should be 
appointed based on their skills and experience, not for being part of elite, political and 
market-player lobby. 
In the meantime, the current level of JSC staff skills can be enhanced through training 
workshops on investment issues, market mechanisms, market misconduct, proper 
monitoring, investigations, and the enforcement process. In addition JSC might consider 
cooperating with its counterparts (the Banking Regulator and Companies Monitoring 
department for example), as well as with prosecutors and judges, to enhance skills and 
improve understanding of insider dealing and market manipulation offences. 
However, holding workshops or providing assessments for the JSC and its staff will be 
futile unless there is a real will to implement the recommendations, and then to initiate 
                                                     
1517
 This was recommended to the JSC in 2005, see: Kulczak NASD Assessment of Jordan (n 30). Also 
see Chapter 4, s.2 
1518
 Was discussed in Chapter 5, s.2  
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substantive reform. This is said because some of the deficiencies discussed in this study 
were brought to the attention of the JSC in 2003, yet there has been no change since.
1519
 
This is yet more evidence that the key to real reform lies with the resilient elites of 
senior market players and politicians. Curtailing their power needs to be at the top of 
any list of reforms. 
6.2.5 Public awareness 
The earlier recommendations highlight the importance of enhancing awareness of 
offences, across the financial industry, but particularly to those involved in regulating 
the regime (as legislators and regulators) and enforcing it (as regulators and judges), and 
to the legal professions (lawyers, legal advisors). Awareness should also extend to the 
general public. As Mohammad Tash, the JSC Chairman, said, their old investment 
mentality should change from personalizing their investment decision, to basing it on 
real financial information and analysis. In other words, making general investors aware 
that their investment decisions could be based on inside information which tipped from 
their friends or relatives, and thereby violating the law. 
6.3 Further Recommended Studies 
This study provides a general overview of the Jordanian insider dealing regime, based 
on critical analysis which explores the failings of the regime, and why it has not once 
been enforced in 17 years. The dearth of Jordanian scholarly studies in this area 
prompted this study. It is hoped that, as a first contribution to the Jordanian literature on 
the subject, this study will inspire more detailed studies. The nature of this comparative-
analysis of the UK and Jordanian prohibition regimes, and the necessary limitations 
noted in the scope (section 1.4), make it impractical to tackle every aspect of each 
regime in full detail. Instead, these can be the basis for new research and further studies 
– for instance, into political influence on legal regimes. 
Typically, most studies discuss and critically analyse the relationship between law and 
economics, or law and finance. This study demonstrates that the relationship between 
law and politics is no less important and equally worthy of consideration.  
Also, the JSC disclosure regime could be the subject of further study, since sound and 
effective disclosure obligation is on the front line when tackling insider dealing. 
                                                     
1519
 See (n 1516) listing some of the assessments, reports and workshops undertaken since 2003. 
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Enforcement processes and actions are another area ripe for consideration. In this 
respect, throwing light on the forces and reasons which underpin enforcement brings 
this dry subject to life – enhancing our understanding of the historical events which led 
to its establishment and development.  
These are suggestions for future studies and as was said earlier, any aspect of this study 
can be nuclear for further thorough studies. 
  
250 
Bibliography 
I. Primary Sources 
A. Rules and legislation 
a) The USA 
The Securities and Exchange Act 1934, Rule 10b-5 
The SEC Rule 14e-3 
b) The UK 
Companies Act of 1980 (Part V) 
Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 1985 
Criminal Justice Act of 1993 (Part V) 
Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (Part VIII) 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005 SI 
2005, No.381 
Financial Services Act of 1986 
Financial Services Act of 2010 
Financial Services Act of 2012 
c) The EU Directives 
Amended proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, COM (2012) 420 
Final, 2011/0279 (COD), Brussels 25/7/2012 
Directive 89/592/EEC of the Council Coordinating Regulations on insider dealing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 28
th
 of 
January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
EC Proposal for a Regulation on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
(market abuse) (MAD II), 2011/0295 (COD) 
European Communities (Markets in Financial Instruments) Regulations 2007 
MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC) 
251 
d) Jordan 
Amman Financial Market Law of 1976 
Banking Law 2000 at: 
<http://www.cbj.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=123&local_type=0&local_deta
ils=0&local_details1=0&localsite_branchname=cbj> 
Central Bank of Jordan Law of 1971 
Commercial Law 1966 available in Arabic at: 
<http;//www.lob.gov.jo/ui/laws/search_no.jsp?no=12&year=1966> 
Companies Law of 1997 available in Arabic at 
<http://www.job.gov.jo/vi/laws/search_no.jsp?no=22&year=1997> 
Constitution of Hashemite Kingdom 1952 
JSC Instructions of Issuing Companies Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing 
Standards of 2004 at: 
<http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/English.aspx?Site_ID=1&Page_ID=717> 
Securities Law of 1997 
The Securities Law of 2002, available in English at 
<http://www.jsc.gov.jo/Public/english.aspx?site_id=1&Lang=3&Page_Id=1
975&Menu_ID2=198> 
B. Cases 
a) The US 
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C 907 (1961) 
SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833 (2
nd
 Cir 1968) 
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 179 (2d. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985) 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833 (1968) 
U.S v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) 
U.S v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 
(1992) 
US v O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) 
252 
b) The UK 
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 451 
Baker Tilly (a firm) v Makar [2009] All ER (D) 198 
Bell & others v Lever Bros & others (1932) AC161 
Blue Arrow case: R v Coben [1992] 142 NJL 1267 
Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, [1966] 3 All ER 721, [1966] 3 WLR 1009, 
110 Sol Jo 853 
Saunders v United Kingdom [1996] 23 EHRR 313 
Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman [1991] BCLC 897 
Oxford v. Moss (1978) Cr APP R 183 
Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch.421 
Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All 
ER 387 
R v Butt [2006] All ER (D) 31 
R v Coben [1992] 142 NJL 1267 
R v. Fisher (1988) 4 B.B.C. 360 
R v. Hipwell [2007] EWCA Crim 562 
R v McQuoid [2009] 4 All ER (D) 100 
R. v Rigby, Baily and Rowley [2005] EWCA Crim 3478 
Saunders v United Kingdom [1996] 23 EHRR 313 
Winterflood Securities Limited, Stephen Sotirious and Jason Robins v FSA, Court 
of Appeal (Civil division) [2010] EWCA Civ 423, 22 Apr 2010 
FSA Final Notice, Arif Mohammed, May 2005 
FSA Final Notice, Darren Morton and Christopher Parry, 6 Oct 2009 
FAS Final Notice, David Einhorn, Jan 2012 
FSA Final Notice, David Messy, 21 Feb 2011 
FSA Final Notice, Entertainment Rights, 19 January 2009 
FSA Final Notice, Evolution Beeson Gregory Limited, 12 Nov 2004 
253 
FSA Final Notice, John Shevlin, 1 Jul 2008 
FSA Final Notice, Marconi, 11 April 2003 
FSA Final Notice, Perry John Bliss, 13 Dec 2010 
FSA Final Notice, Philipe Jbre, 1 Aug 2006 
FSA Final Notice, Photo-Me International, 21 June 2010 
FSA Final Notice, Samuel Khan, May 2011 
FAS Final Notice, Shell Transport and Trading Company Plc, 14 Aug 2004 
FSA Final Notice, Simon Eagle, 18 May 2010 
FSA Final Notice, Sportsworld Media Group, 29 March 2004 
FSA Final Notice, Stewart McKegg, 16 Oct 2008 
FAS Final Notice, William Coppin, 7 Dec 2010 
FSA Final Notice, Wolfson Microelectronics, 19 January 2009 
FSA Final Notice, Woolworths Group, 11 June 2008 
FSA Final Notice, Universal Salvage PLC, 19 May 2004 
FSA v Arif Mohammed, FSMT Case no.012, Mar 2005 
David Massey v FSA, Upper Tribunal Case, (FIN/2009/0024) 
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd v FSA, FSMAT case no: 015, 2005 
FSA v James Parker, FSMT Case no.37, May 2006 
Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd v FSA, FSMT Case no: 015, 2005 
FSA v Philippe Jabre, FSMT Case no.36, 10 Jul 2006 
FSA v Paul Davidson and Ashley Tatham, FSMT Case no: 31, Feb 2006 
FSA v Winterflood Securities Limited, FSMT Case no.66, 11 Mar 2010 
C. European 
Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. (Ga.1903) 
Iourgos Ikonomikon and another v Geargakis (C-391/04) 
ECJ case Markus Geltl v Daimler AG C-19/11, Luxembourg, 22 Jun 2012 
254 
ECJ case Spector Photo Group NV v Commissie voor het Bank, Financie-en 
Assurantiewezen, C-45/08, [2010] All ER (D) 125 (Feb) 
ECJ case Markus Geltl v Daimler AG C-19/11, Luxembourg, 22 Jun 2012 at 
<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CC0019:EN:H
TML> Accessed: 15/9/2012 
II. Secondary Sources 
A. Books 
Agamben G, A brief history of the state of exception (University of Chicago Press 
2011) 
Arner D, Economic stability, economic growth and the role of law (Cambridge 
University Publishing 2007) 
Avgouleas E, The mechanics and regulation of market abuse- A legal and 
economic analysis (Oxford University Press 2005) 
Ayres I and Braithwaite J, Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation 
debate (Oxford University Press 1992) 
Barnes P, Stock market efficiency, insider dealing and market abuse (Gower 
Publishing Limited 2009) 
Bentham J, An introduction to the principle of moral and legislation (Dover 
Publications 2007) 
Blair M, Blackstone’s guide to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Blackstone Limited 2001) 
Black J: Rules and regulators (Oxford University Press 1997) 
Campbell A and Cartwright P, Banks in crisis -The legal response (Ashgate 
Publishing 2002) 
Cruz PD, Comparative law in a changing world, (3
rd
 edn, Routledge-Cavendish 
2007) 
Davidson A, How the city really works: the definitive guide to money and 
investing in London’s Square Mile (2nd edn, Kogan Page 2008) 
Dine J and Koutsias M, company law (6
th
 edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 
255 
Douglas N, Institutions, Institutional change and economic performance 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
Dumenil G and Levy D, The crisis of neoliberalism (Harvard University Press 
2011) 
Ferran E and Goodhart CAE, Regulating financial services and markets in the 
21st century (Hart Publishing 2002) 
Gray J and Hamilton J, Implementing financial regulation: Theory and practice 
(John Wiley & Sons 2006) 
Hannigan B, Company law (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
Hannigan B, Insider dealing (2
nd
 edn, Longman Group 1994) 
Harvey D, A brief history neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2006) 
Hayek F, Law, legislation and liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of 
justice and political economy (Rutledge & Kegan Paul 1982) 
Hayek F, The constitution of liberty, (Rutledge & Kegan Paul 1960) 
Hazlitt H, The critics of the Keynesian economics (2nd edn, Mises Institute 2009) 
Hicks A, Cases and Materials on Company Law (6
th
 edn, Oxford University Press 
2008) 
Hudson A, Securities law (Sweet &Maxwell 2008) 
International Business Publications (USA), Middle East and Arabic Countries 
company laws and regulations handbook- Strategic information and basic 
laws (Vol.1, International Business Publications 2011) 
Joseph K, Stranded in the middle ground (Centre for Policy Studies 1976) 
Keynes M, Essays on John Maynard Keynes (Cambridge University Press 1975) 
King D, The New Right: Politics, markets and citizenship (Macmillan Education 
1987) 
Manne H, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (Free Press 1966) 
Morris C, The two trillion dollar meltdown: Easy money, high rollers and the 
great credit crash (2
nd
 edn, Public Affairs 2008) 
Morris S, Financial services: regulating Business (2
nd
 edn, FT Law and Tax 
1995) 
256 
North D, Institutions, Institutional change and economic performance, 
(Cambridge University Press 1990) 
O’Malley P, The currency of justice: Fines and damages in consumer societies 
(Routledge 2009) 
Pette B, Lowry J and Reisbery A, Pette’s Company Law: Company and Capital 
Markets Laws (3
rd
 edn, Pearson Education Limited 2009) 
Piro T, The political economy of market reform in Jordan (Rawman & Littlefield 
Pub. 1998) 
Rider B, Adams C and Ashe M, Guide to financial Services Regulation (3
rd
 edn, 
CCH Incorporated 1997) 
Rider B, Insider Trading (Jordan & Sons 1983) 
Rider B, Alexander K, Linklater L and Bazley S, Market abuse and insider 
dealing (2
nd
 edn, Tottel Publishing 2009) 
Sealy L and Worthington, Cases and Materials on Company Law, (8
th
 edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 
Sealy L and Hooley RJA, Commercial law: Text, cases, and materials (4
th
 ed, 
Oxford University Press 2009) 
Schmitt C, Political Theology (3
rd
 edn, University of Chicago Press 2005) 
Siwar W, Sources of obligations (2
nd
 edn, Dar Wae’l publishing 2000) 
Steinberg M I, International Securities Law: A Contemporary and Comparative 
Analysis (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 
Swan E and Virgo J, Market abuse regulation (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2010) 
Taylor M, Regulatory Leviathan- will super- SIB work? (CTA Financial 
Publishing 1997) 
Twining W, Globalization and legal theory, (Butterworth 2000) 
Watson A, Legal transplants: An approach to comparative law, (Scottish 
Academic Press 1974) 
Zufferey J B, Regulations of Trading Systems on Financial Markets (Kluwer Law 
International, 1997) 
257 
Zweigeret k and Kolz H, An introduction to comparative law (Oxford University 
Press 1998) 
B. Edited books 
Chynoweth P, ‘Legal research’ in Knight A and Ruddock L (eds), Advanced 
research methods in their built environment (John Wiley &Sons 2008) 
Jessop B, ‘Changing forms and functions of the state in an era of globalization 
and regionalisation’ in Delmore R and Dopfer K, The political economy of 
diversity: Evolutionary perspectives on economic order and disorder 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 1994) 
Lee S and McBride, ‘Neoliberalism, state power and the global governance in the 
twenty-first century’ in Lee S and McBride S (eds.), Neo-liberalism- State 
power and global governance (Springer 2007) 
Montgomerie J, ‘The logic of neo-liberalism and the political economy of the 
consumer debt-led growth’ in Lee S and McBride S (eds.), Neo-liberalism- 
State power and global governance (Springer 2007) 
Wilson G, ‘Comparative legal scholarship’ in McConville M and Chui W H (eds), 
Research methods for law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 
Young P, ‘Punishment, money and a sense of justice’ in Carlen P and Cook D 
(eds.), Paying for crime (Open University Press 1989) 
C. Articles 
Alcock A, ‘A regulatory monster’, (1998) JUL Journal of Business Law 371 
Alcock A, ‘The Draft Financial Services and Markets Bill’ (1998) 19 Company 
Lawyer 258 
Alcock A, ‘Market abuse’ (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 142 
Alcock A, Five years of market abuse’ (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 163 
Alcock A, ‘Insider dealing-an unholy mess’ (1993) 143 The New Law Journal 21 
Alexander K, ‘Principles v. rules in the financial regulation: re-assessing the 
balance in the credit crisis’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law 
Review 169 
258 
Alexander R, ‘Corporate Crimes: are the gloves coming off?’ (2009) 30 Company 
Lawyer 321 
Al Omoush I, ‘The prohibited dealing in securities based on confidential 
information which has influence on its prices ‘Insider Dealing’: 
Comparative Study’, (1997) 12 Mou’ta Journal for Researches and Studies 
311 
Arora A, ‘Changes to the powers of the Bank of England’ (1997) 16 International 
Banking and Finance Law 21 
Ashe M, ‘The crime being something in the City- part 1’ (2000) 150 New Law 
Journal 1344 
Ashe M, ‘The Directive on insider dealing’ (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 15 
Bagge J, ‘Senior management responsibilities under the new regulatory regime’ 
(2000) 8 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 201 
Balmforth B; Burton B; Cross S and Power D, ‘Evidence on UK directors’ 
compliance with disclosure timing regulation’ (2007) 15 Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance 381 
Barnes P, ‘The regulation of insider dealing in the UK: some empirical evidence 
concerning share prices, merger bids and bidder’s advising merchant banks’, 
(1996) 6 Applied Financial Economics 31 
Barry J F, ‘The economics of outside information and Rule 10b-5’ (1982) 129 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1307 
Bavoso V, ‘Financial innovation and structured finance: the case of securitization’ 
(2013) 43 Company Lawyer 3 
Bazely S, ‘Market cleanliness, systems and controls and future regulatory 
enforcement’ (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 341 
Bazely S, ‘FSA enforcement activity, reflections on 2010 and the challenges of 
regulatory change’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 1 
Bazely S, ‘The Financial Services Authority, risk-based regulation, principle-
based rules and accountability’ (2002) 23 Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 422 
259 
Beavan R, ‘Changes to the UK Listing Regime’ (2009) 16 Company Secretary’s 
Review 33 
Becker G, ‘Crime and punishment: An economic approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of 
Political Economy 169 
Ben Dubow and Nuno Monterio, ‘Study finds evidence of widespread insider 
dealing”, (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 179 
Beny L N, ‘Insider trading laws and stock markets around the world: An empirical 
contribution to the theoretical law and economics debate’ (2007) 32 Journal 
of Corporation Law 237 
Black J, Hopper M and Band C, ‘Making a success of principle-based regulation’ 
May 2007, Law and Financial Markets Review 191 
Black J, ‘The emergence of risk-based regulation and new public risk 
management in the UK’ (2005) Public Law 512 
Black J, ‘Decentring regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and self-
regulation in a post regulatory world’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 
103 
Black J and Nobiles R, ‘Personal pension mis-selling: the cases and lessons of 
regulatory failure’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 789 
Black J, ‘Talking about regulation’, (1998) Sep Public Law 77 
Blackmore R and Walmsly N, ‘News analysis-Towards effective regulation”, 
(1992) 43 Law Society Guardian Gazette 89 
Blumestin A and Nagin D, ‘The deterrent effect of legal sanctions on draft 
evasion’ (1977) 29 
Stanford Law Review 241 
Board of Inland Revenue, ‘Revenue tackles insider dealing’ (2005) 125 
Accountancy 9 
Braithwaite J, ‘The essence of responsive regulation’ (2011) 44 U.B.C. Law 
Journal 475 
Brudney V, ‘Insiders, outsiders, and informational advantages under the Federal 
Securities Laws’ (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review 322 
Burger R, ‘Plugging the leaks’ (2007)157 New Law Journal 1222 
260 
Cane P, ‘Self-regulation and judicial review’ (1997) 16 Oct Civil Justice 
Quarterly 324 
Campbell D, ‘What is wrong with insider dealing', (1996) 16 Journal of Legal 
Studies 185 
Carey P, ‘Not so happy birthday’, (1991) 141 New Law Journal 338 
Carlton D W and Fischel D R, ‘The regulation of insider trading’ (1988) 35 
Stanford Law Review 857 
Coffee J, ‘No soul to damn: No body to kick: An unscandalized inquiry in the 
problem of corporate punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386 
Coffey J and Pinto T, ‘The compatibility of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act with the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2001) 12 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 50 
Cox J D, ‘The insider trading regulation and the production of information’ 
(1986) 64 Washington University of Law Quarterly 475 
Curran V, ‘Cultural immersion, differences and categories in the US comparative 
law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 43 
Dabit M, ‘Jordan: financial regulation-foreign investors’ (2006) 23 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 5 
Darling A, ‘The regulation of UK Insurance Industry’ (1996) 4 International 
Insurance Law review 171 
Davies H, ‘Building the Financial Services Authority: What’s new’ (11 Mar 1999) 
Travers Lecture of London Guildhall University 
Davies H, ‘Are words still bonds: how strait is the City’ (2 Nov 1998) Securities 
Institute Ethics Committee, 3rd Annual Lecture 
Davies H, ‘Law and regulation’ (2001) 3 Journal of International Financial 
Markets 169 
Davies P, ‘The European Community’s’ Directive on insider dealing: From 
company law to securities market regulation’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 92 
De Reya B, ‘Commercial, the regulation of financial services-part 1-an overview’, 
(1987) 84 Law society Gazette 1392 
261 
Deakin S, Lele P and Seims M, ‘The evolution of labour law: Calibrating and 
comparing regulatory regimes’ (2007) 146 International Labour Review 133 
Dignam A and Galanis, ‘Corporate governance and the importance of 
macroeconomic’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 201 
Dorn N, ‘The metamorphosis of insider trading in the face of regulatory 
enforcement’ (2011) 19 Journal of Financial Crime 75 
Eadie J, ‘Market abuse and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2001) 3 
Journal of International Financial Markets 74 
Easterbrook F H, ‘Insider trading, secret agents, evidentiary privileges, and the 
production of information (1981) 1981 Supreme Court Review 309 
Fama E, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A review of the theory and empirical work’ 
(1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383 
Engle E, ‘Insider trading: Incoherent in theory, inefficient in practice’ (2007) 32 
Oklahoma City University Law Review 37 
Filby M, ‘Part VIII Financial Services and Market Act: Filling insider regulatory 
gaps’ (2004) 25 Company Lawyers 363 
Fisher E, ‘The rise of risk commonwealth and the challenge for administrative 
law’ (2003) Public Law 455 
Georgosouli A, ‘The nature of FSA policy of rule use’ (2008)28 Legal Studies 
119 
Georgosouli A, ‘The revision of FSA’s approach to regulation: an incomplete 
agenda?’ (2010) 7 Journal of Business Law 599 
Gieve J, ‘The City’s growth: The crest of a wave or swimming with the stream?’, 
(2007)47 Bank of England Quarterly 286 
Gilligan G, ‘The origins of UK financial services regulation’, (1997)18 Company 
Lawyer 167 
Gilson R and Kraakman R, ‘The mechanisms of market efficiency’ (1984) 70 
Virginia Law Review 549 
Goshen Z and Parchomovsky G, ‘The essential role of securities regulation” 
(2006) 55 Duke Law Review 711 
Gower LCB, ‘Big Bang and the City regulation’ (1988)51 Modern Law Review 1 
262 
Graham T, ‘Financial Services and Markets Bill: Investigations and enforcement 
in the context of the financial crime objective’ (2002) 2 Journal of 
International Financial markets 88 
Gunningham LA, ‘Capital market theory, mandatory disclosure, and the price 
discovery’ (1994) 51 Washington and Lee Law Review 843 
Haddock D and Macy J, ‘A Coasian model of insider trading’ (1986) 80 North-
western University Law Review 1449 
Haft R, ‘The effect of insider trading rules on the internal efficiency of the large 
corporation’ (1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 1051 
Haines J, ‘IOSCO to the FSA-new trends in regulating abuse of financial markets’ 
(2005) 26 Company Lawyers 225 
Hansen J and Moalem D, ‘The MAD disclosure regime and the twofold notion of 
inside information: The available situation’ (2009) 4 Capita Market Law 
Journal 323 
Havranek M, ‘The Bank of England and the bank failures’ (2000) 2 Insolvency 
Lawyers 73 
Hayes A, Market abuse’ (2010) 75 Compliance officer Bulletin 1 
Haynes A, ‘Market abuse, fraud and misleading communications’, (2012) 19 
Journal of Financial Crime 234 
Hermann C, ‘Neoliberalism in the European Union’ (2007) 79 Studies in Political 
Economy 1 
Hey E and Mak E, ‘The possibilities of comparative law methods for research on 
built the rule of law in a global context’ (2009) 2 Erasmus Law Review 287 
Hopper M, ‘Market abuse’ (2005) Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
Hopt K, ‘The European insider dealing directive’ (1990) 27 Capital Market Law 
Journal 51 
Johnson H, ‘Disclosure obligations’ (2009) 1 Company Secretary’s Review 1 
Hu J and Noe T H, ‘The insider trading debate’ (1997) 82 Economic Review 34 
Humphreys S, ‘Legalizing lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s state of 
exception’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Laws 677 
263 
Hutchinson A, ‘The Case of Decriminalizing Insider Dealing’ (1990) 11 
Economic Affairs Journal 45 
Huysmans J, ‘The jargon of Exception-On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of 
the political society’ (2008) 2 International Political Sociology 165 
Jackson H and Roe M, ‘Public and private enforcement of securities laws: 
Resource-based evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207 
Joseph S, ‘Efficiency and effectiveness in the securities regulation: Comparative 
analysis of the Unite States’ competitive regulatory structure and the United 
Kingdoms’ single-regulator model’ (2008) 6 DePaul Business & 
Commercial Law Journal 247 
Karnell E, ‘White-collar crime and European financial crisis: getting tough on EU 
market abuse’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 481 
Karmel R S, ‘The relationship between mandatory disclosure and prohibition 
against insider trading: Why a property rights theory of inside information is 
untenable’ (1993) 59 Brooklyn Law Review 149 
Khashroum A and Zaid A, ‘Civil liability for inside dealing, comparative analysis 
between UK and Jordan’ (2007) 13 Al Manara Journal, Al Al-Bayt 
University 137 
Killick M, ‘Twin peaks- A new chimera? An analysis of the new proposed 
regulatory structure in the UK’, (2012)33 Company Lawyer 366 
Klaifat R, ‘The British Resident in Transjordan and the financial administration in 
the Emirate Transjordan 1921-1928’ (2012) 5 Journal of Politics and Law 
159 
Lake B, ‘The use for personal profit of knowledge gained while a director’ (1937) 
9 Mississippi Law Journal 427 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer A and Vinshy R, ‘Legal determinants of 
external finance’ (1997) 3 Journal of Finance 113 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer A and Vinshy R, ‘Law and finance’ (1998) 
106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 
Legrand P, “European legal systems are not converging” (1996) 45 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 56 
264 
Leland H E, ‘Insider Trading: should it be prohibited?’ (1992) 100 Journal of 
Political Economy 859 
Loke A, ‘From the fiduciary theory to information abuse: The changing fabric of 
insider trading laws in the UK, Australia and Singapore’ (2006) 54 
American Journal of Comparative Law 123 
Lomnika E, ‘reforming UK financial regulation: The creation of a single 
regulator’ (1999) Sep Journal of Business Law 480 
Lutz A and May P, ‘Insider dealing- outside problems?’(1989) 7 International 
Bank Law 118 
Lutz S, ‘The revival of the nation-state? Stock exchange regulation in an era of 
globalized financial markets’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy 
153 
Macy J R, ‘From fairness to contract: The new direction of the rules against 
insider trading’ (1984) 13 Hofstra Law Review 9 
Malkawi B and Haloush H, ‘Reflections on the Securities Law of Jordan’ (2008) 
19 European Business Law Review 735 
Malkawi B, ‘Building corporate governance system in Jordan: a critique current 
framework’ (2008) 6 Journal of Business Law 488 
Manne H, ‘What’s so bad about insider trading’ (1967) 15 Challenge 14 
Manne H, ‘Insider trading: Hayek, virtual markets, and the dog that did not bark’ 
(2005) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 167 
Manne H, ‘In defence of Insider Trading’ (1966) 44 Harvard Business Review 
113 
Marsh J and McDonnell B, ‘Handling and disclosing inside information: A guide 
to the disclosure rules’ (2007) 45 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
Mayfield J, ’The FSA approach to insider dealing’, (2009) 159 New Law Journal 
856 
McCoy K and Summe PH, ‘Insider trading regulation: a developing state’s 
perspective’ (1998) 5 Journal of Financial Crime 311 
McDonnell B, ‘Handling and disclosing inside information: a guide to disclosure 
rules’ (2011) 28 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
265 
McDowell R, ‘Financial Services Authority-progress or pragmatism?’ (1998) 13 
Journal of International Banking Law 123 
McGuinness C, ‘Toward the unification of the European Capital Markets: The 
EEC’S proposes a directive on insider trading’ (1988) 11 Fordham 
International Law Journal 432 
McMeel G, ‘The consumer dimension of financial services law: Lessons from 
pensions mis-selling scandal’ (1999) Company Financial and Insolvency 
Law Review 29 
McVea H, ‘What’s wrong with insider dealing’, (1995) 115 Journal of Legal 
Studies 390 
Morse G, ‘Controlling takeovers- the self-regulation option in the United 
Kingdom’ (1998) Jan Journal of Business Law 58 
Morse G, ‘The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers- self-regulation or self-
protection’, (1991) Nov Journal of Business Law 509 
Page A, ‘The Financial Services and Markets Act and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2000) 2 Journal of International Financial Markets 199 
Peat R, Mason I and Bazel S, ‘The FSA as a criminal prosecutor’ (2010) 31 
Company Lawyer 119 
Pistor K, Raiser M and Gelfer S, ‘Law and finance in transition economies’ 
(2000) 8 Economics of Transition 325 
Polinsky M and Shavell S, ‘The optimal use of fines and imprisonment’ (1984) 24 
Journal of Public Economics 89 
Posner R, ‘An economic theory of the criminal law’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law 
Review 1193 
Pound R, ‘The scope and purpose of sociological jurisprudence’ (1911) XXIV 
Harvard Law Review 591 
Prazon M and Fatale M, ‘Revising truth in securities: The use of the Financial 
Capital Market 
Rider B, ‘Civilising the law- The use of civil and administrative proceeding to 
enforce Financial Services Law’ (1995) 3 Journal of Financial Crime 11 
266 
Rider B, ‘Policing the city- Combating fraud and other abuses in corporate 
securities industry’ (1988) 41 Current Legal Problems 47 
Rider, ‘Policing the international financial market: an English perspective’ (1990) 
16 Brook. J. Int'l L 179 
Rider B, ‘self-regulation: The British approach to policing conduct in the 
securities business, with particular reference to the role of City Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers’, (1978) Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and 
Securities Regulation 319 
Rider B, ‘The control of insider dealing-Smoke and mirrors!’ (2000) 7 Journal of 
Financial Crime 277 
Rider B, ‘The regulation of corporation and securities law in Britain-The 
beginning of a real debate’ (1977)19 Malaya Law review 159 
Al-Rimawi L, ‘Jordan recent attempts at modernizing its securities regulation 
corresponds to a wider regional setting’ (1997) 18 Company Lawyer 282 
Schotland R, ‘Unsafe at any price: A reply to Manne, insider trading and the stock 
market’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 1425 
Scott D, ‘The UK’s Financial Services and markets Bill: the regulation of 
individuals’ (2002) 2 Journal of International financial Markets 13 
Scott K, ‘Insider trading: Rule 10b-5, disclosure and corporate privacy’ (1980) 9 
Journal of Legal Studies 801 
Seims M, ‘What does not work in comparing securities laws: A critique on La 
Porta et al’s methodology’ (2006) 16 International Company and 
Commercial Law Review 300 
Siems M, ‘Legal origins: Reconciling law & finance and comparative law’ (2007) 
52 McGill Law Journal 55 
Shutkever C, ‘The Transparency Rule in Practice’ (2008) 23 Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law 346 
Silver D and Salvkin H, ‘The legacy of deregulation and the financial crisis 
linkages between deregulation in the labour markets, housing and the 
financial markets’ (2009) 34 Journal of Business and Technology Law 301 
267 
Smith D, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive regulation in the financial services 
sector’ (2011) 44 U.B.C. Law Review 695 
Stallworthy M, ‘Reforming insider dealing law in the United Kingdom’ (1993) 4 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 210 
Starr T, ‘Mad for it?’ (2007)157 New Law Journal 1560 
Stones R, Regulating financial services: the human rights dimension’ (2000) 11 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 12 
Stott C, ‘case comment, case analysis: R. v Rollins; R. v McInerney’ (2010) 25 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 460 
Stout L, ‘The unimportance of being efficient: An economic analysis of stock 
market pricing and securities regulation’ (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 
613 
Stout L, ‘The mechanisms of market efficiency: An introduction to the new 
finance’ (2003) 28 Journal of Corporation Law 635 
Tradimas T, ‘Insider trading: European harmonization and the national law 
reform’ (1991) 40 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 919 
Travers Smith Regulatory Investigation Group, ‘FSA enforcement action: Themes 
and trends’ (2010) 76 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
Tridimas T, ‘The House of Lords rules on insider dealing’ (1989) 52 Modern Law 
Review 85 
Tridimas T, ‘Acquisition of inside information and intelligent insiders’ (1989) 10 
Company Lawyer 156 
Wang W K S, ‘Trading on material non-public information on impersonal stock 
markets: Who is harmed, and who can sue whom under the SEC Rule 10-b-
5?’ (1981) 54 Southern California Law Review 1217 
Welle E A, ‘Freedom of contract and securities laws: Opting out of securities 
regulation by private agreement’ (1999) 56 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 519 
Werden G and Simon M, ‘Why price fixers should go to prison’ (1987) 32 
Antitrust Bulletin 917 
268 
White M, ‘The implications for securities regulation of new insider dealing 
provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1993’ (1995) 16 Company Lawyer 
163 
Willmott N and James R, ‘The FSA’s changing approach to investigating and 
punishing regulatory misconduct: Practical implications for firms and 
individuals’ (2009) 65 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
Willmott N, McGowen P, Ghusn M, Brocklehurst V, Aikens R, Baily S, Scodie 
M, Palmer J, Whorthon R and Gold A, ‘Equipping the modern regulator: 
assessing the new regulatory powers under the Financial Services Act 2010’ 
(2010) 78 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 
Wilson G and Wilson S, Market misconduct, the Financial Services Authority and 
creating a system of “city grasses”: blowing the whistle on whistle-blowing’ 
(2010) 31 Company Lawyer 67 
Woodcock Tony, ‘Market practice as a defence in regulatory proceedings’ (2010) 
25 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 91 
Wotherspoon K, ‘Insider dealing- the new law: Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 419 
Valentine S, ‘The Stock Exchange and the Big Bang’, (1988) 21 Long Range 
Planning 35 
Yntema H E, ‘Comparative legal research- Some remarks on looking out of the 
cave’ (1956) 54 Michigan Law Review 901 
Yu Chiu I H, ‘Examining the justifications for mandatory disclosure in the 
securities regulation’ (2005) 26 Company lawyer 67 
D. Electronic Articles 
Alissa S, ‘Rethinking economic reform in Jordan: Confronting socioeconomic 
realities’ (2007) Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 1 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec4_alissa_jordan_final.pdf> 
Accessed: 13/3/2013 
Allen & Overy, ‘The Financial Conduct Authority- An overview’ (1 Apr 2013) 14 
<http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20Financial%
20Conduct%20Authority%20April%202013.pdf> Accessed: 11/3/2013 
269 
Al-Qudah F, ‘Could goodwill be subject for corruption?’ (Feb 2012) Goodwill 
Symposium <http://www.clejordan.com/Goddwill/> Accessed: 20/2/2013 
Armour J, Mayer C and Polo A, ‘Regulatory sanctions and the reputational 
damage in the financial market’ (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678028> 
Accessed: 4/4/2012 
Armour J, ’Shareholder Protection and Stock Market development: An Empirical 
Test of the legal Origins Hypothesis’ (2008) 5 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094355> (Accessed: 12/5/2013) 
Bainbridge S M, ‘Insider Trading: An Overview’ (1998) University of California, 
Los Angeles-School of Law 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=132529> Accessed 9
th
 
November 2009 
Bainbridge S, ‘The law and economics of insider trading: A comprehensive 
primer’ (2001) University of California, Los Angeles- School of Law 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=261277> Accessed: 3/3/2010 
Baldwin R and Black J, ‘Really responsive regulation’ (2007) WP/15/2007, 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences, Law Department at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=103322> Accessed: 5/4/2013 
Black J, ‘The development of risk-based regulation in the financial services: 
Canada, the UK and Australia’ Sep 2004, A research report to the ESRC 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics 
and Political Sciences 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publi...> Accessed: 
11/12/2011 
Chang S and Suk D, ‘stock prices and the secondary dissemination of 
information: The Wall Street Journal’s “Insider Trading Spotlight” Column’ 
(1998) 33 Financial Review 115 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=90808> 
Accessed: 21/2/2010 
Dumenil G and Levy D, ‘The crisis of Neoliberalism as a stepwise process’ 2012 
<http://www.jourdan.ens/levy/dle20121.pdf> Accessed: 25/4/2013 
270 
Ferran E, ‘Examining the UK’s experience in adopting the single financial 
regulatory model’ (2003) University of Cambridge-Faculty of Law; 
European Corporate Governance Institution (ECGI) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=346120> Accessed: 15/10/2011 
Ferran E, ‘The break-up of the Financial Services Authority’ (2010) University of 
Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute 
(ECGI) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690523> Accessed: 11/12/2010 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ’Release and control of inside information’ (Sep 
2010) <http://www.freshfileds.com/publications/pdfs/sep10/28789.pdf> 
Accessed: 10/11/2010 
Harabi N, ‘State of corporate governance in Arabic countries: An overview’ (Feb 
2007) University of Applied Sciences, Northwestern Switzerland 31 
<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.ed/45661/1/MPRA_paper_4566.pdf> 
Accessed: 4/9/2011 
Morrison and Foerster, ‘Insider trading annual report’ (2012) 16 
<http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130116-Insider-Trading-
Annual-Review.pdf> Accessed: 1/5/2013 
Muasher M, ‘A decade of struggling reform efforts in Jordan -The resilience of 
the rentier system’ (May 2011) Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 1 
<http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Jordan_reform.pdf> Accessed: 
15/1/2013 
Nazzal M, ‘Economic reform in Jordan: An analysis of structural adjustment and 
qualified industrial zones’ (2005) The Law and Development Organization 
<http://www.lawdevelopment.org/articles/jordan.html> Accessed: 
27/2/2013 
Olson J, ‘European Court tightens disclosure rules’ (Aug 2012) Harvard Law 
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Rules 
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/08/01/european-court-tightens-
disclosure-rules/> Accessed: 11/12/2012 
271 
Peters A and Moore P, ‘Beyond boom and bust: Eternal rents, durable 
authorization, and institutional adaptation Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’ 
(2009) 44 Studies in Comparative International Development 256 
<http://www.mcgill.ca/files/icames/Boom_Bust-2.pdf> Accessed: 
12/2/2013 
Ramachandran S, ‘Jordan: Economic development in the 1990s and World Bank 
assistance’ (2004) The WB Operations Evaluation Department (OED) 
<http://oced.org/countries/jordan/36488608.pdf> Accessed: 3/3/2013 
Rob M, ‘The flaw at the heart of Europe’s insider dealing’, (2003) 34 Euromoney 
34 <http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1002679/The-flaw-at-the-heart-of-
Europes-insider-dealing-laws.html> Accessed: 1/10/2010 
Shambayati H, ‘The rentier state, interest groups, and the paradox of autonomy: 
State and business in Turkey and Iran’ (1994) 26 Comparative Policies 307 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/422114> Accessed: 1/3/2013 
Steffens K, ‘Recommendations for improving the compliance of the Jordanian 
financial firms’ (17 Jun 2008) USAID Jordan Economic Development 
Program (SABEQ) <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADBM843.pdf> 
Accessed: 1/9/2011 
Taylor M, ‘Twin peaks: A regulatory structure for the new century’ (1995) Centre 
for the Study of Financial Innovation <http://hdl.habdle.net/10068/572554> 
Accessed: 13/11/2012 
Taylor M, ‘Twin Peaks’ (Sep 2009) Financial World 
<http://fwarchive.ifslearning.ac.uk/financial_world_/Archive/2009/2009_09
sep/Features/Michael%20Taylor/17268.cfm> Accessed: 7/10/2012 
Thomson G, ‘Responsibilities and neo-liberalism’ (Jul 2007) Open Democracy 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/responsibility_and_neo_liberalism> 
Accessed: 24/4/2013 
Tomasic R, ‘Beyond ‘light touch’ regulation of British banks after the financial 
crisis’ (2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561617> Accessed 15/3/2011 
272 
Welch J, Pannier M, Barrachino E, Brend J and Leoboer PH, ‘Implementation of 
EU directives (I)-Insider dealing and market abuse’ (Dec 2005) British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law at: 
<http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3950D4A4-5792-412C-
BA89-1B30827/0/BC_RS_eudirective_1205_FR.pdf> Accessed: 4/1/2011 
E. Working Papers 
Adugo B I, ‘The new European Union and United Kingdom regime for regulating 
of market abuse’ (2009) University of Manchester WP Series 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1324678 Accessed: 
11/12/2009 
Alexander K, ‘Insider dealing and the market abuse: the Financial Services Act 
2000’ (Dec 2001) WP no.222, ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge <http://www.cbr.com.ac.uk/pdf/WP222.pdf> 
Accessed: 1/12/2010 
Armour J, Deakin S, Lele P, Seims M, ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence 
from a cross-country comparison of shareholders, creditors and work 
protection’ (2009) European Corporate Governance Institute Law WP 
No.129/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008> Accessed: 29/6/2013 
Berkowtiz D, Pistor K and Richard J, ‘Economic development, legality and the 
transplant effect’ (2000) CID WP No.39 
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/039.pdf> Accessed: 7/7/2013 
Billmeier A and Massa I, ‘What drives stock market development in the Middle 
East and Central Asia- Institutions, remittances, or national resources?’(Jul 
2007) IMF WP 07/157 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07157.pdf> Accessed: 
1/2/2013 
Carvajal A and Elliot J, ‘The challenges of enforcement in securities markets: 
Mission impossible’ (2009) IMF Working Paper WP/09/168 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09168.pdf> Accessed: 
1/5/2013 
273 
Carvajal A & Elliott J, ‘Strength and weaknesses in securities markets regulation: 
A global analysis’ (2007) IMF WP/07/259, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07259.pdf> Accessed: 
24/9/2011 
Djankov S, McLiesh C and Shleifer A, ‘Private credit in 129 countries’ (2005) 
NBER WP No.11078 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11078> Accessed: 
8/7/2013 
Eberle E, ‘Comparative law’ (2007) Roger Williams University School of Law 
Research Paper No.52 <http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1019051> Accessed: 
1/5/2013 
Friedman F and Grose C, ‘Promoting access to primary equity markets: A legal 
and regulatory approach’ (May 2006) WB WPS 3892 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/3892.pdf?expires=1329
075935&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F561B44550050FA0698E8F4
E3A8E4B4C> Accessed: 12/12/2011 
Jaradat H, ‘Jordan economy crisis, challenges and measures’ (2010) Paper 
presented in the 3rd Annual Meeting of the Middle East and North Africa 
Senior Budget Officials (MENA-SOB), Dubai UAE at: 
<http://oecd.org/gov/budgeting/46382448.pdf> Accessed: 1/2/2012 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane F and Shleifer A, ‘What works in securities law?’ 
(2003) Harvard University WP Series 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=51246> 
Accessed: 17/11/2009 
Levine R and Zervos S, ‘Stock markets, banks and economic growth’ (1996) WB 
WP No.1690 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/contenet/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-
1690> Accessed: 1/7/2013 
LIewellyn D, ‘Institutional structure of financial regulation and supervision: the 
basic issues’ (2006) A paper presented at the WB Seminar, Washington DC 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF6/Resources/2057292-
1162909660809/F2FlemmingLIewellyn.pdf Accessed: 5/10/2012 
274 
Middle East and North Africa corporate governance workshop, ‘Corporate 
governance in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan (countries of the 
MENA region’ (Oct 2003) 20 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/MENA_Sep_03_CG
_in_in_MENA_countries/FILE/MENA_Sep_03_MENA_CG_report.pdf> 
Accessed: 20/7/2011 
Mwenda K & Fleming A, ‘International developments in the organizational 
structure of financial services’ (2001) A paper presented at a seminar hosted 
by the WB Financial Sector Vice-Presidency, Washington DC 
<http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/abdff2b83e74f852567d1001a8b
a/29e7611f0e618a528525689e006b1e16/$FILE/International%20developm
ents%20in%20the%20organizational%20structure%20of%20financial%20s
ervices%20supervision.pdf> Accessed: 10/11/2012 
Saadi-Sedik T and Petri M, ‘The Jordanian stock market: Should you invest in it 
for risk diversification or performance’ (Aug 2006) IMF WP/06/187 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=926242> Accessed: 
1/2/2010 
Saif I, ‘The process of economic reform in Jordan 1990-2005’ (2007) Go-
EuroMed WP 0709, The Political Economy of Governance in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership <http://www.go-euromed.org/> Accessed: 
14/2/2013 
Siems M, ‘The EU Market Abuse Directive: a case-based analysis’ (2007) 
University of East Anglia (UEA), Norwich Law School WP Series 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1066603> Accessed: 
11/12/2009 
Stout L, ‘Stock prices and social wealth’ (2000) Harvard Discussion Paper 
No.301 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/onli_center/papers/pdf/301.pdf> 
Accessed: 11/1/2010 
F. Webpages 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) <http://www.ase.com.jo> Accessed: 1/4/2013 
275 
HM Treasury website: <http://hm-
treasury.gov.uk/fin_stability_reform_structure.htm> Accessed: 12/12/2012 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
<http://www.iosco.org/about> Accessed: 18/11/2009 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) <http://www.jsc.gov.jo/public/mainenglish> 
Accessed: 11/2/2013 
London Stock Exchange <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/main-market/main/market.htm> Accessed: 1/9/2013 
US Securities and Exchange Commission <http://www.SEC.gov/regulatios> 
Accessed: 1/10/2009 
G. Online Database 
Association of General Council and Company Securities of FTSE 100 Guidelines 
for establishing procedures, systems and controls to ensure compliance with 
the Listing (May 2007) updated Jan 2008 
<http://Idportal.precticallaw.com/jsp/binaryContent.jsp?item=40571392> 
Accessed: 9/11/2010 
CESR Market Abuse Directive, ‘Level three- second set of guidance and 
information on the common operation of the Directive of the Market’ (July 
2007) CESR/06-562b <http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=4683> 
Accessed: 8/11/2010 
IOSCO, ‘Guidelines to emerging market regulators regarding requirements for 
minimum entry and continues risk based supervision of market 
intermediaries’ (Sep 2009) 
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/Reports/IOSCO%20Risk%20Based%20Supervisi
on.pdf> Accessed: 3/5/2013 
MENA-OECD Investment Program, ‘Jordan national investment reform agenda’ 
(19 Jun 2006) <http://www.oecd.org/mena/invetment/38148879.pdf> 
Accessed: 11/11/2010 
World Development Movement case study of the markets in the financial 
instruments directive, ‘The Financial Services Authority: Watchdog or 
lapdog’ (Jun 2012) <http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/default/files/FSA-
watchdogorlapdog.pdf> Accessed: 1/8/2012 
276 
Vision Institute for Civil Society and Good Governance Study (VICSS), National 
Conference on Civil Society, Parliament, and Provisional Laws, 4 Jun 2012 
At: <http://www.vicss.org.jo/GUI/News/ViewNews.aspx?gid=25> 
Accessed: 26/4/2013 
H. Reports 
BoE Report on the collapse of Barings Bank, (18 Jul 1995) 
<http://www.numa.com/ref/barings/bar00.htm> Accessed: 12/12/2012 
G30, ‘The structure of financial supervision-Approaches and challenges in global 
market place’ (2008) Washington DC 
G-20 Working Group 1, “Enhancing sound regulation and strengthening 
transparency”, Final Report, (25 Mar 2009) 
http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/20_010409.pdf 
Accessed: 1/5/2013 
HC-Treasury Select Committee Reports on Northern Rock Bank, (2007-08) 
<http://www.publication.parliament.uk/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasury/56/5
602.htm> Accessed: 5/11/2010 
IMF: United States Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report No 
10/247, July 2010 
Kulczak Michael, ‘Instructions on trading violations and burden of proof- Final 
report’ (2005) Assessment of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) in collaboration with the USAID Jordan. 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF324.pdf> Accessed: 5/10/2011 
Levine R and Zervos S, ‘Stock markets, banks and economic growth’ (1996) 
World Bank WP No.1690 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/contenet/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-
1690> Accessed: 1/7/2013 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Corporate Governance Workshop, Focus 
group discussion, (Sep 2003) 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/MENA_Sep_03_Foc
us_Group_ExSummary.pdf> Accessed: 18/7/2011 
277 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), ‘NASD market surveillance 
assessment and recommendations-Final report’ (22 Oct 2004) 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADB391.pdf> Accessed: 1/8/2011 
OICU-IOSCO, ‘Insider Trading, How jurisdictions regulate it: Report of the 
Emerging Markets Committee of International Organization of Securities 
Commissions’ (2003) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD145.pdf> Accessed: 
13/11/2009 
Polansky S, Kulczak M and Fitzpatrick L, ‘NASD Market Surveillance 
Assessment and recommendations- Final report’ (22 Oct 2004) <http:// 
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADB391.pdf> Accessed: 5/4/2011 
Saidi N, ‘Corporate governance in MENA countries: improving transparency and 
disclosure’ (2004) at 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b508b10048a7e753ab1fef6060ad591
1/Transparency_and_Disclosure.pdf?MOD=AJPERES> Accessed: 1/3/2010 
Turner Review Report, ‘A regulatory response to the global financial crisis’ 
March 2009 
WB, ‘Report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC), corporate 
governance country assessment, Jordan’ (2004) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/jo_rosc_cg.pdf> Accessed: 11/11/2010 
WB Doing Business Projects and Reports at 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/about-us> Accessed: 1/5/2013 
I. Hansard and Parliamentary reports 
Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown statement to the HC on the Bank of 
England, 20 May 1997 
Criminal Justice Bill, HC Standing Committee B, Fifth Sitting, 10 June 1993 
Criminal Justice Bill, HL Deb 3 Nov 1992, vol.539 
Criminal Justice Bill, HL Deb 19 November 1992, vol.540 
Financial Services and Markets Bill, Bill of 1998-1999, HC Library RP 99/98 (24 
June 1999) 
278 
“Green Paper”: “Review of investor protection-A discussion document”, (1982) 
HMSO, cmnd:9125 
HL Select Committee Report, Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England (London, TSO 1999) (HL 96, 27 July 1999) 
HM Treasury Memorandum to the Joint Committee on Financial Services and 
Markets Bill, 14 May 1999 
HC-Treasury Select Committee Written Evidence, “Memorandum from the 
Tripartite Authorities”, Jan 2008 at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasury/
56/56we05.htm> Accessed: 5/11/2010 
Jenkins Committee Report, London: HMO, 1962 
Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets First Report (29 Apr 1999) 
Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets Bill, Second Report (Jun 
1999) 
Report of The Committee on Company Law, Cmnd 1749, para 89, Chairman 
Jenkins (London: HMSO. 1962) 
Second Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill at HL Deb, 3 Nov 1992, vol.539, ccl 
374-88 
“White Paper”, ’Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A new framework For 
Investor Protection’, Jan 1985, Cmnd.9432 
J. Communications 
Adair Turner Speech, then FSA Chairman, the FSA Banquet at the Mansion 
House, 11 Oct 2012, London 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1011-
at.shtml> Accessed: 12/3/2013 
Callum McCarthy, then FSA Chairman, speech, ‘Principles-based regulation- 
what does it mean for the industry’ at the Financial Council’s Annual 
Conference (2nd) 31 Oct 2006 
Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown Speech to CBI annual conference on 28 
Mon 2005 
279 
Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown, Mansion House speech on 22 Tues 
2006 
Conservative Party Policy Paper, ‘From crisis to confidence-A plan for sound 
banking’ 2009 
FCA, Journey to the FCA, 31 Oct 2012 
FCA, approach to regulation, Jun 2011 
Financial Secretary to the UK Treasury Written Ministerial Statement, “Criminal 
Sanctions Directive on Market Abuse”, 20 Feb 2012, HM Treasury at: 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_fst_200212.pdf> Accessed: 
1/5/2013 
FSA, CP 17, Financial services regulation: enforcing the new regime, Dec 1998, 
s.115 
FSA Discussion Paper (DP14), ‘Review of the listing regime’, 1 Jan 2002 
FSA CP/10, ‘Market abuse Part I: Consultation on Draft Code of Market 
Conduct’, 6th Nov 1998 <http://fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp10pdf> (Accessed: 13 
November 2009) 
FSA CP 04/16, October 2004, “The Listing review and implementation of the 
Prospectus Directive” 
FSA CP 54, 27 July 1998 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp54_news/letter.pdf> 
(Accessed: 13th November 2009) 
FSA Occasional Paper, ‘Measuring market cleanliness’, 23 Mar 2006 
FSA, ‘The FSA risk-assessment framework’, Aug 2006 
FSA, ‘A new regulator for the new millennium’ Jan 2000 
FSA Document, ‘Treating customers fairly- Towards fair outcomes for 
consumers’ Jul 2006 <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/fca/documents/fsa-tcf-
towards.pdf> Accessed: 3/4/2013 
FSA, Market Conduct sourcebook (Specialists topics and frequently asked 
questions), Feedback of CP 124, June 2002 
FSA CP 59, ‘Market abuse: A Draft of Code of Market Conduct’, July 2000 
280 
FSA CP 06/04, “Implementation of the Transparency Directive/ Investment 
entities, listing review”, 2006 
FSA CP 05/07, “The Listing review and Prospectus Directive”, April 2005 
FSA CP 09/19 (CP 09/19), ‘Enforcement financial penalties’, Jul 2010 
FSA CP 10/11, ‘Implementing aspects of the Financial Services Act 2010’, Apr 
2010 
FSA and HM Treasury joint CP, “UK implementation of EU Market Abuse 
Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC)”, 2004 
FSA, Market Watch, Issue 10, May 2007, para.2, 3 
<http://fsa.gov.uk/pubs/newsletters/mw_newsletter20.pdf> Accessed: 
21/3/2011 
FSA’s approach to intensive supervision (2010) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speaches/2010/518_
ip.shtml> Accessed: 1/11/2010 
George Osborne speech at Mansion House, 16 Jun 2010 <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_12_10.htm> Accessed: 10/9/2010 
Hector Sants, then Chief Executive of the FSA, ‘Delivering intensive supervision 
and credible’ 12 Mar 2009 
Hector Sants Speech, then FSA Chief Executive, at FSA Annual Public Meeting, 
24 Jun 2010 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speaches/2010/0624
> Accessed: 1/11/2010 
HM Treasury, ‘Financial Services and Markets Bill: A Consultation Document, 
part 1: Overview of financial regulatory reform’ (Jul 1998) 
HM Treasury and FSA Joint Consultation Document, ‘UK implementation of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive (Directive 2003/6/EC)’ (Jun 2004) 
H M Treasury, Feedback Statement Following June 2004 Consultation on UK 
Implementation of EU Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC) 
HM Treasury, Regulatory Impact Assessment, Feb 2005 
281 
HM Treasury, Market Abuse Directive Transposition Note (2005) 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/MAD_tn240205.pdf> Accessed: 
8/4/2011 
HM Treasury, ‘FSMA market abuse regime: A review of the sunset clause’-
Consultation, Feb 2008 
HM Treasury Paper, ‘A new approach to financial regulation, judgements, focus 
and stability’ Jul 2010 
H M Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial regulation’ Feb 2011 
Howard Davis, then FSA Chairman and Executive, ‘Building the Financial 
Services Authority: What’s new’ 11 Mar 1999 Travers Lecture of London 
Guildhall University 
Kari Hale speech, then FSA former Director of Finance, Strategy and Risk, ‘Risk-
based compliance for financial services’ 25 Nov 2004 
King Abdullah, the King of Jordan, speech to the World Economic Forum, Davos 
2000 
List! Issue No.9 (Newsletter), ‘Dealing with inside information, Advice on good 
practice’ (Jun 2005) UKLA Publications. 
<http://www.fas.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/list_jun2005.pdf> accessed: 4/11/2010 
List! Issue No.22, August 2009 at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ukla/list_aug09.pdf> 
accessed: 7/11/2010 
List! Issue No.16, (July 2007) UKLA Publications 
Margaret Cole speech, then FSA Director of Enforcement, at the London School 
of Economics, ‘Insider Dealing in the City’ 17 Mar 2007 at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0317
_mc.shtml> (Accessed: 1/6/2013) 
Margaret Cole speech, then FSA Director of Enforcement and Financial Crime, 
FSA Enforcement Conference, 22 June 2010 at 
<http://fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Events/pdf/enforcement.pdf> Accessed: 
17/11/2010 
Margaret Cole speech, then FSA Director of Enforcement, ‘How enforcement 
makes difference’, at FSA Enforcement Law Conference, 18 June 2008 
282 
Martin Wheatley, the Chief Executive Designated of the FCA, at ‘Journey to the 
FCA’ (Oct 2012) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/fca> Accessed: 28/11/2012 
Monterio el al, ‘updated measurement of the market cleanliness’, FSA Occasional 
Paper No.25, Mar 2007 
Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, speech, ‘Common sense culture, not 
compensation culture’, The Institute of Public Policy Research, 26 May 
2005 
Tracey McDermott speech, then FSA Director of Enforcement and Financial 
Crime Division, APCIMS Conference, ‘Combating financial crime: Key 
themes and priorities for 2013’, 15 Nov 2012 at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/1115-
tm.shtml> Accessed; 1/5/2013 
K. Press releases and Newspapers 
Atlantic, Goldberg J, ‘Monarch in the Middle’, Apr 2013 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-
middle/309270/> Accessed: 15/4/2013 
EC Press Release, ‘Getting tough on insider dealing and market manipulation’, 
20/10/2011 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
1217_en.htm?locale=en> Accessed: 1/4/2012 
Financial Times, ‘FCA promises a lighter regulatory touch’, 21 Mar 2013 
Financial Times, ‘Insider dealing: A bigger bite’, 12 May 2010 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bbc0ee56-5dfa-11df-8153-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2Rqfy7ghu> Accessed: 25/12/2011 
Guardian, ‘Financial Conduct Authority Chief says increasing fines will not 
change culture”, 21 Mar 2013 
Jordan Times reports on the ASE crisis in 2008, 10
th
 of Nov at 
<http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=11992> (Accessed: 4
th
 
November 2009) and on the 17
th
 of Nov at 
<http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=12162> Accessed: 4 Nov 
2009 
283 
Jordan Times, ‘Capital market institutions lack professionals’, 6 Feb 2012 at: 
<http://jordantimes.com/capital-market-institutions-lack-professionals> 
Accessed: 2/1/2013 
Jordan Times, ‘US recommends Jordan’s political, economic reform’, 19 Apr 
2013 <http://jordantimes.com/articles/us-commends-jordans-political-
economic-reform> Accessed: 19/4/2013 
London Evening Stand, Anthony Hilton, ‘Lighter touch on regulation all-round 
support’ 2 Dec 2005 <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard-
home/columnistarchive/Anthony%20Hilton-columnist-182-
archive.do?offset=44> Accessed: 11/112011 
The Independent, ‘Friendlier, but watchdog will still have teeth’, 21 Mar 2013 
The Times, Donovan J, ‘High time to hit the City cheats very hard’ 7 July 2009 
<http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2009/07/07/high-time-to-hit-the-city-cheats-
very-hard/> Accessed: 2/5/2013 
Thomson Reuters News and insight, Frankel A, ‘Arab Bank gambles on – and 
loses – bid to undo crippling sanctions’ 18 Jan 2013 
<http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/01_-
_January/Arab_Bank_gambles_on_–_and_loses_–
_bid_to_undo_crippling_sanctions/> Accessed: 14/2/2013 
Wall Street Journal, Rubenfeld S, ‘Jordan intervenes In Arab Bank terror finance 
lawsuits filed in New York’ 3 Dec 2010 <http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2010/12/03/jordan-intervenes-in-arab-bank-terror-finance-lawsuits-
filed-in-new-york/> Accessed: 5/1/2011 
FSA PR, ‘Arrests made in major FSA insider dealing investigation’, 
FSA/PN/082/2008, 29 Jul 2008 
FSA PR, ‘Ex-hedge fund trader sentenced for insider dealing’, FSA/PN/104/2010, 
22 June 2010 
FSA PR, ‘Former Cazenove partner found guilty of insider dealing’, 
FSA/PN/041/2010, 10 March 2010 
FSA PR, ‘Insider dealers ordered to pay 1.5 million in confiscation’, 20 Aug 2012 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/082.shtml> 
Accessed 1/5/2013 
284 
FSA PR, ‘FSA publishing conclusions on M&A inside information review’, 
FSA/PN/080/2007, 2 July 2007 
FSA PR, ‘Tribunal upholds FSA decision to ban and fine hedge fund CEO and 
CFO 2.1 m for deceiving investors and market abuse’, FSA/PN/071/2011, 
15 Aug 2011 
FSA PR, “Two arrested in FSA insider dealing investigations’, 
FSA/PN/045/2009, 31 Mar 2009 
FSA PR, ‘Six sentenced for insider dealing”, 27 Jul 2012 at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/080.shtml> 
Accessed: 1/5/2013 
IMF PR ‘IMF mission reaches staff-level agreement on the completion of the first 
review under the stand-by agreement with Jordan’ PR No 13/70, March 
2013 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr1370.htm> Accessed: 
5/4/2013 
